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ABSTRACT
This article is an attempt to understand the development of law,
more particularly the civil law, in a country under constant changes,
addressing history, sociology, economics, political science, languages, literature, arts, and, most importantly, civil law itself.
The country’s history starts from the foundation of the Hungarian state in the 11th century, in the middle of Europe, trying to be
independent between strong Western kingdoms and the Byzantine
Empire, and creating legal rules based on Christian values. This
aim was pursued under the domination of different empires: Tatar,
Turk, Austrian, Russian, and German.
Political history helps understand the slow economic and social
development, the special importance of public (constitutional) law,
the importance of cultural development. Over the centuries, the development of civil law was connected with legal development in
other countries of Europe, yet without a formal “reception” of Roman law. Attempts were made to codify civil law on basis of the
classical civil codes but for different (mainly political) reasons without success. Consequently, although special important laws were
enacted, Hungary had no written Constitution until 1949 and no
Civil Code until 1959. Hungarian civil law was to a great extent
∗ Professor emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest. This article is
based on the 41st John H. Tucker, jr. Lecture in Civil Law that was delivered on
November 8, 2018 at the Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
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judge-made law, with published decisions of the Supreme Court (the
Curia) since the early 19th century, having binding force under conditions specified by Acts of Parliament.
After World War II a politically controlled and centrally directed planned economic system prevailed. Nevertheless, the Civil
Code of 1959 reflected the previous Hungarian civil law. As a result
of a slow political détente, the importance of comparative law kept
growing and civil law could develop, to contribute to the profound
changes in the political framework leading to a new political system
in 1990. Since that time, the Hungarian civil law developed within
the framework of European harmonization and Hungary became a
member of the European Union in 2004. The Civil Code of 2013 was
drafted in this context.
Keywords: Hungarian civil law, change of legal system, comparative law and changes of law, history of Hungarian legal system, reception of Roman law, codification of the civil law, court practice
Changes dominate our everyday life. Generations are classified
in accordance with the date of birth in relation to their capability of
adaptation to change. Important changes are present in the field of
law requiring revision of basic legal phenomena as well. Changes of
basic elements of law are not topics of legal history only 1 but are
parts of everyday legal experience (some examples are given in the
last part of this paper). There were spectacular changes in countries
belonging to the former Soviet bloc, particularly in 1989 and 1990,
when political, economic, social, and legal systems collapsed, and
very different systems were established in a very short period of
time. Several scholars visited these countries to examine (to some
extent, as in a laboratory) the special events. It was clear that the
changes taking place in the different countries concerned could not
be understood without examining the international connections. It
1. Paul Mitchell has emphasized in his inaugural lecture at the Faculty of
Laws, University College London, that the change of law is too important to be
left to historians as law is in constant change. See Paul Mitchell, Patterns of Legal
Change, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 177 (2012).

2019]

THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

219

was obvious also that the changes taking place in the different countries were determined by the political, economic, social bases and
history of the countries concerned. Changes of political, economic,
and social systems were not unknown of, but the circumstances were
very different: in 1945 the German state collapsed, albeit in very
different circumstances (and the changes were not directed by the
new German state under control of the allied powers). 2
The present paper outlines system transformation in Hungary. In
the 20th and 21st centuries, a crucial question of the economic, social, and legal system was the role of the state. It concerned the basic
infrastructure of the modern society. Recently, there have been considerable changes in the role of the state in different countries, which
have resulted in important changes in legal regulation. 3 Although
the main topic is transformation of the legal system, this article will
be focused on some of the main institutions, namely persons, property, contracts, and successions, i.e., basic institutions of the civil
law according to continental European legal understanding.
The transformation of the main rules of the above institutions in
Hungary is dealt with not only in their connections with politics,
economy, and society, but also having in mind some basic aims of
comparative law. This approach entails that law is considered as part
of culture, 4 serving both practical and scientific interests, 5 asking
what functions different legal institutions have in different
countries, 6 taking into consideration the given economic and social

2. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, GESCHICHTE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS IN
DEUTSCHLAND IV 32-37 (Beck 1999).
3. John Bell, Administrative Law in a Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE LAW, A HANDBOOK 293-294 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., Hart
2007).
4. FRANZ VON HOLTZENDORFF, ENCYKLOPÄDIE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
14-15 (Josef Kohler ed., Duncker und Humblot 1904).
5. ÉDOUARD LAMBERT, ÉTUDES DE DROIT COMMUN OU DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ, INTRODUCTION I. 915-916 (Giard et Briêre 1903).
6. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 44-45 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1998).
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conditions 7 and the kind of people concerned who dominate the
legal system. 8 Some kind of comparison is present at every step in
the meaning formulated by René David: stepping up the level of
studying rules of a foreign law in order to understand phenomena. 9
The basis of this article is the concept outlined by outstanding
French historian Fernand Braudel: the present is the outcome of experiences from much longer ago. Recent and remote history is the
key for understanding the present and problems of every kind: political, social, economic, cultural phenomena. 10 Accordingly, it
seems that the complicated overall transformation of the political,
economic, social, legal system can be understood taking into account the historical and international background. This article covers four periods of changes:
− the foundation of the Hungarian state,
− the second part of the 19th century and the early 20th century,
− the years after World War II,
− the period since 1989.
In each period a historical overview is given as background information. It is followed by a short characterization of some important legal institutions of the period. The third part outlines
changes in some institutions of civil law in the given period.
I. FOUNDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN STATE
The first transformation of law summarized in this part starts in
the period of the foundation of the Hungarian state. It took several
centuries and can be characterized briefly as a centrally directed,
very slow process which was uneasily accepted by the society, but
7. PIERRE ARMINJON, BORIS NOLDE & MARTIN WOLFF, TRAITÉ DE DROIT
COMPARÉ 38 (LGDJ 1950).
8. Max Rheinstein, Legal Systems, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 208 (David L. Sills ed., Macmillan 1968).
9. RENÉ DAVID, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ (LGDJ
1950).
10. FERNAND BRAUDEL, A HISTORY OF CIVILISATION XXXVI-XXXVII
(Richard Mayne trans., Penguin 1993).
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the change was a necessity under the prevailing conditions at the
time.
The Hungarian state is in the Carpathian Basin. This part of Europe was strategically important already during the period of the Roman Empire. Roman troops invaded a great part of the territory up
to the Danube River in the first century A.D. The river could serve
as defense for the Empire against tribes coming from Asia and at the
same time as possibility to transport goods to the Black Sea.
The Hungarian tribes invaded the territory several centuries after
the fall of the Roman Empire, probably in the 10th century A.D.
They were breeding animals, but farming was also familiar to
them. 11 For some years they tried to move further, and several
groups attacked villages and cities in Western Europe, but they suffered serious defeats in the middle of the 10th century. They had a
similar experience moving eastwards and facing the strong Byzantine Empire. They realized that they had no possibility of moving
forward to find new territories where they could get animals; they
had to settle down and to start agricultural production, farming in
the Carpathian Basin. 12
The change from nomad to sedentary tribes took place during a
long period starting most likely in the 10th century. The economic
change was closely connected with political and social transformation. Nomadic life presupposed different economic, social, and
political conditions, and the change required a rather period, starting
in the 10th and 11th centuries. 13 The transformation was not quiet;
often, clashes broke out.
The process of changes was not isolated from other parts of Europe. In the neighboring Western part of Europe, in the Austrian and
Bavarian lands, power struggle was going on in the 10th and early
11th centuries; this resulted in a strengthened position of the Bavarian king. The Hungarian leader, understanding the power relations
11. ISTVÁN FODOR, VERECKE HÍRES ÚTJÁN… 241-246 (Gondolat 1975).
12. IGNÁC ROMSICS, MAGYARORSZÁG TÖRTÉNETE 36-37 (Kossuth 2017).
13. KORNÉL BAKAY, A MAGYAR ÁLLAMALAPÍTÁS 22-35 (Gondolat 1978).
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in the country and in the neighboring countries, established relations with the Bavarian ruler. As a result of the agreement, his
son married the sister of the Bavarian prince, was baptized a Catholic and got the name of Stephen. He became the first Hungarian
king and had a great role in changing the religion of the Hungarian people to Christianity.
Converting to Christianity was important from the European
political point of view and it was of great importance for the future of Hungary. In territories to the east of Hungary, the Byzantine religion and influence gained ground and so the Hungarian
eastern frontier became borderland of the Christian part of Europe. 14 The difference was essential, partly because religion had
a great importance in medieval times. Religion also impacted political life, and even the structure of the state. In the Eastern European (Byzantine) structures, the Church was subordinate to the
power of princes and absolute central power prevailed. 15 In Hungary, a different system was established. The first Hungarian
king, called later Saint Stephen, was crowned approximately in
1000 by the pope, who was not politically strong at that time. In
addition, according to the prevailing view of the Catholic Church
of that time, the authority of the pope and the power of the king
were complementary in nature. 16
Stephen did not become vassal of anyone, and he obtained the
right to invest bishops and establish bishoprics. He invited several
priests from Western European countries and established several
bishoprics all over the country, which later on played an important role in the transformation of the political and economic
system and in the education of the people. 17
14. ANDREAS KRAUS, GESCHICHTE BAYERNS 63-64 (Beck 1988).
15. Jenő Szűcs, The Three Historical Regions of Europe, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 33 (Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., Dartmouth 1996) [hereinafter EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES].
16. PÉTER ERDŐ, JOG AZ EGYHÁZ HAGYOMÁNYÁBAN ÉS ÉLETÉBEN 55-56
(Szent István 2016).
17. BAKAY, supra note 13, at 22-35, 142-152.
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According to historians, the difference between the development in Western Europe (establishing the feudal system) and
that in latecomers such as Hungary was in close connection with
the period of change. In Western Europe, the social transformation was slow, organic, taking nearly 500 years. On the contrary, the change in Hungary was relatively rapid and the reorganization was the consequence of more central intervention
“from above.” 18
Some elements of the legal system can be found in the Acts
of King St. Stephen. The Acts reflect the central position of the
king: the ownership of the crown and the property granted to
anyone by the ruler shall be protected. 19 The owner of the property has the right of disposal and his disposition shall be respected after his death, too. 20 These were new elements in comparison with the former system of nomad tribes.
The close connection between property law, family law, and
law of succession was reflected by the rule according to which
upon decease of the husband, the widow was entitled to possess
and use all property until she died, or she married again. Upon
the death of the widow, all property fell back to the king unless
there were relatives of the deceased husband. 21 The rule was a
clear indication of the property structure, of the woman’s legal
position in the family and of the inheritance system. The role of
the family and the crown remained of decisive importance until
the late 19th century. 22
18. Szűcs, supra note 15, at 34.
19. Laws of King Stephen I, ch. VI (Hung.), reproduced in 1 THE LAWS OF
THE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM OF HUNGARY (János M. Bak, György Bónis & James
Ross Sweeney ed./trans., Charles Schlacks 1989).
20. Laws of King Stephen I, ch. V (Hung.), reproduced in 1 THE LAWS OF
THE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM OF HUNGARY (János M. Bak, György Bónis & James
Ross Sweeney ed./trans., Charles Schlacks 1989).
21. Laws of King Stephen I, ch. XXIV (Hung.), reproduced in 1 THE LAWS
OF THE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM OF HUNGARY (János M. Bak, György Bónis & James
Ross Sweeney ed./trans., Charles Schlacks 1989).
22. EMILIA WEISS, A TÚLÉLŐ HÁZASTÁRS ÖRÖKLÉSI JOGÁLLÁSA 86-87
(Akadémiai Kiadó 1984).
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The essential elements of the fundamental change of the political, economic, social, and legal system were established in the
11th century. Nevertheless, it took a long time (centuries) until it
was completed. According to historians, the process of transformation was directed mainly from above (by the central power) in
contrast with the West European development. In addition, the
nobility (having a privileged position) represented a larger proportion of the society than in the West. At the same time, the proportion of free citizens was considerably higher: every 20th or
25th person was a nobleman in Hungary, while only every 100th
person in France. On the other side, every 10th person was a free
citizen in France. In contrast, with Hungary where only every
40th or 50th person was a free citizen at the end of the Middle
Age period. 23 The number of cities and that of their inhabitants
was small in comparison with those of Western European countries. The position of cities, from a public law point of view, was
similar to the general system: it was not based on vassalage but
on taxpayer subordination. 24
In the early 13th century, the king’s position was weakened
and in 1222 the ruler, Andrew II, had to make a compromise with
the noblemen and the clergymen. In the so-called Golden Bull
(similar to Magna Charta of Great Britain of 1215) he promised
to convoke the diet regularly and respect fundamental rights. The
Golden Bull was an essential part of the Hungarian constitutional
system up to the 20th century.
The Hungarian kingdom was strong when it was founded.
Later it became weak because of several reasons (attacks by Tatar
troops, battles of several interest groups). The legal machinery
functioned all the time. The language was Latin. At the beginning
of the medieval period, a considerable part of the country’s lawyers studied abroad, mainly in Paris (those who could not afford
23. Szűcs, supra note 15, at 35.
24. GYÖRGY GRANASZTÓI, A KÖZÉPKORI MAGYAR VÁROS 150-151, 158-159
(Gondolat 1980).
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to go to foreign universities studied while working in chancellery). 25 A legal historian characterized the situation saying that the
country may have been undergoverned, but it was over-judicialized. 26 On commission of the king, a chancery lawyer called Werbőczy, playing an important political role too, collected the statutes
and the abundant customary law. He presented the collection (called
Tripartitum) to the diet, which approved it with the aim of enacting
customary law. The text, however, does not have the royal seal, so
it was never signed into law. Nevertheless, it was published a few
years later and applied as customary law until the 19th century. 27
II. THE COMPROMISE OF 1867
The second period of changes was in the 19th century. The problems faced in the second part of the 19th century, however, were
rooted in medieval times. The transformation of the system was realized partly by central direction, partly as adaptation to changing
conditions.
In the 14th century, the Hungarian kings could strengthen the
central power, and Hungary was one of the richest countries in Europe (e.g., its gold mines produced more than five times as much as
any other European state). 28 According to the available data from
the second period of the 15th century, the king’s yearly revenue corresponded to that of the French or Spanish ruler (leading powers of
that period). 29 A dark period of the Hungarian kingdom started,

25. FERENC ECKHART, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE 37
(Grant Richards 1931); GYÖRGY BÓNIS, A JOGTUDÓ ÉRTELMISÉG A MOHÁCS
ELŐTTI MAGYARORSZÁGON 13 (Akadémiai Kiadó 1971).
26. MARTYN RADY, CUSTOMARY LAW IN HUNGARY 5 (Oxford University
Press 2015).
27. See Péter Bónis, The Tripartitum and the European Ius Commune, with
Special Regard to the Commentators 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 197-210 (2014) for the evaluation of the importance of the Tripartitum.
See also RADY, supra note 26, at 15-20.
28. CARLILE AYLMER MACARTNEY, THE HABSBURG EMPIRE 1790-1918 36
(Macmillan 1969).
29. ROMSICS, supra note 12, at 129.
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however, in the 16th century when a great part of Hungary was occupied by the Turkish army. This period did not simply entail an
occupation, but continuous battles which lasted for 150 years. Most
of the country was devastated and the central territories became
practically empty: the inhabitants left for places outside battlefields
or they were killed. The Turkish army tried to invade even Vienna
more than once, but they did not succeed in capturing the city. At
the end, the Habsburg king managed to agree with several European
powers to create a unified European army which was strong enough
to defeat the Turkish army in 1697. This battle resulted in the liberation of Hungary from the Turkish army.
During the period of the Turkish invasion, the territory of the
Hungarian kingdom was divided into three parts: the middle part
was invaded by the Turkish army, the Western part was ruled by
kings belonging to the Habsburg family, and the Eastern part together with Transylvania (considered to belong to the Hungarian
kingdom) was independent (nevertheless paying taxes to the Turkish ruler in exchange for not attacking). The Habsburg king was at
the same time king of other countries (Austria, Czech kingdom), but
all these countries were governed separately. The Hungarian state
organs functioned according to Hungarian legal rules. However,
there were central organs directing the whole empire with no participation of the different countries, e.g., in diplomatic or military questions. In Hungary, the local administration was exercised by Hungarian organs, where the Hungarian noblemen had a decisive role. 30
The Hungarian state functioned in accordance with the system established by Stephen and his successors.
After the end of the Turkish invasion, the country needed reconstruction, but the king’s policy had other objectives. There were serious tensions between the king and the country. At the beginning of
the 18th century a revolution broke out and lasted for several years
with some assistance of different countries (mainly that of France
30. Id. at 187-188.
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being in war with Austria). Lacking the necessary resources, the
revolutionary army surrendered to the king’s army in 1711. A few
years later, however, the king had serious problems as he had no
son and his daughter’s (Maria Theresia) right of succession was
denied by several European rulers pretending their own right of
succession. The king made a compromise with the Hungarian
diet. The diet recognized the rights of the king’s female successor, and the king recognized Hungary’s constitutional order and
system of public administration. 31
There was a peaceful period during the reign of Maria Theresia (who was supported by the Hungarian noblemen in her rightof-succession struggle) but after her death, the political struggle
started again. King Joseph II was not even crowned as he did not
want to accept the independent Hungarian legal system. The Parliament was not convened; the king ruled by means of decrees.
Before his death, the king withdrew the decrees. Although the
political tensions between his successor and the country had not
ceased to exist, a compromise was achieved. In 1790, it was proclaimed that the new king promised under oath to respect the
Hungarian legal order. That was already the period of the French
Revolution. The French Revolution influenced Hungarian intellectuals too (some of them were executed or imprisoned), but
there were no social or economic effects.
In the 18th century, Hungary was underpopulated, with a ruined agricultural economy. On the contrary, in the developed
Western part of Europe, the first industrial revolution was going
on. There was a fundamental change in production, the population
was growing, urbanization developed, and social relations were
changing. 32 The revolutionary ideas and later on the Napoleonic
wars had a great effect in other European countries, too, particularly
31. Acts I, II, and III of 1723 (Hung.).
32. W. A. Cole & Phyllis Deane, The Growth of National Incomes, in THE
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE VI 4-11 (H. J. Habakkuk & M.
Postan eds., Cambridge U. Press 1966).
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in the German states. In Hungary the economy developed very
slowly. Means of production in agriculture had not developed (the
abolishment of serfdom took place only in the middle of the 19th
century), 33 the industry was underdeveloped, and the lack of capital
was a crucial problem of the economy as a whole.
In 1848, revolutions started in several European countries, including Austria, but they were put to an end soon. In March 1848, a
revolution started in Hungary, too. Social, economic, and political
tensions led to a national revolution against the ruler. 34 The ruler,
Ferdinand, abdicated in December 1848 and the new Habsburg king,
Franz Joseph, asked for the help of the Russian czar, who immediately sent his troops to Hungary. In October 1849, the Hungarian
army had to surrender to the Russian army, which was in overwhelming majority. The young new king promulgated a new constitution based on the idea of a unified legal position of all countries
under his rule. 35 For Hungary, the consequence was the loss of independence, the end of the Hungarian legal system, including parliament, courts, and local administration.
In a few years, however, the emperor had to face serious difficulties. The Austrian army lost battles in multiple European wars.
The consequences of the war lost against Prussia in 1866 were particularly hard. Austria had to consent to the formation of Germany,
from which Austria was excluded, and there were also financial
problems. These events had serious consequences in Austrian domestic policy, too. The emperor had to recognize that Austria was
no longer a German state, but a state with several nationalities, and
the best solution seemed to be to make a compromise with the Hungarians. 36
33. Act IX of 1848 (Hung.).
34. GÉZA VÁRADY, EZERNYOLCSZÁZNEGYVENNYOLC, TE CSILLAG 28-36
(Gondolat 1976).
35. HEINZ SCHÄFFER, Die Entwicklung der Grundrechte, in HANDBUCH DER
GRUNDRECHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA VII/1 15-16 (Detlef Merten, HansJürgen Papier & Heinz Schäfer eds., Müller & Manz 2009).
36. MACARTNEY, supra note 28, at 543-546.
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In the second part of the 19th century a great transformation occurred in Europe: national states were created. The Habsburg emperor had to take into consideration that the conditions for creating
a nation state were developed in Hungary, while in the case of other
nationalities of the empire they were achieved sometime later. 37 After long negotiations, a compromise was made. An act was passed
establishing that the king had promised under oath to respect the
laws of Hungary, recognizing the constitutional and administrative
independence of the country, and that the relationship of Hungary
with other countries governed by the king would be the same as it
had been determined in the Acts of 1723. 38 The Hungarian parliament recognized at the same time that foreign and military matters
concerning all countries of the king would be decided and administered in common. 39
The compromise of 1867 opened for Hungary a new period of
development. The country regained independence and fast development started. In the second part of the 19th century, the social and
economic changes were important in Western European countries
and it had an effect on other countries, too. In Hungary, all sectors
of the economy achieved fast development; Austrian and German
capital investment had a great role. 40 The state supported by different means the development of the economy; urbanization, industrialization, railway systems, and education developed. 41 Although the
development was important, the economy and society of Hungary
could not achieve the level of the developed countries of Europe. 42
37. Gábor Gyáni, Modernität, Modernismus und Identitätskrise, in
KULTURTRANSFER UND KULTURELLE IDENTITÄT 11, 17 (K. Csúri, Z Fónagy & V.
Munz eds., Praesens 2008).
38. Act II of 1867 (Hung.).
39. Act XII of 1867 (Hung.).
40. ANDRÁS GERGELY & ZOLTÁN SZÁSZ, KIEGYEZÉS UTÁN 220-224 (Gondolat 1982).
41. GYÖRGY KÖVÉR, IPAROSODÁS AGRÁRORSZÁGBAN 26-35 (Gondolat
1982); MACARTNEY, supra note 28, at 703-705.
42. At the beginning of the 20th century the great majority of the population
worked in the agriculture; see PÉTER HANÁK, MAGYARORSZÁG A
MONARCHIÁBAN 330 (Gondolat 1975).
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As a result of the fundamental political, economic, and social
changes, the question was what kind of change would take place
in the legal system.
The public law problems were reflected by Act No. I of 1687,
which confirmed the rights promulgated in the Golden Bull
(with the exception of the right of resistance to the king).The
Act promulgated the recognition of the right of the king’s son to
be the next king on condition that prior to the coronation the
future king would have to take oath to maintain all pre-existing
rights and privileges and to recognize the rights promulgated in
the Golden Bull. The reason why the Act was passed was to declare the independence of the country connected only by the personality of the king to other parts of the Habsburg Empire. Consequently, the king was bound to rule the country according to
Hungarian rules and only the Hungarian Diet (Parliament) had
the right to authorize the king to levy troops and to raise taxes. 43
During all of the 18th and 19th centuries, constitutional law issues were in the center of interest. 44 The prevailing concept
(since the early period of the Hungarian state) was the “Saint
Crown,” meaning the unity of the king, the noblemen, and the
territory of the state. Its important element was the limitation of
the king’s power. 45
It was declared that an act could be passed only with the consent of the Parliament; rights and privileges were acknowledged,
and the court system and the independence of the courts were
respected. 46 An important element of the Hungarian legal system
was that decisions of the Supreme Court, the Curia, made since

43. ECKHART, supra note 25, at 144.
44. DOMOKOS KOSÁRY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
HUNGARY 163-164 (Corvina 1987).
45. ENDRE NAGY & LAJOS RÁCZ, MAGYAR ALKOTMÁNY- ÉS KÖZIGAZGATÁSTÖRTÉNET 45-46 (Gábor Máthé ed., HVG Orac 2007); BARNA MEZEY, MAGYAR
ALKOTMÁNYTÖRTÉNET 97-98 (Osiris 2009).
46. Act XII of 1790/91 (Hung.).
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1723, were collected and published in 1800; since that time, decisions have been published regularly. 47
In the 19th century, particularly after 1830, the economy started
developing slowly, but there were many hindrances. The law itself
was mixed in nature: there were a lot of feudal elements, and some
new rules fostered development. In the 19th century (particularly in
the first part of it), something similar was also happening in other
European countries, 48 but feudal elements remained important in
Hungary because of the history of the country.
After the fall of the revolution in 1849 and with the new system
introduced by the king, Hungarian law was abolished, the Hungarian
court system ceased to exist, and the Hungarian system of administration was no longer in operation. Austrian law entered into force,
the administration and the courts were replaced by new organs. Hungary was an administrative unit of the empire. The Austrian Civil
Code became effective in Hungary in 1852. From a different perspective, one had to recognize that in the economic field the new
system had advantages: no more taxes in commercial connections
within the empire, free movement of capital, and construction of
railway lines. Steps were also taken in other fields for modernization
(e.g., in education). In the political field, however, passive resistance
prevailed: the majority of the population was against the political
power.
In spite of the general attitude against the political system imposed on the country, it is fair to recognize that some progress was
made in the field of the law. Feudal elements of the legal system
were eliminated. The ancient rule of limited rights of ownership (ensuring rights to the family and to the crown) was abolished, ensuring
free disposal by the owner (to alienate or to mortgage the property),
which paved the way for loans. The Austrian system of land registry

47. IGNÁCZ FRANK, A KÖZIGASÁG TÖRVÉNYEI MAGYARHONBAN I 73-74
(Magyar Királyi Nyomda 1845).
48. HELMUT COING, II EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 1 (Beck 1989).
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was introduced, and it had an important role in loans and the purchase and sale of land. The Austrian Civil Code entered into force,
replacing Hungarian customary law. The drafting of the Austrian
Civil Code lasted for a long time and during this period many
changes took place. The Code as a whole brought nothing very new,
but during its preparation several smaller new elements cropped
up. 49 The basic ideas of the Austrian civil law were not absolutely
new for Hungarian lawyers, as they were mostly based on Roman
law constructions. In Hungary, no reception of the Roman law took
place as in some other European countries, but Roman law was not
unknown (different constructions prevailed, however, particularly
in property law and in matrimonial law, where canon law was applied). 50
In the early 1860s, the king made some concessions because of
the problems in international relations and it seemed necessary to
ease political tensions within the realm. One of the measures taken
was the reestablishment of the Hungarian judicial system. The question was, however, what kind of law should be applied by the courts.
Up to that point, no agreement had been reached between the king
and Hungary (an overall passive resistance still existed).
By that time profound changes had taken place in social and economic conditions, but they needed confirmation in the political and
legal fields to continue with the changes. The basic question was
whether foreign law should be accepted or if, instead, the old Hungarian rules should be chosen and work out new rules based on those
old rules. The crux was the change of the legal system.

49. Johannes Pichler, Der Kampf um die Kodifikation, in RENAISSANCE DER
IDEE DER KODIFIKATION 18, 22 (Franz Bydlinski, Theo Mayer-Maly & Johannes
Pichler eds., Böhlau 1991).
50. GYÖRGY BÓNIS, KÖZÉPKORI JOGUNK ELEMEI 66-67, 87, 96 (István B.
Kállay ed., Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó 1972); IMRE ZAJTAY, The
Permanence of Roman Law Concepts, in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES, supra
note 15, at 68; GÁBOR HAMZA, ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG DER MODERNEN
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN UND DIE RÖMISCHRECHTLICHE TRADITION 377
(Eötvös Universitätsverlag 2009).
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One hundred years later, Alan Watson published his ideas on
legal transplants. According to him, many legal rules make little impact on individuals and it is important that there be a rule; legal rules
are not peculiarly devised for a particular society and this is not a
matter for great concern. 51 The opposite view was expressed by Otto
Kahn-Freund. He summarized the position saying that not only the
knowledge of the foreign law is required, but also its social and political context. The use of comparative law for practical purposes
becomes an abuse if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores
this context of law. 52
In 1861, a conference of chief justices was convened. The conference had the task to work out proposals concerning the law to be
applied by the courts. The question was partly to modernize the legal
system. From this point of view, the simplest way would have been
to continue to apply the Austrian Civil Code, which was in force at
that time in Hungary too. The opposite position was to stick to the
independence of Hungary and to return—at least provisionally—to
rules of the Hungarian law which reflected in many respects a
heightened level of social and economic development. At that time,
however, the king had not been crowned and no political agreement
had been reached; the country still was passively resisting.
The conference of justices decided to return to the old Hungarian
rules, with some exceptions which seemed inevitable. One of those
exceptions was the regulation of land registration and the rules of
the Austrian Civil Code on that matter. Maintaining these rules in
force until new rules would be enacted seemed inevitable. The conference also prepared rules of procedure, so that the court system
could start working. The conference presented the decisions to the
Parliament. The Parliament and later the king also approved the decisions, but no act was passed because of the constitutional crisis.
51. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 101 (2d ed., Scot. Acad. Press 1974).
52. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 1-27 (1974).
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Thus, the Supreme Court, the Curia, published the decisions to be
applied as interim rules until new rules would be enacted by the Parliament. 53
As a result of the interim rules, a part of the rules on property
and succession was modified, but the rest of the civil law needed
modernization. After the compromise, a very active legislative activity started, and different drafts of a future civil code were prepared. There were different ideas as to the reception of concepts or
rules of other countries, particularly those of the German lawyers
and that of the commercial code of the German states. The debate
about the reception of foreign rules continued. On the one side, the
reception of the rules of developed countries was requested irrespective of any political or other aspects. 54 On the other side, the importance of maintaining traditional positions was emphasized. 55
The development of legislation demonstrated the correctness of
Zimmermann’s statement (made about a different topic) that different parts of the civil law have different features, and so family law
and the law of succession are very dependent on social conditions.
Also, property law and contracts may be different in nature. 56 Thus,
the Commercial Code of 1875 was based to a great extent on the
Commercial Code (of 1861) of the German states. 57 Meanwhile, the
laws on family law, including marriage, (distinguishing canon law
and state law rules) were a reflection of Hungarian political and social relations. Later on, more than one draft of a Civil Code was
prepared and presented to the Parliament, but the bills were not ap-

53. JÁNOS ZLINSZKY, WISSENSCHAFT UND GERICHTSBARKEIT 168-169
(Klostermann 1997).
54. REZSŐ DELL’ADAMI, AZ ANYAGI MAGÁNJOG CODIFIKATIÓJA 318 (Athenaeum 1877).
55. Quoted by MÁRIA HOMOKI NAGY, GESCHICHTE DER ZIVILRECHTLICHEN
KODIFIKATION 488-489 (Gábor Máthé ed., Dialóg Campus 2017).
56. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 19 (Oxford U. Press 1996).
57. ISTVÁN APÁTHI, A MAGYAR KERESKEDELMI TÖRVÉNY TERVEZET 8-9
(Heckenast 1873).

2019]

THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

235

proved by the Parliament because of different political reasons. Although there were several separate acts concerning civil law relations, the Hungarian civil law remained to a great extent judge-made
law until 1959.
III. THE PERIOD OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY
The third period started as necessity, but shortly transformed
into a fast centrally directed, forced series of changes which were
alien to the society and economy. It led to a new period of changes
(discussed in the fourth part of this paper).
The development of the Hungarian society and economy came
to an end when World War I started. The war had disastrous consequences for the country. After the war, the country faced economic
crisis. Germany started World War II in 1939, and Hungary (geographically between Germany and the Soviet Union) entered into
the war in 1941 as an ally of Germany. The preparation for the war
and the war itself hindered the development of the society and the
economy. In March 1944, the country was invaded by German
troops, in September 1944 the Soviet Army entered into the Carpathian Basin, in December 1944 started the battle of Budapest that
lasted until February 13, 1945. The war had disastrous consequences
for the country. Many Jews were killed in concentration camps
(Jewish communities represented 5 per cent of the population, and
after the war that figure declined to 2 per cent), 58 several hundred
thousand people died in battles or were taken to the Soviet Union,
means of communication, railways, bridges, and dwelling houses
were destroyed. Units of the Soviet Army stayed in Hungary even
after the end of the war and left the country only in 1991. The Communist Party seized power in 1948 and created a new political and
economic system.

58. IVÁN T. BEREND, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1944-1993 5 (Cambridge U. Press 1996).
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Before 1948, Hungary had multiple acts containing elements of
the constitutional order, but no single constitutional charter. In 1948
a constitutional act was voted by the parliament of the new political
system. 59 The preamble of the constitution expressed the aim to create a very new political, economic, and social system with the help
of the Soviet Union. A strongly centralized political system was
brought about with no political freedom. As that was the period of
the Cold War, the economy was designed to prepare for the next
war. On basis of central direction, heavy industry was developed,
even if Hungary had no raw material and no energy resources for it.
There were some changes after the death of Stalin in 1953, but a
stricter political control returned soon. In 1956, revolution broke
out, but it was oppressed by the Soviet Army. After a period of
vengeance, concessions were made by the political power and living
conditions became better in Hungary than in most of the other socialist countries. As a result of the détente in international political
relations, Hungarians had the opportunity of having contacts with
the Western world. Step by step, Hungarian lawyers could establish
international scientific relations, mainly by means of comparative
law.
The centrally directed economic system became practically
bankrupt. In the mid-1960s, a so-called economic reform was introduced, but soon came to a halt because of political reasons. The international economic changes, including the oil shock, had serious
consequences for the Hungarian economy. The system could not be
maintained in its original form. Economic and political changes took
place step-by-step, but these had not modified basic elements. Foreign debt and structural problems resulted in the bankruptcy of the
system by the end of 1980s, in close connection with the collapse of
the Soviet bloc.
After World War II, between 1945 and 1948, the first steps taken
by the state aimed at restarting life in the country in ruins. In the
59. Act XX of 1948 (Hung.).
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field of legislation, the first step concerned the constitutional position. It was declared that Hungary is a republic and members of parliament are elected by the people of Hungary. 60
One of the serious problems before the war was the ownership
structure of land. Few owners (among them noble families) possessed a great part of agricultural land, and the number of landless
peasants was high. Social tension was high. The government between the two world wars distributed some land, but that distribution
was of small importance. At the end of World War II, the Communist party forced land reform in all Central and East European
countries. In Hungary, a radical land reform was implemented 61 and
it resulted in typically small estates (140–280 acres), where it was
hardly possible to make any profits on farming. 62
In the first years after 1945, important steps were taken aiming
at social changes. As early as in the period of World War I the role
of women had changed: as men were soldiers and far away from the
family, women became the center of the family and, at the same
time, women were the ones who had to work. The same happened
twenty years after the end of World War I, during World War II. As
a result, the position of women changed profoundly, even in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, a sign of the important change of the position of women in society was the act of
Parliament recognizing the right of women to pursue university
studies with the same rights as men. 63
In connection with the changes during the war period, the concept of family changed all over Europe. As husband and wife were
far from one another and as social control systems did not function
in the same way as in years of peace, the role of the social institution
of marriage lost its former importance. 64 At the same time, property
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
2007).

Act I of 1946 (Hung.).
Act VI of 1945 (Hung.).
BEREND, supra note 58, at 20.
Act XXII of 1946 (Hung.).
HARTMUT KAELBLE, SOZIALGESCHICHTE EUROPAS 28, 36-37 (Beck
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relations had also changed and they were closely connected with
family relations. 65 For example, keeping immovables for the family
was very important in an agrarian society, but this did not have such
importance in an urbanized society with mass production and a different property structure.
In Hungary several acts of Parliament were passed after 1945
concerning problems of family relations. Changes in the society’s
family and property structure were reflected in the modification of
succession rules. As during years of war there were huge numbers
of death cases, inheritance issues had to be solved every day. Furthermore, the succession rule based on the concept of large families
was inacceptable in the middle of the 20th century, particularly under post-war communication possibilities.66 Consequently, the right
to inherit was limited to members of the smaller family. Another
important step was the regulation of the rights of children born out
of wedlock, ensuring them equal rights as other children (the number of these children was important, partly as a result of relations
during war period, partly because of the high number of rapes committed by soldiers of the invading army). 67
The period between 1948 and 1990 was characterized by constant changes in the legal system in accordance with the transformation of the political system. The main feature of the new system
was central direction in all aspects of political, social, and economic
life. At the beginning, it was a strict system, later it was more relaxed
and, at the end, steady erosion was salient. The political process was
only partly reflected by the civil law.
The political aim was to get rid of every element of the former
regime as soon as possible. Ownership relations changed quickly.
State ownership was established by means of a series of legal rules

65. JEAN CARBONNIER, FLEXIBLE DROIT
SANS RIGUEUR 264 (10th ed., LGDJ 2001).
66. Act XVIII of 1946 (Hung.).
67. Act XXIX of 1946 (Hung.).
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on nationalization: property was taken from private owners (including even smaller dwelling houses) promising that some kind of compensation would be afforded, but this only took place after the collapse of the system (i.e., after 1990).
The political aim of abolishing private ownership could not be
achieved, however, in the field of agriculture. Two or three years
after the land reform, when a great part of the population became
owner of land, it was politically not feasible to nationalize land. During the whole period of the political system, land was formally not
taken from peasants, it was not nationalized. Collectivization took
place in the form of creating cooperatives. Peasants were forced to
become members of cooperatives, transmitting their land to cooperatives, but formally keeping the right of ownership. Later on, however, no one could state which piece of land belonged to whomafter the changes of 1990, what should be given back caused serious
problems.
The transformation of agricultural relations was realized not
only by forced creation of agricultural cooperatives, but by other
means, too. Industrialization needed great investment. The national
economy destroyed by the war was unable to finance the investment.
The solution was imposing a great part of the burden on agriculture,
on peasants, by means of taxation. Peasants who could not pay the
taxes were put to prison. With the exception of the old generation,
people fled from villages to cities, where the new industrial enterprises needed workforce. The thousands of newcomers in cities having problems of shortage of flats caused additional problems and
social tensions. The mass movement from villages to cities also contributed to the weakening of family ties and had several other consequences (increase of alcoholism, health problems). One of the
consequences was that family ceased to be the economic unit of society. 68

68. ENDRE NIZSALOVSZKY, A CSALÁD JOGI RENDJÉNEK ALAPJAI 101 (Akadémiai Kiadó 1963).
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Consequences of social changes were reflected by changes in
family law rules: equality of spouses was recognized, common ownership of spouses became the rule, and hard conditions of divorce
were abolished. 69
As a result of the agricultural policy, private ownership on land
was maintained, but with restrictions. Not only ownership of land
could not be abolished, but in general the political situation was not
favorable to terminate private property. Consequently, ownership,
including the right of inheritance was maintained. 70
Companies were nationalized. Private economic activity was restricted and taxed heavily. Contractual relations were regulated in
detail by central state organs. Market relationships between the nationalized enterprises were replaced by plan targets. Rules of the socalled plan contracts changed often. Disputes between state enterprises were no longer decided by courts, but by special state organs. 71
The transformation of the whole body of civil law according to
the requirements of the new political system was not easy, as the
civil law was not codified. It was to a great extent judge-made law.
Decisions of the Supreme Court had a decisive role. Therefore, the
Government asked the Supreme Court to reconsider decisions of
principle and publish the list of decisions which remained applicable. 72 In 1952, a new code of procedure in civil law litigation was
passed by the Parliament. 73 The code limited the parties’ rights in
the procedure and strengthened the role of the court and of the public
prosecutor.
In 1953, the drafting of the Civil Code started. The best professors of civil law participated in the drafting committee and had an
active role. The bill of the code was presented to the Parliament in
69. Act IV of 1952 (Hung.).
70. Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution of 1949 (Hung.).
71. Analysis was given by GYULA EÖRSI, A TERVSZERZŐDÉSEK (Akadémiai
Kiadó 1957).
72. Government decree No. 4338/1949. (XII. 6.) MT rendelet (Hung.).
73. Act III of 1952 (Hung.).
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1959 and it was accepted without any serious debate. 74 The first
Civil Code in Hungarian legal history contained only 685 sections. The reason was that the economy was being constantly reorganized and there were political changes, as well. Important
changes took place in agriculture: forced organization of agricultural cooperatives was coming to an end. The state direction of
the economy was under constant redesign. Under these conditions, the courts had an active interpretation role, and the traditional decisive role of the Supreme Court remained, but in a modified form.
The Civil Code contained rules of political importance concerning the role of the state and the special position of state property. However, in the field of contracts and the law of succession
the main ideas of the civil law of the pre-war period were maintained. Nevertheless, the rules on contracts also reflected the requirements of the planned economy.
It was obvious that the drafters of the code had relied in many
aspects on the draft of the Civil Code of 1928, on the pre-war
court practice, and on legal theory. In contrast with some other
countries of the socialist political bloc, the Hungarian Civil Code
adopted only some elements of the political changes. Due to this
fact, the Code could serve later onwith several amendmentsthe process of returning to the market economy.
In the 1960s the serious structural problems of the system became evident. At the same time, groups within the ruling party
aiming at realizing political reforms gained ground. The political
leadership accepted the concept of reform. In the field of economy, the main idea was to abolish strict detailed central direction
and combine planning with an operative market. It was an important change and it needed serious transformation of the system. Important changes were needed in legal rules, too. The Hungarian reform ideas were in harmony with similar reform concepts
74. Act IV of 1959 (Hung.).
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in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 75 The reform could not be realized,
however, because the political development in Czechoslovakia went
further than it was acceptable in the Soviet Union and in political
hard-liner countries. In autumn, Czechoslovakia was invaded by armies of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the reform was put to
an end. 76 In Hungary, the change was not complete. Some elements
of the reform had been implemented. A special mixed system was
brought about.
Differences in the legal system became even more apparent by
the end of the 1970s and 1980s. At the end of 1970s, the second oil
shock caused problems in the world economy. Different countries
reacted in a rather different way, which mirrored the special nature
of each of the systems of those countries. 77 The Hungarian economy
was near bankruptcy and it was necessary to take steps towards a
market economy, as the centrally-directed plan economy was inefficient. Private activities were permitted in secrecy. In agricultural
cooperatives, peasants were permitted to have a small private economy. The importance of hidden private economy was particularly
great in agriculture already in the 1970s and 1980s. About 38-50%
of agricultural produces, which could be sold to the world market,
was brought about by private units. 78 Furthermore, agricultural cooperatives obtained the right to start with additional, non-agricultural activities (e.g., create units pursuing construction activities).
Under the umbrella of state enterprises, units were created making
contracts with enterprises for production.
The general reform ideas gained ground again. In the field of
civil law, legislation realizing reform ideas, stopped in early 1970s,
75. See LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (Gyula Eörsi & Attila
Harmathy ed., Akadémiai Kiadó 1971) (discussing concepts of legal questions of
the economic reform in different socialist countries).
76. BEREND, supra note 58, at 145-152.
77. TERENCE DAINTITH ed., LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY
(De Gruyter 1988).
78. István Harcsa & Imre Kovács, Farmerek és mezőgazdasági vállalkozók,
in TÁRSADALMI RIPORT 1996 104 (Rudolf Andorka, Tamás Kolosi & György
Vukovich eds., TÁRKI 1996).
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and got ground in 1977, when a general revision of the Civil
Code took place. 79 In many respects, it was a return to previous
civil law rules which were not compatible with strict central
planning. This development recalls Hayek’s statement concerning the role of public law expressing socialist and totalitarian
ideologies but withering away: “public law passes but private
law persists.” 80 In the case of Hungary in the 1970s, however,
the situation was complicated as a great part of the civil law was
full of public law elements. This was particularly so in the field
of property law (rules on state ownership and restrictions on private property), rules on state-owned enterprises and a part of
contracts (contracts between state-owned enterprises). In 1977,
the essential elements of property law could not be modified due
to political ideas. Simultaneously, with the modification of the
Civil Code, rules on state-owned enterprises also changed
(strengthening the position of directors of state enterprisesthe
change had serious consequences in the second part of the 1980s
in the process of privatization). 81 As a result of the changes, the
situation has been characterized in the mid-1980s as a mixed
economy. 82
By this time, the government permitted the population of
Hungary to travel abroad and to engage in academic contacts,
even if under strict conditions. Hungarian scholars could get acquainted with new scientific results. In the legal field, the main
field of academic contacts was comparative law. In Hungary,
there was a tradition of participating in comparative law contacts. Professor Elemér Balogh participated in the establishment
of the International Academy of Comparative Law and he was
79. Act IV of 1977 (Hung.).
80. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 134-135
(Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973).
81. Act VI of 1977 (Hung.).
82. János Kornai, A magyar gazdasági reform jelenlegi helyzetéhez és
kilátásaihoz, in GAZDASÁGUNK HELYZETÉRŐL ÉS FEJLŐDÉSÜNK PROBLÉMÁIRÓL
33, 49 (Róbert Hoch & Iván Major eds., MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet
1985).
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Secretary General of the Academy during many years. 83 The Academy of Comparative Law became an important field of contact since
the late 1960s, but it was not the only channel of getting information.
Contacts could be established with French, German, English, and
even U.S. universities, research institutes, and organizations. The
contacts and information helped Hungarian lawyers in (among other
fields) codification. Thus, the amendment of the Civil Code of 1977
contained rules on consumer protection in the law of contracts, then
a rather new tendency even in the law of developed countries of Europe. The new regulation of contracts has also considered changes
such as those related to the problems of long-term contracts. 84
Another new element of the amendment was the regulation of
the widow’s right of succession. The traditional rule was the right of
usufruct over the deceased’s property. Under the conditions of the
modern society, the traditional rule caused serious problems. The
typical object of the property was no more land but movables and
money. Another factor causing problems was the change of family
relations. Divorce became a typical issue and in several cases the
right of usufruct of a young widow practically excluded the right of
succession of descendants (e.g., in the case of a car). Therefore, the
amendment of the Civil Code introduced the right of replacing usufruct with the right of inheritance of a child.
IV. THE PERIOD AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY
In the 1980s, problems in Hungarian economic and social relations became unmanageable. The government had to openly admit
that the debts of Hungary with foreign debtors were so great that the
state budget could hardly cope with them. Several state-owned en-

83. Louis Milliot, Elemér Balogh (1881-1955), 78 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ
805 (1955).
84. See, e.g., several articles of Ian R. Macneil and specifically, IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (Yale U. Press 1980).
DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE
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terprises were practically bankrupt. The standard of living decreased. 85 In 1989, the economic situation became even worse.
Debts increased although the selling of state enterprises (privatization) had already started. The Hungarian currency was devaluated,
the standard of living decreased, and interest rates increased. The
bankruptcy of the state was evident and almost admitted openly.86
In international relations, it became evident that the Soviet Union
also had serious difficulties, its position became weaker and was unable to maintain its positions in the countries of the Warsaw military
pact. The diplomatic activity of the United States and of the Federal
Republic of Germany increased particularly in Hungary and Poland.
Under the changing conditions, the position of the Communist
party could not be maintained although concessions were made in
the economic and political fields in the 1980s. The most important
step in the process of transition to a new system was the Act of Parliament on associations in January 1989. 87 Although the act concerned private law associations too, its political importance was due
to the fact that it also permitted political associations. Political
groupings became stronger, and an opposition platform was brought
about.
The withdrawal of a part of the Soviet troops from Hungary
started in April 1989. In May 1989, Reagan and Gorbachev met in
Moscow. In July 1989, President Bush visited Poland and Hungary.
In September 1989, Hungary opened the border to citizens of East
Germany staying in Hungary to leave for Austria (it was a step towards the collapse of the regime in East Germany). The political and
military alliance of the Warsaw Pact was dissolved at the end of June
1991. In June 1991, the last Soviet troops left Hungary.

85. Unofficial but published grounding of Act XVII of 1988 on state budget
of 1989 (Hung.).
86. Unofficial grounding of Act LII of 1990 on the realisation of the state
budget of 1989 (Hung.).
87. Act II of 1989 (Hung.).
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In 1989, the government started negotiations with the opposition
in the framework of the so-called round-table meeting and an agreement was reached on free elections, amendment of the Constitution
(changing its character essentially), and establishment of the Constitutional Court. As a result of the election, a new Parliament started
its activity in May 1990 and in this Parliament the opposition parties
had the majority of deputies. A new epoch started changing the
whole political, economic, and social system.
A special feature of the change of the system was that every element had to be reconstructed and even new bases had to be created.
That was the situation in the political life, too. Political parties had
been destroyed as a result of the 1948 Communist political takeover
(traditional peasant, labor parties ceased to exist and their leaders
were either put into Russian or Hungarian prisons or had to leave
the country). The ruling party was more an instrument of direction
than a political party in a democratic system. Consequently, no political experience existed. In the process of system change, new parties were created but on an uncertain basis. This is reflected by the
fact that two of the parties which were among the winners of elections during the period after 1969 ceased to exist after the new elections. Another party which had been a member of the governing coalition in an election period later could not get any seat in the Parliament.
Although political life was heated, every government could remain in office for the four-year period, meaning that political stability had been prevailing in spite of the serious social and economic
difficulties. Immediately after the changes, the opposition was very
strong in the Parliament and governed mass media. Since 2010, the
same party has won the elections, recently winning a two-third majority in the Parliament.
At the time of the collapse of the former regime in 1989, no-one
had clear ideas about changing the political, social, economic, and
legal systems simultaneously. The problem was, however, that the
task was not only to build up a new system but to modernize the
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economy as well. The social dimension of the changes was unclear;
political and economic questions were in the foreground.
It has been pointed out that the original relative backwardness of
the country did not change during the 1948–1990 period, and that
the forced industrialization preferring heavy industry created new
structural economic problems. 88 Economists and sociologists have
studied the problems of the transformation of countries which belonged to the Soviet bloc and worked out different theories. One of
the questions discussed was whether the same solution could be applied in Asia (e.g., Vietnam), in countries of the former Soviet Union, and in the different European countries. Another important
question was whether the development could be organized from
above by the state. 89 A further problem of general character was
whether these countries had to go the same slow way of building a
new economic and social system as it had happened in Western European countries or if a “jump over” was possible. Furthermore, the
question was put whether Western legal models should be imported
for building up new society and economy. 90
No one had clear answers to the fundamental questions, but politicians had to act under the pressure of the day and mixed answers
were given. It was, however, evident that it was impossible to introduce the common law as a whole in countries having several hundred years of legal background and a very different social and economic environment. Thus, the starting point was the system as it was
in 1989–1990. The political basis was the amendment of the constitution in 1989 (followed by several amendments later on) and, after
many years, the new constitution of 2011.
88. David F. Good, The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income Estimates for the Hapsburg Successor States, 1870-1910, 54 J. OF ECON.
HIST. 869, 888 (1994).
89. Lawrence P. King & Iván Szelényi, Post-Communist Economic Systems,
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 205, 210-216 (2d ed., Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., Princeton U. Press 2005).
90. Thomas W. Waelde & James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western Transplants A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy
Status? 43 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 347-378 (1994).
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The system as a whole was, however, different from that of a
market economy even if changes had happened in the previous
years. One of the requirements was ensuring free entry to the market, regulating the right to be an entrepreneur (it had not been permitted before 1989). Company law was to be worked out. Special
rules of capital market were needed. Behavior in the market had to
be regulated (e.g., protection of consumers, prohibition of unfair
competition). New rules on price regulation and loans, including the
bank system in general, were very much needed. Rules on bankruptcy were required in a market in operation. Among the conditions
for the existence of a market was the system of information: registers (data concerning the participants of the market and land registry
informing of ownership of land and mortgage). Rules of procedure
were also needed. Some of these rules could be borrowed from other
countries, but the bulk of the work to be done depended on local
conditions.
In addition to the creation of the conditions for the market to
operate, the government had to solve problems of huge debts. Privatization of state-owned enterprises started before 1989, but the
danger was that the national economy would suffer huge losses.
Some kind of control had to be worked out. It was, however, difficult to exercise control as the property to be sold had no real price:
there was no market; the price system was artificial and lacked any
real basis. Restoring the economy into the position of 1947 was impossible because of several reasons, but some kind of compensation
was to be given by the state to all those who suffered. The basis was
the acceptance of continuity.
From the very first moment of the transformation of the system,
the question was the recodification of civil law. Although there were
different opinions, the position was accepted that foreign experiences were to be studied, but it was not advisable to start with codification work when the whole political and economic system was in
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transformation. 91 In addition, in 1988, negotiations were going on
with the European Economic Communities and a partnership agreement was reached in 1994. 92 Under the agreement, Hungary was
obliged to harmonize its rules with those of the Communities. Harmonization had started much earlier than the official signing of the
Agreement. The transformation of the legal system was also influenced by the signing of the European Convention on Human Rights
promulgated in 1994, but had been taken into consideration since
the commencement of political changes. 93 These international commitments have influenced Hungarian legislation to a great extent in
the field of civil law, too.
In April 2003, the Council of the European Union made a decision on the admission of Hungary and several other countries to the
European Union and in 2004 Hungary became a member of the European Union. 94 Hungarian civil law developed since that time accordingly. The work on the preparation of the draft of a new Civil
Code started in 1998. The work lasted for several years. 95 At the
end, the new Civil Code was adopted in 2013. The Code maintained
continuity of traditional civil law theory but incorporated the necessary changes, including new rules derived from the law of the European Union.
This article focuses on the changes of the system, so no information or analysis of the Code will be given. It has to be mentioned,
however, that the preparation of the Code and the transformation of
the civil law system has got great support from the comparative law
contacts with German, French, U.S. lawyers and the regular round91. Results of some of the consultations were published: QUESTIONS OF CIVIL
LAW CODIFICATION (Attila Harmathy & Ágnes Németh eds., Institute for Legal
and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1990); BINDING FORCE OF CONTRACTS (Attila Harmathy ed., Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1991).
92. Voted by the Hungarian Parliament, Act I of 1994.
93. Act LXXXVI of 1994 (Hung.).
94. Act XXX of 2004 (Hung.).
95. See LAJOS VÉKÁS, AZ ÚJ POLGÁRI TÖRVÉNYKÖNYV ELMÉLETI ELŐKÉRDÉSEI (HVG-ORAC 2001) for an analysis of theoretical problems found in the
Code.
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table conferences with British professors headed by Hugh Beale
which were held every year for an eleven-year period.
One of the central questions of civil law is the person. In the
period before the changes, human beings as subjects of law were of
minor importance. State-owned enterprises and cooperatives were
the subjects of economic life. In 1989 and the following years, lawyers studied mainly questions of company law and transformation
of state-owned enterprises. For practicing lawyers, it was unknown
that in a market economy the entrepreneur has a central role. 96 One
of the crucial problems of the period since World War II until the
period of changes was the lack of entrepreneurs. It was due in part
to the period of war, in part to the system of the planned economy.
Before World War II, an important part of entrepreneurs was Jewish,
and another important part were of German origin. Because of the
Holocaust, a great part of the Jews were killed before the end of the
War. After the war, most ethnic Germans were expelled from the
country because they had been Nazi collaborators. Between 1949
and 1954, over 300,000 families of entrepreneurs, small businessmen, and middle-class professionals were deprived of their property.
Several hundred thousand Hungarians were killed during the war or
taken to Soviet labor camps. The agricultural transformation (by
means of cooperatives) and the tendency of leaving villages and
starting a new life in cities to work in the industry resulted in the
nearly complete disappearance of private economy. The entrepreneurial character was nearly eliminated by the 1980s. 97 The consequences became serious after 1990 when many citizens lost their job
and became entrepreneurs out of necessity without having any experience, background, information, or idea of risk. Change of mentality takes a long time and consequences are present in political and

96. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 893-898
(12th ed., Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed., Oxford U. Press 1954).
97. RUDOLF L. TŐKÉS, HUNGARY’S NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION 120-122
(Cambridge U. Press 1996).
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social life without any considerable possibility of influencing it by
legal rules.
Other hidden elements of changes were social problems. A sign
of the problems was the increase of criminality. The increase between 1971 and 1987 was more than 50% and the search was successful only in 30% of the cases of crimes against property. 98 After
political changes, crimes against property remained the most important type of crime. 99 The increase of criminality was a sign of
problems of social values.
Since the 1950s, there was a tendency of instability of marriage,
instability of professional activity, increase in death rate, and a decrease of birth rate. 100 Between 1980 and 1989, there was a 75%
increase in the number of alcoholics treated in welfare centers and
psychiatric hospitals. 101 These were serious signs of the need for social and political changes and change of mentality accordingly. The
problem is that it is very difficult to change mentality. Nowadays,
one of the greatest problems is to stop the decrease in populations,
to increase the number of births, and to increase the number of marriages. The fundamental problem is how to restore social values.
Present-day civil law faces all the problems of the changing
world. 102 In connection with the main institutions of the civil law,
there have been a lot of changes. Starting with the biological revolution, continuing with electronics, telecommunications, computing,
98. Vavró István, A bűnözés alakulása Magyarországon 1971 és 1987 között,
95 STATISZTIKAI SZEMLE 184-185 (1989).
99. KÖZPONTI STATISZTIKAI HIVATAL, A JOGERŐSEN ELÍTÉLTEK TÁRSADALOMSTATISZTIKAI VIZSGÁLATA 1990-2003 (Társadalomstatisztikai füzetek
2005).
100. Dezső Dányi, Demográfiai átmenetek, in SZERVEZETEK, FOLYAMATOK,
ÖSSZEFÜGGÉSEK 92 (Tamás Faragó ed., Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó 2002). Rudolf
Andorka & István Harcsa, Népesség és család, in TÁRSADALMI RIPORT 1990, 1112 (Rudolf Andorka, Tamás Kolosi & György Vukovich eds., Tárki 1990); RUDOLF ANDORKA, A MAGYAR NÉPESSÉG TEVÉKENYSÉGÉNEK ALAKULÁSÁT BEFOLYÁSOLÓ GAZDASÁGI ÉS TÁRSADALMI TÉNYEZŐK 33, 44 (Tamás Faragó, Új
Mandátum Könyvkiadó 2002).
101. TŐKÉS, supra note 97, at 129.
102. See JUDITH ROCHFELD, LES GRANDES NOTIONS DU DROIT PRIVÉ (Thémis,
Presses Universitaires de France 2011) for an overview of changes.
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new urbanization phenomena, new dimensions of trade, possibilities
of travelling and one could continue the list of changes. All new
phenomena influence the world of law.
The aim of this article has not been, however, to try to find possible reactions in the field of civil law. 103 It has been only an attempt
to give an overview in the field of civil law of the renewed efforts
to react to the historical changes in a country.
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INTRODUCTION TO HUNGARIAN LAW (Attila Harmathy ed., 2d ed. 2019).
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“[W]e are only just beginning to disentangle a few of the threads, which are still so
unknown to us that we immediately assume
them to be either marvelously new or absolutely archaic, whereas for two hundred years
(not less, yet not much more) they have constituted the dark, but firm web of our experience.” 1
I. A COMPLEXIFIED SOCIO-LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
A binary representation appears when considering #MeToo. But
the converging element remains culture and through the virtual
spaces of the internet, its concrete symbolization serves as a central
tenet for the unity of a people. Social media, therefore, are key facilitators in the communication process, which have in their possession the most powerful arsenals to hide, reveal, amplify and/or modify socio-cultural changes within our modern societies: “All acts of
communication produce meanings. It is the power of these meanings, what we do to them, that shapes relationships, exercises influence, models reality, generates behaviors of domination and feelings
of subordination.” 2
Social media has a substantial influence over people and can
even transform the ideology of entire communities with the speed of
light. But this contextual exchange may also negatively impact the
actors involved in this communication process through associated
behaviors of domination versus feelings of subordination. Accordingly, these multiple-layered binary representations are part of a
broader perspective shedding light on representations, pictures,
power, history, social demonstrations, etc.:
Media texts intend to engage people, to convey some kind of
1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF
MEDICAL PERCEPTION 199 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Routledge 1973).
2. GRAEME BURTON, MEDIA AND SOCIETY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 1
(Open U. Press 2005).
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information, and to produce reactions in their audiences,
which justify their continuing production. Even when treated
as part of the environment, they can never be seen as passive
in the way that the façade of the building or wallpaper is passive. 3
The first aspect of this actively engaged representation tackles
common understandings of the symbolism of #MeToo (U.S.) and
#BalanceTonPorc (France) in two ways. The first element conveys
a centralized representation of unity involving two peoples deeply
rooted in their cultural and historical heritage with allegorical portrayals that could be extracted either from Japanese Noh theatre or
from more contemporary pictures found in Time Magazine. As already stated by Marusek & Wagner 4 with the Kraken theory, Kraken
transmogrifies, and so rumors can be told to anyone. As such, #MeToo tellers could either be masked or unmasked. 5 The second element of this binary code involves either wrongful or innocent misrepresentations substantiating the foundations of either #MeToo
and/or #BalanceTonPorc. Wrongful misrepresentations are characterized as intentionally false statements and/or rumors that could unduly attract people to join #MeToo or #BalanceTonPorc, while innocent misrepresentations unintentionally connote falsity, such as
the example of Alyssa Milano, who upon discovering her mistake in
claiming to be the first to harness the “me too” phrasing as the basis
for #MeToo, gave public tribute instead to the original founder of
the #MeToo movement, Tarana Burke.
The second aspect of the binary representation examines the legal duality of free speech versus hate speech in the American and
French contexts. The paradoxical distinction of speaking versus
hearing blurs the boundaries between these two frameworks of
3. Id. at 5.
4. See Anne Wagner, E-Victimization and E-Predation Theory as the Dominant Aggressive Communication: The Case of Cyber Bullying, 29 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 303 (2019), available at https://perma.cc/3FVG-J6MX. See also Sarah
Marusek & Anne Wagner, #MeToo: A Tentacular Movement of Positionality and
Legal Powers, 4 INT. J. LEG. DISCOURSE 1-14 (2019).
5. Id.
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speech. Because the online nature of speech with regard to #MeToo
is global in scope, the consequence from materials posted online either restricts (U.S.) or heightens (France) protections against defamatory speech. Constitutional limits are tested according to public and
private spheres of persona and allegation. Legally, as a concept of
liberty, speech champions the rights of the few against the tyranny
of the many within this arena of politicized virtual communication.
II. CHALLENGES OF SILENCE AND EXPOSURE
First, the complexity of #MeToo assumes a triadic dimension as
this (1) online movement (2) is related to demonstration (3) by challenging the State. To begin with, the online quality of #MeToo is an
amorphous tangle of concealed spaces that become unraveled
through their visible appearance on a computerized screen. On this
screen, the depths of the Internet are animated despite the flat dimensions of the viewing platform. The screen represents the unity
of those many people and ideas behind the hashtag. Yet, screens also
serve as a metaphor for the filtering of vision, as the screen guards
against transparency and the full perforation of light. It is through
this screen that the identities of those who join the online movement
of #MeToo are protected from public view. In fact, when visiting
the #MeToo Movement webpage, 6 one sees the image of a screen
which appears to shield the discernible identity of a woman in the
background. Identity is filtered, or screened, for purposes of anonymity.
Second, #MeToo is a demonstration in which the screening of
identities represents a protest against the public humiliation and private trauma associated with sexual misconduct. For those who suffer
in silence, joining this movement is the affirmation of a collective
voice through which the individual is sheltered. This is similar to the
projective technique used to help children with complicated grief,
6. See Me Too movement webpage, available at https://perma.cc/R8GRM7N8.
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breaking the silence to help survivors open doors to underlying and
hidden grief by joining #MeToo but remaining enshrouded. 7
Third, the breaking of silence through #MeToo admonishes the
silent complicity of the State, which, in the view of many, does nothing to prevent sexual misconduct. This admonishment thickens as it
becomes an open challenge to the sanctioned culture of silence that
perpetuates the acceptance of such misconduct. Importantly, such a
challenge takes place on the internet as the State itself is much fuzzier, as if behind a screen through which regulations cannot completely permeate. Moreover, behind the screen of the internet, Twitter posts on #MeToo are protected in the U.S. as free speech. However, in France, the use of Twitter as a similar type of platform for
breaking the silence defies legal protections of free speech (#BalanceTonPorc) as the promulgation of hate speech. In both scenarios,
#MeToo is a screen that selectively filters the incoming rays of legal
regulation pertaining to internet-based speech.
Online social platforms are new emergent orders, an invisible
fist power, that rely on visible demonstration online and also in the
street to empower those who seek to transcend the perceived ineffectiveness of State actions against sexual misconduct. Women no
longer hide themselves in shadows but want to shed light on the realities of their working conditions. The hashtag then constitutes the
arsenal where blinds and other contrivances 8 have been removed
and replaced by a sort of omnipresence. Such transparency develops
the idea of the Panopticon as “all seeing” insofar as #MeToo guards
against future misconduct.
However, a consequence of the removal of any types of barriers
fosters a kind of paranoia, fear, and delusion that some experience
7. LINDA GOLDMAN, BREAKING THE SILENCE: A GUIDE TO HELPING CHILDREN WITH COMPLICATED GRIEF—SUICIDE, HOMICIDE, AIDS, VIOLENCE, AND
ABUSE (2d ed., Brunner-Routledge 2001).
8. Jeremy Bentham, Proposal for a New and Less Expensive mode of Employing and Reforming Convicts (1798), quoted in ROBIN EVANS, THE FABRICATION OF VIRTUE: ENGLISH PRISON ARCHITECTURE, 1750-1840 195 (Cambridge U.
Press 1982).
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in #MeToo. States may feel like they no longer have control to stop
activity that could substantially damage targeted people. Somehow
anxiety and paranoia defile the whole society, propagated at the
speed of light by social media. There is much nervousness among
those who may even question the authority to do their work properly
insofar as fear and power are combined into malediction as the
meaning of the song from Screamin’ Jay Hawkins “I Put a Spell on
You” 9 suggests. As a way out of the curse, paranoia can be cured
through a public self-admittance of the alleged behavior. But paranoia may also be incurable when allegations are denied and further
generate a perpetual state of paranoia.
Focusing blame through the hashtag is perpetuated further
through the body of the accused when captured through online images. Here, the presumption of guilt or innocence is associated with
a depicted physical response embodied in the gaze of the accused. If
the accused is shown as looking down, the gaze seems evasive and
signals knowledge of culpability. If the gaze, though, is direct, the
accused seems to repudiate allegations from the accuser in the fixed
stare of veracity. This gaze symbolizes social retribution as “The
tortured body is first inscribed in the legal ceremonial that must produce, open for all to see, the truth of the crime.” 10 For #MeToo,
Foucault’s spectacle of the scaffold is the hashtag transformed as the
visual representation of guilt recorded through social media as an
online testimonial in an approach to law that happens outside the
courtroom in response to rumors. 11 Yet, as Foucault suggests, the
spectacle is meant to imprison in the confines of publicized space
for the purposes of demonization. It is this online social demonization that releases the State from taking legal action, i.e., enacting

9. SCREAMIN’ JAY HAWKINS, I Put a Spell on You, in AT HOME WITH
SCREAMIN’ JAY HAWKINS (Epic Records 1958), available at https://perma.cc
/S35M-8FAJ.
10. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
35 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977).
11. Marusek & Wagner, supra note 4, at 1-15.
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more protective and articulate legislation, which might remedy a variety of harms in positioning justice to transpire in the courtroom
rather than in the virtual scaffold.
The image of the scaffold is one of final judgment, and in the
#MeToo environment, such judgment is often based upon legally
unsubstantiated rumor. The audience of the scaffold displays the
public masses who are easily misled and wanting a show. Recently
in France, such an example of what can happen when fake news infects social media took place and resulted in bedlam. Through the
rapid spread of rumor on social media, an unknown source insidiously claimed that a white van of Roma was traveling between the
cities of Nanterre and Colombes (near Paris) wantonly abducting
young women. Following the sharing of this rumor on social networks, two people were unfairly accused and lynched; on the evening of Monday, March 25, 2019, seventy people armed with baseball
bats, knives, and rocks attacked Roma in Clichy-sous-Bois and
Bobigny, in northern Paris. Roughly twenty were arrested with the
police issuing a warning against this fake news. Such suspension of
justice through public hanging is the contagion of rumors and the
unthinkable and shameful exploitation of the innocent.
In the U.S., rumors on social media also triggered a witch hunt.
There, #MeToo, which began as a wave of public denouncement
against sexual misconduct, resulted in a wave of public accusation
in which hundreds of men (and fewer women) were removed from
their positions of employment. This upsurge of indictment was
marked by a flurry of shifting employment with women replacing
men in many of these same positions. 12 Yet, one year later, some of
these same men returned to the same positions previously held. For
instance, Louis C.K., a comedian who had lost his career after having publicly admitted to masturbating in front of his female colleagues, returned to the stage at Comedy Cellar in New York City.
12. Audrey Calrsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly
Half of Their Replacements Are Women, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2018), available
at https://perma.cc/RTP4-N8QQ.
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Other men, including radio personality Garrison Keillor and professional football team owner Jerry Richardson, have, like Louis C.K.,
returned to positions they held prior to their public shaming from
#MeToo accusations. The problem is “when people accused of harassment return to power without making amends—or never lose it,
at least financially—it limits the post-Weinstein movement’s potential to change how power is exercised in American society.” 13
Even as the social tides change, not everyone is able to stay
afloat. For those accused without subsequent finding, the damage
has already been done. And it is not just a problem for men. Women,
too, are accused of sexual misconduct through #MeToo with accusations challenging the safeguards of due process: “We should admit
that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is
no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of
knowledge; nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” 14
The most famous of these few cases where women were indicted
is actress Asia Argento, who was accused, first, of sexual misconduct involving a minor (17-year-old boy), and, second, of paying
him to keep him silent. Often, #MeToo allegations against public
figures may be rooted in politicized vindication for past labor complaints. In the case of Andrea Ramsey, a U.S. Democratic political
candidate accused of firing a male employee for refusing to have
sex, this positioning is the heightening of power, the heightening of
awareness. Ramsey discontinued her campaign and, in a rebuttal of
power over accusation, proclaimed the following: “On balance, it is
far more important to me that women are stepping forward to tell
their stories and confront their harassers than it is to continue our
campaign.” 15 Ramsey’s concern for the significance of the larger
movement and her own predicament within the chains of rumor is
13. Id.
14. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 27.
15. Jacey Fortin, Accused of Sexual Harassment, Andrea Ramsey Ends Kansas Congressional Run, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2017), available at https://perma
.cc/L5QE-U4SB.
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similar to how Tarana Burke described her own role in #MeToo:
“Inherently, having privilege isn’t bad but it’s how you use it, and
you have to use it in service of other people.” 16
This vortex of sexual abuse allegations on #MeToo and #BalanceTonPorc amplifies the paranoia between men and women in the
workplace. Everyone is now a suspect in a febrile atmosphere in
which accusers, accused, and witnesses each feel pressure similar to
the Middle Ages, when people were dragged into the public square
and stoned. This combination of striking visual aspects acting
through the inscription of #MeToo is intended to raise social awareness and compel the State to take all the necessary legal actions
against these wrongful misconducts, but often vilify the innocent.
A. Survivors vs. The Unknown Soldier
The #MeToo movement is the enervation, planning, and coordination of social response aligned through an overall strategy that
pressures the State for legal remedy while compelling a cultural shift
pertaining to the discourse of sexuality. Through multiple techniques, such as the screen and the public shaming of those accused
of sexual misconducts, these tactics are employed to spread the allegations that come from either #MeToo under the U.S. context or
#BalanceTonPorc under the French context.
The explicit original goal of this movement is to organize and
shape the foundations of the society so that women will no longer
be victims but survivors of sexual misconducts, and so creates a kind
of mass ideology, with the rise of global alliances for and against.
Strategy becomes then limited to the tactics being used, given the
size, the morality, and the types of resistance available. The confederation of these movements worldwide belongs to tactical principles
shedding light on the offensive, the surprise, the unity, the force, and

16. Emma Brockes, #MeToo Founder Tarana Burke: ‘You Have to Use Your
Privilege to Serve Other People,’ THE GUARDIAN (2018), available at https
://perma.cc/5J8G-Y7GD.
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the maneuvering. Their subsequent results would lead to drastically
alter men’s roles within society, and so to unchain women, stop tyranny, and exit a shameful situation with heads held high as sung by
Gloria Gaynor in “I will survive.” The penetration in the enemy’s
field is the main attack to weaken harassers and make sure they
come to the forefront instead of hiding themselves behind their positions in the hierarchy, as did Harvey Weinstein and those other
Harvey Weinstein’s who followed.
Survivors, as the main battlefield players, fight for their own
rights, just like U.S. civil rights leaders did in the early 1950s. This
was the case of Rosa Park in Montgomery, who refused to give up
her place on a bus to a white man and was arrested by the police. On
the day of her trial (December 5, 1955), the Montgomery bus boycott movement began to demand social justice. At its head was a 26year-old pastor, Martin Luther King Jr. For 381 days, thousands of
people refused to get on a bus, walking to work, sharing cars, or
taking taxis. Rosa had thus emerged from her anonymity to bring
water to the civil rights mill. This part of American history has also
had a strong impact on French pop culture; a singer, Pascal Obispo,
sang Rosa’s story, her courage and her will to live in a more equitable world in “Rosa.” Two verses are premonitory:
You didn’t ask for anything there . . . . Rosa.
But it came upon you . . . that day.
You’ve only paved the way.
You had that courage there . . . . Rosa.
....
If you saw Rosa . . . .
The roads you’ve made.
Because one day you dared.
Just stand up to it.17
Although the term at that time was “militant,” it has evolved
over time; now the term is “survivor,” an individual who has faced
or is still facing toxic relations, but is always there to communicate

17. Translated by the authors.
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these incivilities, abuses or sexual misconducts loud and clear. People act first of all for their own rights, but with the influence of time
individual stories become collective stories that build the foundations of a resistance movement. This was the case when, in 2017,
women marched in the streets to assert their stance standing in high
heels before the glare of their alleged aggressors. Their selfies taken
from above resemble the outstretched arm of the Statue of Liberty
(U.S. context) holding the torch of truth, 18 freeing people from tyranny, like R-E-S-P-E-C-T sung by Aretha Franklin, in close relationship to #MeToo with its motto R-E-S-I-S-T, 19 or with Marianne
marching 20 in France, chanting in the streets of Paris with the song
of Michel Delpech “Que Marianne était jolie.” 21 Women stood
boundless, in increasingly high social positions, with their fists22
reaching heavens as a means of social revolution, recognition, and
achievement for their own rights. They are no longer voiceless; instead, now they are silence breakers. 23 Furthermore, people could
first see their manicured red nails showing their femininity and
strength, setting them free like in “Unchain my Heart,” 24 a song
from Joe Cocker. As such women, these front battlefield leaders end
by putting their nails on men’s coffins and the color turns into pink,
as a remembrance of the expansion of sexual freedom. Additionally,
this image of the chain brings us back to the links of the internet,
where #MeToo originally started, and acts as a void, a reminder of
our fears, and our own self-constructed paranoia.
18. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, THE ATLANTIC (2017), available at https://perma.cc/M6SM-6WW5.
19. ARETHA FRANKLIN, Respect, in I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY I LOVE
YOU (Atlantic 1967).
20. See Eugène Delacroix’s famous painting, Liberty Leading the People, at
https://perma.cc/RR7N-5Z2U.
21. MICHEL DELPECH, Que Marianne était jolie, in LES GRANDES CHANSONS
(Tréma 1989).
22. See For All Womankind Website, https://perma.cc/GC3N-RK4C.
23. Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland, Person of
the Year—The Silence Breakers, TIME (2017), available at https://perma.cc
/BCU9-Z75S [hereinafter The Silence Breakers].
24. JOE COCKER, Unchain My Heart, in UNCHAIN MY HEART (Parlophone
Records 1987).
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The envelopment of this social movement embedded within the
hashtag comes from the Lone Wolf, Tarana Burke, who has unglamorously been striving for nearly two decades to help young African
American girls who are victims of abuse. Burke was an activist in
the movement of sexual violence well before the mise-en-scène 25 of
#MeToo. She spent time alone from the pack to listen to girls’ calls.
Somehow the Lone Wolf alienated herself from others to find her
own paths and means of actions. Subsequently, she created her own
association in 2007 (Just Be Inc.) for freedom, truth, and authenticity for these “endangered” groups of girls, as a “movement about the
1 in 4 girls and the 1 in 6 boys who are sexually abused every year
and who carry those wounds into adulthood.” 26 This Lone Wolf rose
to the surface once #MeToo gained notoriety with Alyssa Milano,
who gave her back the torch. As she is now in front of this social
battlefield, Tarana Burke is viewed as “The Unknown Soldier,” who
is protected by Alyssa Milano, harnessing her celebrity for the benefit of the most vulnerable and anonymous. Therefore, Tarana Burke
symbolizes all the unknown people who experience sexual misconduct and human rights violations, and who fight for the recognition
of their rights. She is the witness of these modern evils, the first person to report these infamous acts in public, and so she needs a shield
for protection, as she is not used to this over-mediatized staging. Her
first shield was Alyssa Milano Consequently, Burke’s more famous
than a celebrity even though she was originally an anonymous person. She arouses people’s awareness as the key figure of this #MeToo movement. Tarana Burke, like The Unknown Soldier or Le
Soldat Inconnu both in the U.S. and France, is greater in terms of
visibility, albeit invisible most of the time. Accordingly, she is the
trigger, the unifying symbolic element, of a movement that not only
far exceeds herself as a human being, but also makes her a living
25. Roland Barthes, Brecht et le discours : contribution à l’étude de la discursivité, L’AUTRE SCÈNE (1975).
26. Doug Criss, The Media’s Version of #MeToo is Unrecognizable to the
Movement’s Founder, Tarana Burke, CNN (2018), available at https://perma.cc
/NHR4-7SCZ.
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and vivid symbol of a fight for human rights and against discrimination. In this way, her status becomes even more legitimate and
sacred. The Unknown Soldier (U.S.) and Le Soldat Inconnu (France)
are entombed in distinguished spaces. In the U.S., he rests at Arlington National Cemetery atop a hill overlooking Washington, D.C. under the supervision of the U.S. Department of Defense, with a guard
just in front. In France, he remains under the Arc de Triomphe, a
symbol of victory. For The Unknown Soldier and Le Soldat Inconnu,
a torch is forever alight, known in France and the U.S. as the “Eternal Flame.” Just like this flame, Burke’s depersonalization makes
her a bright eternal icon for #MeToo, which will survive her death,
similar to Rosa Park, who will remain forever a civil rights leader in
the United States, after having received the Presidential Medal of
Freedom in 1996 and the Congressional Gold Medal in 1999. Rosa
Park was a civil rights champion in the U.S., whereas Tarana Burke
is still acting as a silence breaker. Furthermore, she is positioned as
a human rights advocate, under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”
#MeToo is widely related to the idea of keeping heads up high,
against all odds, so that the truth can come out in the open to expose
and defeat the oppressors, as sung by Kesha in “Praying.” Sexual
harassers will then “return to the Abyss,” 27 showing the strength and
determination of the oppressed, as her lyrics seem to suggest:
I’m proud of who I am.
No more monsters, I can breathe again.
And you said that I was done.
Well, you were wrong and now the best is yet to come.
Cause I can make it on my own, oh.
And I don’t need you, I found a strength I’ve never known.
I’ll bring thunder, I'll bring rain, oh.
When I’m finished, they won’t even know your name. 28

27. Marusek & Wagner, supra note 4, at 6.
28. KESHA, Praying, in RAINBOW (RCA Records 2017).
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Like personal relations, many social media actions are chaotic
in nature. From this chaos arises a kind of vortex that amplifies and
leads to the depth of nothingness and emptiness emerging as a result
of the hashtag. Liberation then comes with the “Exposure League”
under Alyssa Milano’s aura. This league could easily be compared
to the Justice League with these superheroes, the 2017 movie, who
met as a team of crime fighters to defend the earth from all kinds of
threats and save the world from destruction. Fueled by their faith in
social networks and inspired by Tarana Burke’s selfless acts, Alyssa
Milano and her female vigilantes, who are devoid of any interested
act, then become Burke’s spearheads, promoting all the principles
and ideas put forward by #MeToo. This “Exposure League” includes Alyssa Milano, Ashley Judd, Taylor Swift, Susan Fowler,
Adam Iwu, Rose McGowan, Lindsey Reynolds, to quote just a few
of them. They act as silence breakers to protect the oppressed and
expose the oppressors to the public. Like the Justice League in fiction, these personalities put their assets (notoriety and professional
skills) at the service of the oppressed, of this silent part, which until
then had not been able to point out the dysfunctions of today’s society due to their social status, which is common and unlikely to interest the media as a whole. Unlike imaginary vigilantes, these personalities act not to “save the world,” but to expose the abuses of the
most powerful—in the broadest sense—against the least vulnerable.
They are there to protect and denounce what some consider being
their undeniable gains and privileges (e.g., the case of Harvey Weinstein): “Law becomes generally and integrally associated with the
mythic settling of the world—its adequate occupation and its bestowal on the rightful holders, the Occidental ‘possessors and builders of the earth.’” 29 The laws appeal of universal gain is contextualized according to winners and losers.

29. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF
OF LAW & CRIME (Routledge 1992).
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Due to their renown and their address book, the “Exposure
League” has the ability to bring to the forefront in the media, at the
local, national, and international levels, these acts violating the
rights of women and men. Indeed, as Alyssa Milano is under the
celebrity aura with her female vigilantes, she has the necessary
means and abilities to fight back against this vortex that spins around
very fast and pulls the torch of enlightenment into its empty space
(i.e., social media). After resurfacing from the mingled waters of
fury, she is then in a position to hold high this torch and to hand it
over to Tarana Burke, the symbol of the “Unknowns,” willing to
sacrifice herself for the benefit of others.
B. Binary Nature of the Anonymous Elbow
Burke’s attention to the mundane, the nameless, the less famous,
the vulnerable propels us to rethink what “me too” really means.
Lest we get caught up in celebrity narratives and the stories of the
rich and famous, let’s return to the anonymous elbow on Time Magazine’s Person of the Year 30 as a place to begin. The phrase “me
too” began with Burke as an emendatory credo for own sense of
powerlessness in not finding the words of this empathetic idiom
when hearing the account of sexual violence from a child under her
care. Developed as a mantra for actively compassionate listening,
the words “me too” were originally a statement of support for those
who needed to hear this expression of sensitivity and understanding,
i.e., the vulnerable, the nameless, those without power or voice. The
visual representation of the unannounced victimization as an indirect correlation of Burke’s original intent is to recognize the struggle
those in everyday situations encounter. This struggle is seen in the
image of the anonymous elbow in Time Magazine’s 2017 Person of
the Year cover, The Silence Breakers: “For giving a voice to public

30. Alissa Wilkinson & Emily Stewart, Time’s 2017 Person of the Year is the
“Silence Breakers.” Trump is runner-up, VOX (2017), available at https://perma
.cc/4V9S-D299.
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secrets, for bringing to life the murmurs on social networks, for
pushing us to refuse the unacceptable, the Silence Breakers are the
personalities of the year 2017.” 31 The embodied presence of the
faces and identities are depicted; the cover also included unclaimed
and unnamed extensions of the body, such as the arm/elbow. In the
bottom left-hand corner of the picture, 32 a clothed arm bent at the
elbow is leaning on the table. In what can be called here as “the
anonymous elbow,” this appendage belongs to a young hospital
worker from Texas who was the victim of sexual harassment. This
woman did not wish to appear in the cover photo because she feared
negative reprisals toward her family for showing her face and disclosing her identity. 33 Barthes gives a mode of image observation.34
He envisages the punctum (here, the elbow) as a way to “emphasize
on the viewers’ capacity of zooming in, of paying more attention to
some elements than others.” 35 This punctum, a small detail, is not
always present in images, but when it appears it can transform and
enrich the whole meaning of a picture. This incomplete but still
striking visual element makes it possible to avoid visualizing only a
web of constraints and rituals and allow readers to appropriate this
intriguing element and give it a particular inflection:
The Photograph is pure contingency and can be nothing else
(it is always something that is represented)—contrary to the
text which, by the sudden action of a single word, can shift
a sentence from description to reflection—it immediately

31. Melanie Roosen, Celles et ceux qui dénoncent le harcèlement sont la Person of the Year du Time, L’ADN (2017), available at https://perma.cc/DW5YDTQA (author’s translation).
32. This image is readily available online; see The Silence Breakers, supra
note 23, at https://perma.cc/33FZ-7F6Y.
33. Alle McMahon, Time Magazine’s Person of the Year: Who are the
Women on the Cover and What’s With the Elbow?, ABC NEWS (2017), available
at https://perma.cc/H6LN-SNGE.
34. ROLAND BARTHES, LA CHAMBRE CLAIRE. NOTE SUR LA PHOTOGRAPHIE
(Seuil 1980).
35. Anne Wagner, Visual Rhetoric as a “Space-in-between”—Semiotic Account of French Official Presidential Photographs, in 13 STUDY IN HISTORY OF
LAW, JUSTICE: SENSING THE NATION’S LAW 153-172, 155 (Mark Antaki et al.
eds., Springer 2017).
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delivers those ‘details’ that make up the very material of ethnological knowledge. 36
Given the richness of the image, this photograph forms a labyrinth, at the center of which the reader will find nothing else but this
elbow. Therefore, Time noted that portraying the elbow was more
generally portraying all women who were reticent to make their
identities and claims known insofar as the appearance of the elbow
“is an act of solidarity, representing all those who are not yet able to
come forward and reveal their identities.” 37 Indeed, in considering
the anonymity of the elbow further, we might consider the slogan of
the #MeToo movement on their website: “you are not alone.” 38 The
collective identification of those subject to sexual harassment and
sexual violence may be a sufficient step in healing through the survivorship affiliation group. Yet, the larger question of achieving justice in a legal manner invites further consideration into constructions
of the accuser as well as the accused through image and voice frameworks that ultimately lead to a paradox of social versus legal forms
of due process.
While celebrities in Hollywood have brought crucial social
awareness to the realities of sexual harassment and sexual violence
by men in the entertainment industry, the realities of those who suffer with a less pronounced voice have been neglected by the movement’s momentum, as the images and voices of both victims and
accused are limited in their representativeness. As a result, those
without the accompanying veneration of exposure associated with
publicly expressing “me too” are represented by the anonymous elbow. The elbow represents the many women and men who come
from disparate and varied situations and backgrounds. The paradox
between those with voice (Hollywood women with agency) and
those with a less pronounced voice (domestic violence survivors,
victims of sexual predation in sports and religious settings, even the
36. BARTHES, supra note 34, at 52 (author’s translation).
37. McMahon, supra note 33.
38. See Me Too Movement Webpage, supra note 6.
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vulnerable in nursing homes) generates contradictory images of a
racialized and sexualized heteronormativity in which wealthy and
named white men and women dominate within a presumed binary
of masculine power/female victimhood. As Tarana Burke notes
“#MeToo does not have space for black girls.” Burke said this at the
stage of the School of the Art Institute:
It doesn’t have space for black women, it doesn’t have space
for queer folk, it doesn’t have space for disabled people, people of color, trans people, anybody else that’s other . . . .
#MeToo is about who is going to be taken down next—what
other powerful, white, rich man is going to lose his privileges
for a period of time. 39
In this way, the anonymity of the elbow is much more nuanced
than the representation of multiple anonymous identities in signaling the struggle for those without celebrity status and bringing
awareness to the otherwise muffled quiescence of sexual trauma.
Yet, as #MeToo reminds us through the collectivization of identities
who join the hashtag, unpopular ideas that challenge a culture of
permissiveness can themselves be traumatic. In this way, the elbow
is the embodied symbol of suppressed speech and the potential harm
from accusation that the hashtag perpetuates.
III. LEGAL DICHOTOMY BETWEEN FREE SPEECH AND HATE SPEECH
The legal dichotomy between free speech and hate speech in
both U.S. and French sides of the Atlantic is prominent. It radically
represents two legal spins for racist, homophobic, or sexist discourses, 40 while bringing attention to hate speech and free speech
under three spectrums. The duality in these types of speech consti-

39. Morgan Greene, #MeToo’s Tarana Burke Tells Local Activists Movement
‘By Us and For Us’ Must Include Women of Color, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (2018),
available at https://perma.cc/WHM7-W8QZ.
40. MICHAEL HERZ & PETER MOLNAR, THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF
HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES (Cambridge U. Press
2012); IVAN HARE & JAMES WEINSTEIN, EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY
(Oxford U. Press 2009).
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tutes the evil twin, ready to collaborate with the other, but also willing to have the last word over the other. So, the triadic dimension on
dominance patterns can lead to permission (U.S.), prohibition
(France) or cacophony in #MeToo.

Figure 1. “Dominance Patterns” from #MeToo
The first spectrum, the U.S. spectrum, is much more permissive
than the French spectrum. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (1787) states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Since the nation’s inception,
legislative restrictions have happened repeatedly, with the United
States Congress first passing the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 as
legislation that limited First Amendment freedoms. Under this spectrum and in cases since then, the American wording is vague in setting constitutional limits on freedoms of speech. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that:
[It] is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. 41
41. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, at 571-572 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
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However, the counter spectrum comes from one of the more recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 2011 that rejected any legal
restriction of hate speech as a form of censorship incompatible with
freedom of expression:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict
great pain . . . [W]e cannot react to that pain by punishing
the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to
ensure that we do not stifle public debate. 42
In an approach that nearly suggests absolutism, Supreme Court
jurisprudence indicates that while the First Amendment does not
protect expressive acts that cause violence, it does protect speech
that incites hateful or discriminatory attitudes. This protection is
based in the so-called “balancing approach” that limits legislative
censorship of speech to protect against the disapproval of unpopular
content or possible responses to unpopular speech. 43 This means that
inflammatory actions such as supremacists marching in Nazi uniforms in a small town populated by many Holocaust survivors, 44 or
those of members of the Ku Klux Klan who burn crosses for purposes of intimidating African-American and Jewish people, are effectively protected by the Constitution insofar as legislative targeting of marginalized groups is unconstitutional.45
The second spectrum, the prohibitive one, prevails in France. It
sanctions some of these acts of speech insofar as they are perceived
as abuses of this freedom. Article 24 of the Act of July 29, 1881 on
Freedom of the Press (amended in 2004) 46 relates public provocation “to discrimination, hate, or violence against a person or group
of persons on account of their origin or membership or non-membership of a specific ethnic group, nation, race or religion,” and
42. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460-61 (2011).
43. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
44. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
46. Loi sur la liberté de la presse (29 July 1881) (amended in 2004) [hereinafter Press Law of 1881].
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“their gender, sexual orientation or disability,” 47 resulting in an offence punishable by one year’s imprisonment and a €45,000 fine.
The Freedom of the Press Act also punishes insult more severely48
and defamation, 49 when they are committed “against a person or
group of persons because of their origin or membership or nonmembership of a particular ethnic group, nation, race, or religion”
or “on account of their sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or
disability.” 50
Insofar as insult and defamation constitute expressive acts, there
is no indication that the aggravating circumstance should be read in
the same way as the aggravating circumstance identified by article
132-76 of the French Criminal Code (the motivation of the perpetrator), as the possibility of inciting a discriminatory attitude towards
the individual or group concerned. While hate speech cannot be
minimized with the above ideas, French law defines them as provoking hatred, and so covers some offensive or defamatory speech,
by punishing expressive acts, which publicly designate some individuals to be insulted, defamed, discriminated against or assaulted.
The third spectrum, cacophony, is a “marketplace of ideas,” 51 a
place where freedom of expression is protected, accepted, and/or respected without any temporal limitations, even though in a specific
spatiotemporal continuum (the U.S. context) Jacob Abrams challenged social normativity in the context of WWI. The concept of
exchanging ideas brings hate and freedom to the forefront so that
they combine both their strengths and weaknesses in order to safeguard their respective identities, 52 similar to the evil twin mentioned
at the beginning of this section. However, they cannot work without
one another, creating some unavoidably conflicting, incongruous,
47. Id. at art. 33.
48. Id. at art. 29 (“offensive expression, terms of contempt or invective which
do not contain an accusation of any fact”).
49. Id. (“allegation or accusation of a fact which damages the honor or consideration of the person or group to whom the fact is attributed”).
50. Id. at art. 33.
51. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
52. GASTON BACHELARD, THE POETICS OF SPACE (Beacon Press 1994).
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dissonant, chaotic, and paranoid disturbances, and here comes cacophony, the worst scenario that sucks #MeToo into the vortex.
A. American Perspectives
The #MeToo hashtag is a form of symbolic speech representing
an alliance of exposure that poignantly disturbs the silence surrounding sexual misconduct. The salience of this symbol is based
on an online environment in which to be anonymous is to be hidden.
Assuming an identity through the hashtag is the pronouncement of
grief by making the past public. Yet, the hashtag is the illusion of
action if viewed from the celebrity perspective that competes with
the anonymity of private individuals. A critique of the hashtag
movement reveals the disillusionment of power for the collective to
rectify previous wrongdoing, to change culture, or to destroy the
past as it remains to haunt the present. In the same way that paranoia
is framed through an aggressive self-protectionist stance toward the
wrongdoer, accusations made online must be legally proven in court
to be valid. Otherwise, a culture based upon the righting of wrongs
in a cultural setting becomes a witch hunt in which anyone can become the target. 53
In the legal culture of the U.S., the hashtag is a form of speech
implicated in the allegation of wrongdoing. Yet, even as the allegation is allowed within the marketplace of ideas, speech happens
within a chaotic discourse of words, identities, and reverberation:
It is a mistake, however, to think that the identification of
truth is the only potential consequence of establishing an
open marketplace for facts, ideas, opinion, and argument.
When such a marketplace exists, its very existence may have
a wealth of consequences on the behavior of those whose

53. NOUS TOUTES!, Viol, harcèlement, sexisme : “La chasse à l’homme” est
ouverte, vraiment ?! (2017) (French perspective), available at https://perma.cc
/NE92-TFXU. See also Lindy West, Yes, This Is a Witch Hunt. I’m a Witch and
I’m Hunting You, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2017) (U.S. perspective), available at
https://perma.cc/CKZ7-VU65.
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activities are affected by the existence or location of the marketplace. 54
Those who engage in the marketplace have a variety of viewpoints. Yet, even as courts are tasked to protect the rights of minority
viewpoints 55 and to tread lightly on abridging the freedoms associated with the constitutional protections of speech, 56 the meaning behind speech remains a salient juxtaposition between public and private understandings of exposure and identity (i.e. reputation). Proof
of actual malice associated with defamatory speech must be proffered by those alleging claims of libel, which often provides more
protections for less public individuals. 57 Moreover, the more public
a figure is, the fewer protections against libel she or he has, and the
more protections those who speak out against them have even in the
disputable public forum of the internet. 58 As a case in point, for presidential candidate Donald Trump, the quality of being public could
be linked to “fake news” as he stated, “I’m going to open up our
libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and
false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money.” 59 For the
courts, celebrity is mostly public, while anonymity is private, with
protected speech as the critique of power, as in #MeToo. However,
even this established jurisprudential binary is transmuted into a vortex of wealth, fame, and control as the category of a “limited-purpose public figure” thwarts protections for private citizens to prove
libel. 60 The online forum of rumor and allegation of #MeToo tests
the hegemonic normative paradigm of free speech in the U.S. insofar
54. Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90
NYU L. REV. 1160-1228, 1163 (2015).
55. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
56. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
58. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
59. Adam Liptak, Justice Clarence Thomas Calls for Reconsideration of
Landmark Libel Ruling, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2019), available at https://perma
.cc/8B6Y-T7LS.
60. McKee v. Cosby, Jr., 586 U.S. (2019) (the petition for a writ of certiorari
was denied).
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as the ability for private, hidden, and otherwise anonymous individuals, who become much more public through the internet, to prove
libel and defamation is constrained through the global spaces of social media, as well as through the hate speech precedents articulated
in American courts that may or may not involve cyber activity.
B. French Perspectives
The hashtag creates unique types of cultural narratives where
“cultural stories circulating within and without legal discourse describe and construct women’s bodies and the feminine” 61 under multiple scenarios and spaces. The hashtag shapes differently and supports stories that come from rumors 62 involving either misrepresentations or allegations that must be proven in court to become factual
in accordance with due process. From the French perspective, which
is more prohibition-oriented, the boundary between private and public screenings is almost blurred, even invisible with a clear emphasis
on shining the spotlight on alleged harassers. 63
The hashtag #BalanceTonPorc was created in October 2017
from the U.S. by a French freelance journalist, Sandra Muller, following the first revelations about Harvey Weinstein in Hollywood. 64
She clearly emphasized that her hashtag was intended to disclose
full names and physical addresses of “aggressor(s),” being potential
bases of defamatory speech with legal remedies against hashtag users. The responding deluge was almost immediate with hundreds,
thousands of French women describing their tenuous professional
positioning within firms. She herself posted allegations concerning
Eric Brion, the former general manager of Equidia, whom she knew
in the professional world, but with whom she had never worked before. However, she is now being sued for defamation because of the
61. Penelope Pether, Critical Discourse Analysis, Rape Law and the Jury Instruction Simplification Project, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53-94, 60 (1999).
62. Marusek & Wagner, supra note 4.
63. Wagner, supra note 4.
64. Marusek & Wagner, supra note 4.
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rumors she propagated against him appeared on this social vortex.
This case was scheduled to go to court in May or June 2019, and the
French courts were called to consider (1) if sexual harassment could
be considered when they met only once in a cocktail party, (2) if
their professional relationship was compulsory, and (3) if inappropriate and unsubstantiated comments during a single event in a public space could lead to actions in court.
In France, freedom of expression is restricted. The Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens 1789 provides that everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 65 but these rights
can be limited. With pervasive new e-media platforms, no piece of
legislation clearly forbids or screens the hashtag. However, under
specific circumstances, some hashtags breach the law and are illegal, and must be removed from French social platforms. This is the
case of #UnBonJuif and #AntiNoir (literal translations: #BeGoodJew and #AntiBlack), which both targeted specific groups of
the French population (Jewish and Black people) and escalated the
threat of violence against them. Recently, the hashtag #JeSuisKouachi was scrutinized under both the Law on the Freedom of the
Press 66 and the recent law of November 13, 2014 to combat terrorism. 67
However, in most cases, the hashtags in question emanate from
or are taken over by persons acting under pseudonyms, which complicates their identification. 68 One example is the hashtag #UnBonJuif, for which Twitter had been given notice by privately-organized, anti-defamatory associations to promptly remove any mentions including the hashtag and to reveal the identity of the authors

65. Declaration of the Rights of Man (National Assembly of France 1789) in
YALE LAW SCHOOL, The Avalon Project, available at: https://perma.cc/R8A7HML7.
66. Press Law of 1881, supra note 46.
67. Loi renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme, no.
2014-1353 (13 Nov. 2014), available at https://perma.cc/SSN7-EY3D.
68. Wagner, supra note 4.
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of the disputed statements. After dealing with the international nature of the social network, which challenged the res judicata authority of the decision, these associations succeeded in obtaining from
Twitter, in July 2013, through an amicable agreement, the identification data of the authors of the disputed tweets.
As a tool of expression and communication, the hashtag is subject to various criminal and civil provisions relating to the protection
of fundamental freedoms. As such, any abuse can be legally punished. To date, Twitter has been the only social network subject to
conviction in France for abusive hashtags in France, despite the high
number of requests to delete tweets that had been issued. So, the
online wall is highly pervasive and provokes visual confrontations
that are abusive and disrespectful under current French legislation.
For this reason, some cases went to court, especially in connection
with Facebook.
On March 18, 2015, the Paris Regional Court gave comedian
Dieudonné a two-month suspended sentence for publicly promoting
acts of terrorism on his official Facebook page. This judgment was
upheld by the Paris Court of Appeals in a decision dated June 21,
2016. 69 Then another case went to court. An employee of a company, who had sent an email to other employees criticizing the draft
harmonization of the collective status of his company’s employees,
was fired for serious misconduct. With this May 19, 2016 decision, 70
the Court of Cassation confirmed the nullification of the employee’s
dismissal, stating that “to assess the seriousness of the remarks made
by an employee, it was necessary to take into account the context . . . the publicity given to them by the employee and the recipients of the message.” The court also further noted that “the remarks
had been made in a message addressed to employees and trade union
representatives concerning the negotiation of a collective agreement

69. Cour d’appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Paris, (pôle 8 - ch. 1), June 21, 2016
(Association Avocats sans frontières et a. c/ D. Mbala Mbala).
70. Cass. Soc., 19 May 2016, 15-12.311, unreported (Fr.).
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to defend rights that could be called into question,” meaning the employee had not abused his freedom of expression.
And to complete the prohibition-oriented approach from France,
the “right to reply” has been implemented, giving the possibility to
a person (natural or legal) designated in an online public communication the possibility of publishing a response. The request has to be
sent by registered letter to the online platform manager, within three
months from the date of publication of the online content. A proposed alternative is that people exercise their “right to reply” directly online.
IV. BEING VISIBLE AND THE “FORGETFULNESS OF BEING”
The echoing response to the first call of Being (#MeToo) is
about the pervasive and even noxious characteristics of visibility
within online social media. Openness is being challenged when exploring the unforeseen deviant paths or consequences that could lead
to a kind of e-notoriety, more deeply rooted in individualism than in
collectivism. In light of this, a being should be distinguishable from
others, “by thinking Being as a being.” 71 Blaming, shaming, targeting a being are self-centered actions of #MeToo, emphasizing “ourselves” (as a whole collectivity).
Vortex, as #MeToo, failed to delineate the notions of Being and
beings as its main functions. Being is #MeToo, and beings are survivors, The Unknown Soldier and the alleged aggressors. Vortex
arises from the abyss and generates a turbulent circular movement
of particles around an instantaneous axis. The eye of vortex is dual.
When caught in its nets, the vortex acts as a fury ready to drown
anything and anyone into the depth, the abyss of darkness (i.e., incrimination, arraignment, or conviction). On the contrary, it could
still be dangerous, though less, and let people consider the consequences they have taken that make the eye of vortex reappear, and
71. NINCENT VYCINAS, EARTH AND GODS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER 11 (Martinus Nijhoff 1969).
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propel them into the abyss of light (i.e., acquittal, absolution, or exoneration).
In Balance ton quoi, Belgian singer Angèle refers to #BalanceTonPorc and #MeToo. The title of her song is premonitory and
directly refers to the Weinstein case, from which the famous #BalanceTonPorc was derived in France. In her clip, 72 in a courtroom,
she alternately takes the roles of judge, defense lawyer, victim, harasser, and instructor. In this video, the producers have tried to point
out the entrenchment of sexism, sometimes unconscious to a part of
the population. The singer at the end takes the role of a “feministin-progress” (the instructor) in an “anti-sexism academy,” located at
the border between Belgium and France, to raise awareness and instill values of respect for women so as to break these rigid codes and
prove that girls are not stupid, which are preconceived ideas still
prevalent in our modern society. Her lyrics, 73 under the guise of decency, show how the evils of society have a hard life:
Throw your what.
Even if you speak badly about girls, I know that deep down
you understood.
Throw away your what, maybe one day it’ll change.
Throw your what.
Therefore, people’s relations and connections are deeply connected to the world in which they live. As such, the fullness of people’s identity, “the Forgetfulness of being,” 74 cannot be defined
without considering the right to be forgotten. The mingled waters of
vortex engender the virtuosity of perpetuality, denying people as beings the right to be forgotten online, regulated by the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in articles 17 and 19, and
substantially analyzed in Ctrl + Z: The Right to Be Forgotten by

72. ANGÈLE, Balance ton quoi, in BROL (Angèle VL Records 2018).
73. Id. Lyrics available at https://perma.cc/L4WR-3N6X (author’s translation).
74. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME: A REVISED EDITION OF THE
STAMBAUGH TRANSLATION (State University of New York Press 1962/2010).
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Meg Leta Jones. 75 Professor Dubravka Zarkov voices her insight
and leaves us with lessons for the future:
[A]s someone who has studied media representations, I am
also worried that visibility and exposure will be taken as
a solution to the problem of sexual violence. In other words,
I am worried that ‘making a person (especially the accused)
visible’ will be mistaken for ‘making the problem visible.’
Sadly, this is not the same, and the former can actually hamper the latter. Making powerful men as perpetrators and
young, beautiful women celebrities visible as victims carries
a danger of forgetting that sexual harassment, assault and violence are very much part of everyday life of many different
women and men, and that when feminists say it is a matter
of ‘power relations’ we do not actually reduce this power to
a number of powerful men. We want to look at larger power
structures that allow men—be they ‘powerful’ or not—to
treat women as their sex objects. And this is where I also see
the danger of this current mode of public ‘blaming and shaming’ of specific ‘bad men.’ 76
As Zarkov warns, images can mask, even as they uncover injustice. What we see (and even more importantly, what we don’t see)
can actually serve to misrepresent, and even camouflage, the
(un)represented.

75. MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (NYU Press
2006).
76. Dubravka Zarkov & Kathy Davis, Ambiguities and Dilemmas Around
#MeToo: #ForHowLong and #WhereTo?, 25 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 3-9 (2018)
(emphasis in original).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Digest Online Project (www.law.lsu.edu/digest) 1 was developed on the occasion of the bicentennial of the Digest of the
Civil Laws now in Force in the Territory of Orleans (Digest of
1808). 2 The first ancestor of the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana turned 200 years on March 31, 2008. This brief note looks
at the digitalization process one decade later and is divided into
three parts. Firstly, it highlights the importance of the Digest of
1808. Secondly, it shares insights on the digitalization process.

∗ Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University (The Netherlands); LLB, LLD, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina); LLM, Louisiana
State University (U.S.); PhD, Maastricht University.
The author thanks Olivier Moréteau for sharing insights and constructive criticism
when reading earlier drafts of this note. The author is likewise indebted to Samuel
Levy, who engineered the digital platform, for providing the statistics on the Digest Online.
1. See DIGEST ONLINE, available at https://perma.cc/YTT6-H7ST.
2. See generally A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO
ITS PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (Bradford & Anderson 1808).
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Thirdly, it presents information on the impact of that digital resource during its first ten years.
II. RELEVANCE
Louisiana was among the first jurisdictions to embrace the nineteenth-century codification process.3 On March 31, 1808, the local
Legislature promulgated the Digest of 1808. 4 That text comprised 2160
articles, was divided into a Preliminary Title and three books,5 and was
drafted in French and translated into English.6 The Digest of 1808 did
not include an exposé des motifs. 7 Nevertheless, a number of copies
contain interleaves with manuscript notes attributed to one of the drafters, Louis Moreau-Lislet.8
One of these manuscripts, the de la Vergne copy, includes references to Roman and Spanish materials.9 That 1814 manuscript also includes references to French texts of Roman grounding.10 The content

3. Mitchell Franklin, Concerning the Historic Importance of Edward Livingston, 11 TUL. L. REV. 163, 169-170 (1937). See generally Agustín Parise, A
Brief on Codification in Louisiana (1803-1830), in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS:
INTEGRATION OR DIS-INTEGRATION? 85 (J. Oosterhuis & E. van Dongen eds.
2013).
4. 1808 La. Acts No. 122.The complete French title is Digeste des lois civiles actuellement en force dans le territoire d'Orléans, avec des changemens et
améliorations adaptés à son présent système de gouvernement.
5. Preliminary Title of the General Definitions of Rights and the Promulgation of the Laws, and three books: Book I of Persons, Book II of Things or Estates,
and Book III of the Different Manners of Acquiring the Property of Things.
6. See generally E.B. Dubuisson, The Codes of Louisiana (Originals Written
in French; Errors of Translation, LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT
143 (1924); and John M. Shuey, Civil Codes—Control of the French Text of the
Code of 1825, 3 LA. L. REV. 452 (1941).
7. Joseph Dainow, Moreau Lislet’s Notes on Sources of Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808, 19 LA. L. REV. 43, 43 (1958).
8. John W. Cairns, The de la Vergne Volume and the Digest of 1808, 24 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 31, 74 (2009).
9. See the text of the avant-propos at Digest Online, supra note 1. See also
Cairns, supra note 8, at 76-77.
10. In addition, 645 articles do not have corresponding notes. See Vernon
Valentine Palmer, The Recent Discovery of Moreau Lislet’s System of Omissions
and Its Importance to the Debate over the Sources of the Digest of 1808, 49 LOY.
L. REV. 301, 337 (2003).
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of this copy was tested in 1971 by Rodolfo Batiza, 11 who identified the
textual origins of 2081 articles.12 He concluded that approximately
85% of the text of the articles had been extracted from French texts
(e.g., Code Napoléon, Projet of 1800). 13 In 1972, Robert A. Pascal
published a reply 14 claiming that French law, composed after elements
from Roman, Romanized Frankish, Burgundian, and Visigothic origin,
habitually resembled the Spanish law that derived from Roman or Roman-Visigothic origins. 15 He understood that the Code Napoléon provided a mine of texts written in French.16 Thus, the drafters used French
texts that contained or could be modified to contain in substance the
Spanish-Roman law then in force in Louisiana.17 The work of Batiza
and Pascal reflected that whether French, Spanish, or Roman, the laws
were mainly taken from the continental European system, and that the
Digest of 1808 was not a mere copy of the Code Napoléon or of a single
text. 18 That Tournament of Scholars 19 keeps alive the interest in the
Digest of 1808 and in the Louisiana civil law system.
III. DIGITALIZATION
The Digest of 1808 was digitalized as part of the bicentennial
events by the Center of Civil Law Studies (CCLS) of Louisiana State
University (LSU), making it accessible freely online. The original
French and the English translation can be viewed separately or together, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. The typing of both versions was

11. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971).
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972).
15. Id. at 605.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 606.
18. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY FOR
THE UNITED STATES 32 (1993).
19. That expression was presented in Joseph Modeste Sweeney, Louisiana
Civil Code of 1808: Tournament of Scholars over the Sources of the Civil Code
of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1972).
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extracted from the first edition; and with the exception of obvious typos, the Digest Online strictly follows the original wording and orthography. The manuscript notes from the De la Vergne copy are also
available, in manuscript form for the whole text and in typed form
for the Preliminary Title and Book I.
The De la Vergne copy, as the name indicates, is a volume that belonged to the de la Vergne family for generations, and is presently in
possession of Tulane University, after a bequest that followed the death
of Mr. Louis V. de la Vergne.20 The volume was published by the LSU
and Tulane law schools in 1968, and by Claitor’s in 1971, with a bicentennial soft cover reprint in 2008. The right to reproduce the notes within
the Digest Online Project was generously provided to the CCLS by Mr.
de la Vergne. 21

Figure 1. Homepage of the English version.

20. On the life of Mr. de la Vergne and his contribution to the study of Louisiana legal history, see Agustín Parise, Louis Victor de la Vergne (1938-2017), 10
J. CIV. L. STUD. 3 (2017). On the bequest of the manuscript, see https://
perma.cc/3793-KY3A.
21. See Olivier Moréteau and Agustín Parise, The Bicentennial of the Louisiana Civil Code (1808-2008), 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195, 197-198 (2009).
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The digitalization work was undertaken by an interdisciplinary team 22 and can be traced to May 2007. In a 2007 communication, team members indicated that “once completed, the Digest
On-Line project will enable research activities on the legal culture
of Louisiana from every corner of the World.” 23 The idea was to
build bridges between Louisiana and other jurisdictions. That
communication indicated that Bracton Online 24 and William
Blackstone’s work in the Avalon Project 25 had served as inspiration. 26 The Project Description, dated May 11, 2007, aimed to
make available “the original French [FR], with the English official translation [EN], and also the manuscript notes of the principal draftsman, Louis Moreau-Lislet, which give the sources used
for the drafting of the main divisions of the codes [MG] and the
individual articles [MA].” 27 It further read that:
Technically, the Code will be broken down in units [U].
Each unit is composed of the corresponding sections of FR,
EN, MG, MA, with the additional complexity that MG and
MA will be accessible both in typed [MG] [MA] and in manuscript form [PDF/MG] [PDF/MA].
The Digest will be accessible from a content table in French
[CT/FR] and in English [CT/EN], via hyperlinks leading
from CT/FR to FR and CT/EN to EN.
Opening any Unit of FR or EN, one can navigate horizontally to the same unit of EN or FR, as well as to MA, MG (in
PDF or typed form), with free horizontal navigation from
one to the other. Also, from any of these, one may navigate
vertically to the preceding or following unit of the same nature document. 28

22. All team members are mentioned in Credits, available at https://perma
.cc/7ZE8-947T.
23. Agustín Parise, Memorandum to Linda Rigell, Vic Erwin and Vicenç Feliú, Oct. 19, 2007 (on file with the author).
24. See Bracton Online, available at https://perma.cc/N44T-AS53.
25. See Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, available at
https://perma.cc/8KXS-2NHQ.
26. Parise, supra note 23.
27. Olivier Moréteau, Project Description, May 11, 2007 (on file with the
author).
28. Id.
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When referring to the arrangement of units, the text read that
“normally a unit will correspond to a chapter, occasionally a title
when very short, but chapters will often be broken down into
smaller units (one or several sections).” 29 Finally, the Project Description offered a matrix that served as blueprint, as illustrated in
Chart 1 below.
CT/FR

CT/EN

B1T1C1
B1T1C2
B1T1C3
B1T2C1
B1T2C2
B1T2C3
B1T2C4
B1T3
B1T4C1
B1T4C2
B1T4C3

B1T1C1
B1T1C2
B1T1C3
B1T2C1
B1T2C2
B1T2C3
B1T2C4
B1T3
B1T4C1
B1T4C2
B1T4C3

FR
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6
Unit 7
Unit 8
Unit 9
Unit 10
Unit 11

EN
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6
Unit 7
Unit 8
Unit 9
Unit 10
Unit 11

MG

MA

Unit 1
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 5
Unit 6
Unit 6
Unit 7
Unit 7
Unit 8
Unit 8
Unit 9
Unit 9
Unit 10 Unit 10
Unit 11 Unit 11

PDF/
MG
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6
Unit 7
Unit 8
Unit 9
Unit 10
Unit 11

Chart 1. Blueprint.
The Digest of 1808 was “physically” broken into units when sent
to the IT team members. For example, Figure 2 shows how the manuscript notes for individual articles for Book I, Title I, Chapter I
(MA B1T1C1) was shared with team members, who would then
type in Word the notes and further digitalize them to “feed” the Digest Online.

29. Id.

PDF/
MA
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6
Unit 7
Unit 8
Unit 9
Unit 10
Unit 11
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Figure 2. Manuscript notes for individual articles.
IV. IMPACT
The Digest Online is part of a larger project called Civil Law
Online, intended to showcase the rich repository of Louisiana scholarship, while also incorporating civil law resources from other sister jurisdictions. 30 In recent years, other resources were made available
30. See The Russell Long Chair and CCLS Newsletter, No. 7, May 2008; and
Agustín Parise, Golden Jubilee of the Center of Civil Law Studies: Celebrating
the Development of Legal Science in Louisiana, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1, 11 (2015).
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beyond the Digest Online by the CCLS. These resources built on the
expertise acquired in the Digest Online Project; and include the
compiled 31 and the current editions of the Civil Code, the latter in
English and with a French translation. 32
The Digest Online includes a user guide, 33 aiming to facilitate
the work of researchers. In similar lines, the resource offers a search
engine 34 and instructions on how to cite its contents. 35 Scholars access the Digest Online from different parts of the world, focusing in
different subject matters. Further, authors refer to the Digest Online
in their writings, 36 hence proving that the digitalization process enabled users to approach the source.
2008-2014
United States of America
United Kingdom
Chile
Germany
Italy
Chart 2. Country of origin (top 5). 37

2018
United States of America
United Kingdom
Russian Federation
South Korea
India

Statistics on the visits to the Digest Online are preserved, with
the exception of the period July 2014 to December 2017. 38 Statistics
reveal the use by scholars. Access to the Digest Online was from
31. See Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, available at https:
//perma.cc/X7CE-MGQT.
32. See Louisiana Civil Code Online, available at https://perma.cc/YFK8N6X4.
33. See User Guide, available at https://perma.cc/7AJ3-DKUR.
34. See Search the Digest of 1808, available at https://perma.cc/4EHG-8TA4.
35. See Citation, available at https://perma.cc/F5XL-CJA6.
36. Rebecca J. Scott, “She . . . Refuses to Deliver Up Herself as the Slave of
Your Petitioner”: Émigrés, Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest of the
Civil Laws, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 115, 116 (2009).
37. The top countries for 2008-2014 in this note resulted from the visits to
the homepage of the Digest Online. It should be noted that some visitors, once
their research was ongoing, accessed other units multiple times, without visiting
the homepage.
38. Servers were moved and reconfigured several times during that period.
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across the globe, as demonstrated, for example, when looking at the
2018 visitors.39 As reflected in Chart 2, in the ten-year period, most
visitors were from the U.S., followed by the United Kingdom. Visitors were from different legal traditions, hence showing the diverse
interest that scholars may have for a mixed jurisdiction. Statistics
show that visits spread throughout all books. However, as Chart 3
shows, the most visited units were from the Preliminary Title and
from Book I, dealing with persons. These units include images and
transcription of manuscript notes. Further, a number of publications 40 deal with those units and could have triggered additional interest in readers. The 2007 statement on enabling research activities
on the legal culture of Louisiana from every corner of the World was
confirmed.
Units 2008-2014
5
Preliminary Title
33
Book II Of things and of the different modifications of property

Units 2018
5
Preliminary Title
22
Book I Of persons

39. Visits to the Digest Online during 2018 were from the following jurisdictions: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Liberia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Puerto Rico, Republic of Serbia, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia,
Seychelles, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom, U.S., and Vietnam.
40. See, e.g., John W. Cairns, Blackstone in the Bayous: Inscribing Slavery
in the Louisiana Digest of 1808, in RE-INTERPRETING BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: A SEMINAL TEXT IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS
73 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2014); Alejandro Guzmán Brito, Las fuentes de las normas
sobre interpretación de las leyes del “digeste des lois civiles” (“code civil”) de
la luisiana (1808/1825), 31 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS HISTÓRICO-JURÍDICOS 171
(2009); and Scott, supra note 36.

292

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

Units 2008-2014

Units 2018

Title III Of usufruct, use and habitation
Chapter I Of usufruct
Section IV Of the obligations of
the owner
Section V How usufruct expires

Title VIII Of minors, of their tutorship, curatorship and emancipation
Chapter I Of tutorship
Section VII Of the causes which
dispense or excuse from the tutorship
Section VIII Of incapacity for,
exclusion from and deprivation of
the tutorship
6
Book I Of persons
Title I Of the distinction of persons, and the privation of certain
civil rights in certain cases
Chapter I Of the distinction of
persons established by nature
Chapter II Of the distinction of
persons which are established by
law
101
Book III Of the different manners
of acquiring the property of
things
Title XIX Of privileges and mortgages
Chapter I Of the nature of a mortgage and of its several sorts
Chapter II Who may mortgage
and what thing may be mortgaged
Chapter III Of the effects of mortgage
Section I Of the effects of mortgage with regard to the debtor

6
Book I Of persons
Title I Of the distinction of persons, and the privation of certain
civil rights in certain cases
Chapter I Of the distinction of
persons established by nature
Chapter II Of the distinction of
persons which are established by
law
22
Book I Of persons
Title VIII Of minors, of their tutorship, curatorship and emancipation
Chapter I Of tutorship
Section VII Of the causes which
dispense or excuse from the tutorship
Section VIII Of incapacity for,
exclusion from and deprivation of
the tutorship

2019]

THE DIGEST ONLINE PROJECT
Units 2008-2014

11
Book I Of persons
Title IV Of husband and wife
Chapter I On marriage
Chapter II How marriages may be
contractor or made
Chapter III Of the nullity of marriages
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Units 2018
Section II Of the effects of mortgage against third possessors and
of the action of mortgage
22
Book I Of persons
Title VIII Of minors, of their tutorship, curatorship and emancipation
Chapter I Of tutorship
Section VII Of the causes which
dispense or excuse from the tutorship
Section VIII Of incapacity for,
exclusion from and deprivation of
the tutorship

Chart 3. Units consulted (top 5). 41
V. CLOSING REMARKS
The mixed character of Louisiana and its legal heritage have
proved to be of interest for scholars. As stated in 1933 by Mitchell
Franklina leading scholar on the civil law heritage of Louisiana—
the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana “is the most important contribution of Louisiana to an American culture.” 42 At this stage in
time, it is appropriate to extend the scope of this statement, claiming
that the civil code, and its ancestors, are the most important contribution of Louisiana to the civil law worldwide.
The digitalization process of the Digest of 1808 indeed invited
hundreds of scholars from different legal traditions to explore a sem-

41. This enumeration excludes the homepage, the cover page, the index, and
the search engine.
42. Mitchell Franklin, Civil Code of the State of Louisiana, Revision of 1870,
7 TUL. L. REV. 632, 632 (1933) (book review).

294

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

inal building block for codification in the Americas. It further enabled the dissemination of an important component of Louisiana’s
legal heritage across the globe. This resource, a decade after its conception, continues contributing to the development of global perspectives and of comparative legal history. 43

43. On recent developments in these perspectives towards the study of law,
see, e.g., Thomas Duve, European Legal History—Concepts, Methods, Challenges, ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES,
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL HISTORY 29 (Thomas Duve ed., 2014); Aniceto
Masferrer et al., The Emergence of Comparative Legal History, in COMPARATIVE
LEGAL HISTORY 1 (Olivier Moréteau et al. eds., 2019); and Agustín Parise,
OWNERSHIP PARADIGMS IN AMERICAN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS:
MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SHIFTS IN THE LEGISLATION OF LOUISIANA, CHILE, AND
ARGENTINA (16TH-20TH CENTURIES) (Brill 2017), especially chapter 2.

BREXIT, BORIS JOHNSON AND THE NOBILE OFFICIUM
Stephen Thomson *
Keywords: Brexit, civil procedure, constitutional law, equitable jurisdiction, European Union, Scotland
Nowhere is off limits, these days, for a discussion of Brexit. 1
Not even the pages of the Journal of Civil Law Studies are safely
insulated from this all-pervasive subject. This report from Scotland
discusses a petition to the nobile officium of the Court of Session—
a unique equitable jurisdiction—that almost became one of the most
dramatic cases in UK constitutional history, and which generated
global interest in this little used jurisdiction of the supreme civil
court in Scotland. It was just one of the many twists and turns in the
Brexit saga, but one that adequately demonstrated how distinctive is
this power of the Scottish courts when contrasted with their counterparts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The main, relevant aspects of Brexit can be summarised as follows. The electorate in the referendum on the United Kingdom’s
membership of the European Union, held on June 23, 2016, voted
by a majority to leave the EU. On March 29, 2017, the UK 2 gave
notice to the European Council 3 of its intention to withdraw from
the EU in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European

*
Associate Professor, City University of Hong Kong; LL.B. (Hons.),
LL.M. (Res.), Ph.D., Dip.L.P., University of Edinburgh.
1. This portmanteau of “British” and “exit” has widely become the standard
way of referring to the act and/or process of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal
from the European Union.
2. As required by the UK Supreme Court’s decision in R (on the application
of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5,
the UK could only serve notice under TEU Art. 50 with parliamentary consent as
expressed in an Act of Parliament. The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 was subsequently enacted authorizing the Prime Minister to notify, under TEU Art. 50, the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU.
3. This shall be used as shorthand for the Council of the European Union.
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Union (TEU). 4 This triggered a two year withdrawal process that
would mean that the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (the “Treaties”) would cease to apply to the UK on
March 29, 2019. 5 A great deal of water passed under the bridge during those two years, especially in domestic UK politics. Notably, the
UK Parliament enacted the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018,
which, inter alia, provided that the Withdrawal Agreement 6 may be
ratified only if parliamentary approval thereof had been obtained. 7
In the context of three failed attempts by the UK Government to
obtain that parliamentary approval in early 2019, the then UK Prime
Minister, Rt. Hon. Theresa May MP, twice requested an extension
to the Article 50 period from March 29, 2019 until June 30, 2019.
The European Council granted, on the second occasion, an extension until October 31, 2019, 8 thus setting this as the new date on
which the Treaties would cease to apply to the UK.
May’s repeated failure to obtain parliamentary approval for
her negotiated Withdrawal Agreement led to her resignation as
leader of the Conservative Party (and thus Prime Minister), with
Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson MP winning the party’s leadership election and thus becoming the Prime Minister on July 24, 2019.
Johnson, who prior to his election as leader stated that he would
take the UK out of the EU on October 31, 2019 “come what may,
do or die,” 9 came to make similar, firm statements to that effect
after entering office. Among these were his statement on September 5, 2019 that he would rather be “dead in a ditch” than request
4. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26. 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, Art. 50. [hereinafter TEU].
5. TEU, supra note 4, at Art. 50(3).
6. Namely an agreement (whether or not ratified) between the UK and the
EU under TEU Art. 50—European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s.20(1) [hereinafter EU Withdrawal Act 2018].
7. EU Withdrawal Act 2018, supra note 6, at s.13.
8. European Council Decision (EU) 2019/584, Nov. 4, 2019 O.J. (L 101)
1-3. The first extension was, pursuant to European Council Decision (EU)
2019/476, until April 12, 2019.
9. Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt divided over Brexit plans, BBC NEWS,
https://perma.cc/8VM2-5FNW.
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an extension beyond October 31, 2019; 10 his letter sent on September 6, 2019 to Conservative Party members stating that
“beg[ging] Brussels for an extension to the Brexit deadline . . . is
something I will never do”; 11 his claim on September 7, 2019, in
response to a question of whether he would seek an extension if required to do so by law, “I will not. I don’t want a delay”; 12 and his
answer in an online “People’s PMQs” on September 12, 2019, in
response to the question “Can you confirm we will leave the EU on
31 October?,” “[I have] probably said that five times already, but [I
am] delighted to confirm that.” 13
Set in that context, the UK Parliament enacted the European Union
(Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, often informally referred to as the
“Benn Act”14 and pejoratively referred to by Johnson as the “Surrender
Act.” 15 This essentially required that, if parliamentary approval had not
been obtained either for a negotiated withdrawal agreement or for the
UK to leave the EU without such an agreement, in the manner prescribed, 16 then the Prime Minister would be required, no later than October 19, 2019, to seek to obtain from the European Council an extension to the Article 50 period by sending to the President of the European Council a letter in the form set out in the Schedule to the Act.17
Despite Johnson’s claims that the UK Government would remain in
compliance with its legal obligations while taking the UK out of the
EU on October 31, 2019—claims that raised widespread speculation
10. Boris Johnson: ‘I’d rather be dead in a ditch’ than ask for Brexit delay,
BBC NEWS, https://perma.cc/BJA6-HHPB.
11. Lanre Bakare, Boris Johnson ‘could be jailed for refusing to seek Brexit
delay,’ THE GUARDIAN, https://perma.cc/JF79-SK5W.
12. I will not seek Brexit delay, Boris Johnson insists, THE TIMES, https://
perma.cc/WCF7-877X.
13. Brexit: government publishes Operation Yellowhammer documents—
live news, THE GUARDIAN, https://perma.cc/VM75-J8VW.
14. The bill was introduced to the House of Commons by Rt. Hon. Hilary
Benn MP.
15. Henry Nicholls, PM Johnson defends use of Brexit ‘surrender act,’ REUTERS, https://perma.cc/T287-FFBR.
16. See Cherry v Advocate General, 2019 SLT 1143, para. 22.
17. European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, s.1 [hereinafter EU
Withdrawal Act 2019].
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as to what stratagem the government might be intending to deploy in
order to do so (it later transpired that there was none, or none that came
to fruition 18)—concern mounted in some quarters that Johnson
would fail to comply with his obligations under the European Union
(Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019.
A petition was therefore lodged by three persons—Dale Vince
(a businessman), Jolyon Maugham QC (a barrister) and Joanna
Cherry QC MP (a Scottish National Party MP)—to the nobile officium of the Court of Session. The petition sought, inter alia, that
the court would authorize and ordain its clerk to sign and send the
extension letter, which may be required to be sent to the European
Council should Johnson fail to do so by the end of October 19, 2019,
as required by law. 19 This thrust the nobile officium from the shadows of relative obscurity—and on which this author has written the
only text 20—into the global spotlight, as this could be the means by
which the UK formally sought an extension to its departure from the
EU under Article 50, and by which Johnson’s insistence that the UK
would leave the EU on October 31, 2019 would come undone.
It is at this juncture that a brief description of the nobile officium
must be given. The nobile officium (literally “noble office”) of the
Court of Session (the supreme civil court in Scotland) 21 is its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction to award any remedy it thinks fit
in technically narrow, but substantively wide, circumstances. As an
equitable jurisdiction, the petitioner “comes to the court not as a
matter of legal right, but of equitable supplication.” 22 The two main
18. Explainer: Looking for loopholes—How could Johnson avoid delaying
Brexit?, REUTERS, https://perma.cc/344M-RQZB. The claim of legal compliance
was also made by the Advocate General (on behalf of the UK Government) in
Vince v Advocate General [2019] CSIH 51, para. 3.
19. EU Withdrawal Act 2019, supra note 17, at s.1(3).
20. STEPHEN THOMSON, THE NOBILE OFFICIUM: THE EXTRAORDINARY EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF SCOTLAND (Avizandum
2015).
21. The High Court of Justiciary—the supreme criminal court in Scotland—
also has a nobile officium. The UK Supreme Court does not, however, have a
nobile officium, even though appeal may lie to it from the Court of Session.
22. THOMSON , supra note 20, at 1.
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situations in which the nobile officium has tended to be used are
where (i) a remedy is not provided for by law, typically in exceptional or unforeseen circumstances, 23 often characterised as a “gap”
in the law, 24 or (ii) an outcome is provided by law, but its application
would be particularly oppressive, burdensome or unjust, in which
case the court can disapply or mitigate the effect of an existing legal
rule. Pertinent to the case at hand, it had also been used on a handful
of occasions to ordain substituted authority to subscribe, 25 namely
to authorize a person, typically the Clerk of Court, to sign a document that was legally required to be signed in place of the rightful
signatory who was unable or unwilling to sign that document. This
judicial power was regarded as unique to the Scottish courts—with
no counterpart available in the courts of England and Wales, or of
Northern Ireland—hence, the petitioners’ decision to turn to the
Scottish courts in pursuit of their objective. 26
The petitioners had certainly been astute to identify this procedural mechanism as a potential means of forcing Johnson’s hand:
either of signing and sending the letter himself, as required by the
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019, or of having it signed and
sent on his behalf so as to achieve the objectives of the Act. A small
number of cases had seen the court authorize an official (usually the
Clerk of Court) to sign on behalf of a recalcitrant person. The underlying principle in such cases has been:
[A]n intention not to permit legal processes to be obstructed
by what are typically recalcitrant persons who have not only
a right, but an obligation, to sign a particular document or
instrument . . . . [T]he power may also be exercised where it
is not certain that the rightful subscriber is refusing to sign
23. Lord Justice-General Emslie described the existence of extraordinary or
unforeseen circumstances as “the primary justification for the exercise of the nobile officium.” Anderson v HM Advocate, 1974 SLT 239, 240. See also THOMSON, supra note 20, at 226-228.
24. Stephen Thomson, The Nobile Officium in Civil Jurisdiction: An Outline
of Equitable Gap-Filling in Scotland, 29 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 125 (2014).
25. THOMSON, supra note 20, at 168-169.
26. For a discussion of limitations on the exercise of the nobile officium, see
THOMSON, supra note 20, at 223-252.
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the document or instrument, but where it is nevertheless
proving impossible to obtain subscription. In each case, the
Court has authorised a clerk or deputy clerk of court to sign
in place of the rightful subscriber. As such, the Court ensures
that a practical solution is found where it would be inequitable to allow an obstruction or defeat of the realization of legal rights. 27
The court thus authorized the Clerk of Court to sign a discharge
of bonds on behalf of a bondholder who refused to sign it, even in
defiance of a court order. 28 In another case it authorized the Clerk
of Court to sign an assignation on behalf of a recalcitrant bankrupt. 29
The court has authorized the Deputy Principal Clerk of Session to
sign a disposition of property on behalf of a person who stated in a
letter that she would never sign such a disposition, which she sent
alongside the unsigned disposition that had been sent for her signature. 30 The court also authorized the Clerk of Court to sign a disposition on behalf of a seller who refused to do so, 31 and authorized
the Deputy Principal Clerk of Session to sign a disposition on behalf
of a seller who had travelled to Nigeria and who could not be contacted for signature. 32
These cases provided precedent 33 for the court to authorize one
of its officials to sign a document that was legally required to be
signed, but which the rightful signatory either could not or would
not sign. Clearly, however, the nobile officium had never been used
to sign and send a document in place of the Prime Minister to
27. THOMSON, supra note 20, at 169.
28. Wallace’s Curator Bonis v Wallace, 1924 SC 212.
29. Pennell’s Trustee, Petitioner, 1928 SC 605.
30. Lennox, Petitioners, 1950 SC 546. There is a curious, if slight, resemblance between these facts and the conduct of Johnson, who not only stated on
multiple occasions that he would not seek an extension from the EU, but in the
end sent an unsigned photocopy of the extension letter to the European Council
together with a letter explaining why his government would prefer not to have an
extension to the Art. 50 period.
31. Mackay v Campbell, 1966 SC 237.
32. Boag, Petitioner, 1967 SC 322.
33. Despite some judicial statements to the contrary, invocation of the nobile
officium should not—by the very nature of the jurisdiction—require precedent.
THOMSON, supra note 20, at 241-252.

2019]

SCOTLAND

301

formally request an extension on behalf of the UK under a provision
in an international treaty. The nobile officium had also never been
used in a manner that would have such spectacular political and constitutional ramifications, nor had there been any reason for it to gain
such prominent media attention, both domestically and internationally. It could not, however, be said in the context of those historical
precedents that the current petition to the nobile officium was without merit.
A petition to the nobile officium of this kind must be presented
to the Inner House, 34 namely the senior division of the Court of Session (the junior division, from which appeals can be made to the
Inner House, being the Outer House). The court’s judgment (dated
October 9, 2019) stated that it would “normally be a necessary precursor to any order authorising the substitution of a signature by the
clerk of court” that an order be obtained for specific performance of
a statutory duty under section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988. 35
The obtainment of such an order was not successful in a related action, in which Johnson was deemed to accept that he must comply
with the requirements of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2)
Act 2019 and affirmed that he intended to do so. 36 The Inner House,
on the strength of that related judgment, effectively considered the
current petition to be premature inasmuch as coercive measures
should normally not be granted unless a party has already failed to
comply with their legal obligations within the relevant timeframe. It
noted that it was uncertain whether the statutory requirements that
would oblige Johnson to send an extension letter to the European
Council would be met, and the time for sending that letter (should
he be required to do so) had not yet come. 37 This petition might,
ordinarily, be dismissed on two bases. First, there had not yet been
any unlawfulness for the reasons of time already stated. Second, the
34.
35.
36.
37.

Rules of the Court of Session, r 14.3(d).
Vince v Advocate General, supra note 18, at para. 5.
Vince v Johnson [2019] CSOH 77.
Vince v Advocate General, supra note 18, at para. 8.
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petition could be dismissed as unnecessary given the alternative
remedies sought or potentially available in the related action (including specific performance), noting the general principle that the
nobile officium cannot be competently invoked where another remedy is available or which was not pursued and which is no longer
available. 38 However, the court noted that should it be necessary
for a petition to be brought afresh after the statutory deadline for
sending the extension letter of October 19, 2019, any remedy the
court might award could be rendered ineffective as a result of the
passage of time (and noting that the UK could still be scheduled
to leave the EU on October 31, 2019). The court therefore continued consideration of the petition until October 21, 2019 “by
which time the position ought to be significantly clearer.” 39
As events unfolded, it became unnecessary for the court to
consider whether it should exercise its nobile officium to order
the Clerk of Court to sign and send the extension letter to the European Council in place of Johnson. This is because, on October
19, 2019, Johnson sent three letters: one (believed to be an unsigned photocopy) to the President of the European Council seeking an extension to the Article 50 period until January 31, 2020
(in putative fulfilment of his obligations under the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019), 40 a cover letter from the Permanent Representative of the UK to the EU to the Secretary-General of the European Council, 41 and one (a signed letter appearing
to be written in a personal capacity) to “Donald” (Donald Tusk,
President of the European Council) expressing his and his government’s dissatisfaction with a further extension to the UK’s

38. See THOMSON, supra note 20, at 237-241.
39. Vince v Advocate General, supra note 18, at para. 12.
40. Letter from Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Donald Tusk, President of the European
Council (Oct. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/H5GB-FJ9S.
41. Letter from Sir Tim Barrow, United Kingdom Permanent Representative
to the European Union to Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Secretary-General of the
European Council (Oct. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/N54N-Q2W6.
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withdrawal from the EU. 42 The European Council subsequently
agreed to extend the Article 50 period until January 31, 2020,
with provision for early termination of that extension should a
withdrawal agreement be ratified by both sides at an earlier date. 43
The petition to the nobile officium therefore became redundant,
but its significance should not be underappreciated. This was the
first time that the nobile officium had been petitioned against such a
turbulent legal, political and constitutional background, and importantly, it was not dismissed by the court as unmeritorious. Had
Johnson failed to comply with his obligations under the European
Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, the court may well have exercised the nobile officium to ordain the Clerk of Court to sign and
send the extension letter to the European Council on his behalf.
There was, for a time, a real possibility of this and it was in this
context that the nobile officium went from relative obscurity to a
surge in national and international interest in what was this unique
power of the Scottish courts that could force Johnson’s hand in seeking an extension to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 44 Since the
events of October, 2019, a general election was held on December
12, 2019, 45 in which Johnson’s Conservative Party won a landslide
majority, significantly changing the parliamentary arithmetic on all
matters Brexit. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act
2020 was subsequently enacted for the implementation of the revised Withdrawal Agreement, with the UK’s departure from the EU
taking effect on January 31, 2020.
The significance of the nobile officium case nevertheless endures. It launched the nobile officium to stratospheric notoriety
42. Letter from Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Donald Tusk, President of the European
Council (Oct. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/V6XP-LF97.
43. Decision EUCO XT 20024/2/19 REV 2.
44. See, e.g., Reevel Alderson, What is the nobile officium?, BBC NEWS,
https://perma.cc/TJ66-EW69 and Kieran Andrews, Legal Bid to Force Boris
Johnson to Delay Brexit, THE TIMES, https://perma.cc/RD75-FAGZ.
45. Legal provision for this election was made in the Early Parliamentary
General Election Act 2019, effective October 31, 2019.

304

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

relative to its previous, quiet existence. There is now such awareness
of the jurisdiction and its highly versatile potential applications that
it may in future attract more petitions than the handful submitted
each year. The first Deputy President of the UK Supreme Court,
Lord Hope of Craighead, wrote in the foreword to this author’s text
on the nobile officium that it “needs to be invoked wherever it is
needed to prevent injustice, and the courts need to be encouraged to
use it.” 46 This author has also encouraged practitioners to use it, and
to use it properly. 47 It is probably safe to say that no one envisaged
that the nobile officium would (almost) be used to such dramatic effect as in this case, and the publicity surrounding the case may provide the catalyst for that encouragement. It also shows that equitable
jurisdiction, sometimes written off as an obscure backwater of the
legal consciousness, can be thrust onto centre stage when the occasion arises, and that it can serve a distinct purpose that is not served
by ordinary legal jurisdiction.
The fact that the petitioners turned to the courts of Scotland for
resort to this unique judicial power, and not to those elsewhere in
the UK which do not enjoy such a power, is further evidence of the
practical implications of Scotland’s distinct legal system. The Scottish jurist Lord Kames wrote that there was growing in the Court of
Session a jurisdiction which “will probably in time produce a general maxim, that it is the province of [the court], to redress all wrongs
for which no other remedy is provided.” 48 That has been especially
evident in the court’s nobile officium, and it is a testament to the
continuing utility of that high equitable jurisdiction that the petitioners sought to effect the Prime Minister’s statutory obligations, not in
England, Wales or Northern Ireland, but in Scotland.

46.
47.

See THOMSON, supra note 20, at x.
Stephen Thomson, The Nobile Officium: Still Relevant, Still Useful, THE
JOURNAL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND, available at https://perma
.cc/P9US-96VW.
48. HENRY HOME, HISTORICAL LAW TRACTS 228-229 (4th ed., Bell & Bradfute 1817).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most people would think that a child’s best interest would be to
live with the biological mother and biological father under one roof
as one big happy family. Although this might be ideal, this is not
always possible. Many families with children separate all around the
world and go through challenging custody battles. In most situations, each party will claim that he or she should be granted sole
custody or designated as the domiciliary parent1 because it would be
* J.D./D.C.L. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Carter
and Professor Ryan for their assistance, wisdom, and support throughout the writing of this case note.
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(B) (2018) defines domiciliary parent with
the following implication:
(2) The domiciliary parent is the parent with whom the child shall primarily reside, but the other parent shall have physical custody during
time periods that assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact
with both parents.
(3) The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All
major decisions made by the domiciliary parent concerning the child
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in the child’s best interest. On the other hand, there are some biological parents who see themselves as unfit to take care of their child
at the moment and grant permission for the child to stay with a nonparent because it would be in the child’s best interest. Often times,
it is in the child’s best interest to stay with a nonparent. However,
parents have superior rights in most cases. The case of Tracie F. v.
Francisco D.2 confronts this issue by looking through the lenses of
whether a child should be moved from what is generally viewed as
the stable and long-lasting environment provided by a nonparent
who has been awarded custody as a domiciliary parent. In this case,
the Louisiana Supreme Court examines the issue by employing the
best-interest-of-the-child doctrine to clarify the different approaches
that appellate courts have developed in similar situations and to
come to a conclusion that will be in the best interest of the child in
the case.
II. BACKGROUND
There is a lot of law on the best-interest-of-the-child standard in
state, federal, and international law. In regard to efforts which have
been implemented internationally for the rights of children, in 1989,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child was approved in New
York by the United Nations. The treaty sets out the civil, political,
economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children. Article 3
states that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.”3 This concept has been analyzed and applied in various cases in Louisiana, including the instant case. This matter entails a custody dispute between a biological
shall be subject to review by the court upon motion of the other parent.
It shall be presumed that all major decisions made by the domiciliary
parent are in the best interest of the child.
2. Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 188 So. 3d 231 (La. 2016).
3. UN General Assembly, Convention on The Rights of The Child at art. 3,
(United States, November 1989), available at https://perma.cc/GV6E-JVGF.
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father and a maternal grandmother, who had been named as the
domiciliary parent in a consent judgment.4
On May 29, 2006, D. was born to Tracie F., who was unmarried.
Tracie indicated that D.’s father was Francisco D., who was in his
early 30s.5 Tracie and Francisco have never lived together, nor have
they ever been in a committed relationship. After Tracie gave birth
to D., Tracie filed a petition for sole custody or, alternatively, for
joint custody with Francisco but with Tracie being named as the
domiciliary parent. On January 7, 2007, by stipulated judgment,6 the
court granted joint custody, naming Tracie as the domiciliary parent.
Francisco was awarded reasonable visitation and was ordered to pay
$400 per month in child support and to sustain health insurance on
the child.
By all accounts, including his own stipulation, Francisco had
very little interaction with D. in D.’s upbringing for about the first
seven years of D.’s life. During that time, Francisco rarely exercised
his visitation rights and had not taken a role in D.’s educational development. However, Tracie also had proved to be less than a model
parent. When D. was still an infant, Tracie placed many of the responsibilities on her mother, Kathy B., and stepfather, Michael B.
without giving them legal rights. Thus, they acted as de facto parents.7 Additionally, when D. was about six months old, Tracie and
D. moved into Kathy and Michael’s house for an extended period of
time. As D. grew beyond infancy, so did Kathy and Michael’s role

4. Although the underlying reasons were uncertain from the record before
the court, the court adhered to the appellate court’s attempts to conceal the identity
of the litigants and the minor child in the court’s opinion.
5. As a child born from unmarried parents, D. had been “formally acknowledged by both parents.” See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 184, 186, 196 (2019).
6. A stipulated judgment is a type of custody award which a court renders
when the parties consent to a custodial arrangement and there is no evidence of
parental fitness from either party. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335 (2019).
7. See De Facto Parent Information (JV-295), Advokids, at https://perma
.cc/DFR3-73E5. A de facto parent is an individual who assumes, on a day-to-day
basis, the role of a parent for the child. This person fulfills the child’s physical
and psychological needs for the care and affection of the child. Also, this person
assumes that role for a substantial period.
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in the development of D. Kathy and Michael sent D. to a private
school, and Kathy paid the tuition. Michael was the coach for D.’s
baseball team. Also, Kathy and Michael cultivated D.’s religious upbringing and supported his participation in cub scouts.8 The record
was uncertain as to whether Francisco fulfilled all of his child support obligations. However, it established that out of the payments
which Francisco did make Tracie did not give any portion of them
to Kathy or Michael. Thus, Kathy and Michael handled the bulk of
the financial responsibilities when they cared for D.9
In the beginning of 2013, Kathy became concerned about
Tracie’s behavior, including her supervision of D. Through counsel,
Kathy contacted Francisco to inform him of her concerns about
Tracie’s behavior. Kathy’s counsel informed Francisco that Tracie
was involved in a physically abusive relationship and had begun
abusing drugs. Kathy suggested that D. be removed from Tracie’s
custody and Francisco agreed. On May 28, 2013, Francisco joined
Kathy in a pleading styled “Petition to Change Custody to Non-Parent and Petition of Intervention for Custody of Minor Child.”10 Concurrently with the joint petition, a proposed order was submitted
which granted Kathy with temporary custody with a rule to show
cause why Francisco should not be relieved of child support obligations “with the change in custody to Kathy.”11 The district court imposed the temporary order. Tracie was designated as a defendant in
Kathy and Francisco’s petition. Subsequently, on July 18, 2013, all
three parties agreed to a decree by which D. was permanently removed from Tracie’s custody and joint custody was granted to
Kathy and Francisco. By the same stipulated judgement, Kathy was
named as the domiciliary parent and Francisco was not required to
pay child support.12

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On August 7, 2014, Francisco filed an “Amended Rule to
Change Custody, Set Visitation and Other Relief and Memorandum
of Law to Exception of No Cause of Action.”13 Francisco’s pleading
was prefaced with the statement that “circumstances have changed
to such a material extent and degree affecting the welfare of the child
to warrant a modification of custody.”14 Francisco alleged that
Kathy had not provided him with any information about D.’s health,
education, and welfare. Francisco contended that D. had expressed
a strong interest to stay with him and that he wanted sole custody
because he as a biological father had a paramount parental right over
Kathy, a nonparent.
Francisco’s rule to change was referred to a hearing officer who
found that there had not been any material circumstances that had
changed since the stipulated judgment. Based on the officer’s instructions, Francisco’s request to change custody was set for trial
because his request was “such a profound step” that to do so would
require a trial before a district judge.15 Both Kathy and Francisco
filed separate pretrial memoranda, and each argued that the other
party had the burden of proof. However, the district court had not
indicated which party had the burden of proof. Francisco and Kathy
both presented evidence of their current and extensive involvement
in D.’s life and upbringing, with Francisco indicating that he became
actively involved in D.’s life only within the past year.16 At the conclusion of the trial, the district court awarded sole custody to Francisco and indicated that Kathy had the burden of proof, but failed to
meet her burden of proving that if the father had custody of the minor, the child would sustain substantial harm.17 The court expressed
that the evidence adduced at trial proved that D. would be in a loving
and structured environment under the biological father’s care.18 The
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237-38 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2019)).
Id. at 238 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131, et seq. (2019)).
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court further recognized Francisco’s paramount right to custody of
his child.19 Subsequently, Kathy appealed.
In a split decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth
Circuit determined that Francisco had the burden of proof to show
“rehabilit[ation]” to be currently fit to be designated as a domiciliary
parent and to prove that the environment provided by Kathy as the
present domiciliary parent had “materially changed.”20 Thus, the appellate court’s majority reinstated the “stipulated judgment awarding joint custody to Kathy and Francisco, with Kathy designated as
the domiciliary parent.”21 Francisco then sought review by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The court granted a writ to determine the
standard for adjudicating a request for increased custodial rights
brought by a biological parent who shared joint custody with a
grandparent, and the biological parent had earlier stipulated that the
grandparent should be designated as having the rights and responsibilities of a domiciliary parent.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision was guided by Title V,
Book I, of the Louisiana Civil Code article 131 and the legislative
comments to its revision. Article 131 indicates that “[i]n a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child
in accordance with the best interest of the child.”22 The court concluded that the legislative comments to article 131 were immensely
instructive for this case and that according to the 1993 Revision
Comment (a), “the best interest of the child [is] the overriding test
to be applied in all child custody determinations.”23 Further, the
court acknowledged Revision Comment (d) in article 131, which
states that “[t]his Article should be followed in actions to change
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2019)).
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2019).
Id. at comment (a).
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custody as well as in those to initially set it.”24 Therefore, relying on
these comments, the court held that the primary consideration in a
determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. Specifically, in this case, since the original custody decree was a stipulated judgment, the court further held that:
[A] biological parent with joint custody, who seeks modification of a stipulated custody award to obtain greater custodial rights, must prove: 1) that there has been a material
change of circumstances since the original custody decree
was entered; and 2) that the proposed modification is in the
best interest of the child.25
With this being said, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded
that the appellate court committed legal error in choosing the standard it did, for several reasons. First, the appellate court should have
applied the standard from article 131 and not the standard from article 133. Second, the court explained that the heightened standard
chosen by the appellate court hinders—rather than advocates—the
best-interest-of-the-child standard. Further, the standard articulated
by the appellate court curtails, rather than respects, the constitutional
rights of biological parents. The standard diminishes the constitutional rights because the standard that was applied by the appellate
court does not even get to the analysis of the child’s best interest.
Thus, this deprives the biological parent from the right of proving
that it would be in the child’s best interest to have the biological
parent designated as the domiciliary parent. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the correct standard (best interest of the
child) to the facts of this case.
Applying the first part of the standard of whether there had been
a material change of circumstances since the original custody decree
was entered, the court held that Francisco had proven—by his shift
from minimal involvement to being integrally involved in the
child’s life—a material change in circumstances.26 Francisco had
24.
25.
26.

Id. at comment (d).
Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 235.
Id. at 247-248.
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frequent visitation with D. and even provided D. with his own bedroom at Francisco’s home. Also, Francisco had afforded opportunities for religious growth which were complementary to the religious
traditions of D.’s early childhood upbringing. Further, Francisco had
nurtured D.’s interest in hunting and fishing, and regularly communicated by phone with D. Applying the second part of the standard
of whether it would be in the best interest of D. to change the custody decree, the court held that although Francisco’s recent involvement with D. was commendable and was reflected in some of the
best interest of the child factors from article 134 in equipoise between Francisco and Kathy, several of the factors weighed in favor
of Kathy as the domiciliary parent as in D.’s best interest.27 Francisco was able to meet the factors of developing a loving and affectionate relationship with D., but Kathy met those factors, and more,
because she was there for the majority of D.’s upbringing and provided for the necessities and stabilities which D. needed in his early
stages of life. Specifically, Kathy had the ability to provide D. with
a growing stable and adequate environment for D. to thrive in. Thus,
the court found that it was in the best interest of D. to reinstate the
stipulated judgment by which Francisco and Kathy share joint custody and Kathy was designated as the domiciliary parent.
Judge Crichton concurred in the result reached by the Louisiana
Supreme Court; however, in his view, Francisco had not demonstrated a material change of circumstances sufficient enough to trigger the second prong of the analysis applied by the court. Specifically, Judge Crichton expressed that Francisco’s recent efforts to
foster a relationship with D. did stand out compared to Francisco’s
earlier involvement with D. and would be considered a change in
circumstances. Yet, he believed that Francisco had not shifted his
behavior enough to be considered integrally involved in D.’s life.
Thus, Judge Crichton indicated that Francisco had not even met the
threshold of materiality.
27.

Id. at 248-249.
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IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary will first provide a discussion on the court’s
application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard and how the
practice of this standard shapes the future development of the child.
Next, this commentary will look at a more thorough analysis of the
evidentiary standard required to be met for a nonparent to obtain
joint or sole custody indicated in the code and how this standard is
incompatible with society’s current custom. The Louisiana Supreme
Court did not address the ability of a parent to consent to a judgment
wherein the parent shares legal custody of a child with a nonparent.
A. Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard
The best-interest-of-the-child standard applied in a custody case
where a biological parent is requesting increased custodial rights
with a grandparent, and the biological parent has earlier stipulated
that the grandparent should be designated as the domiciliary parent
such as in this case, gives both parties the chance to fight for the
protection of the child. Child Welfare Information Gateway defines
“best interests” as the deliberation that courts undertake when deciding what types of services, actions, and orders will best serve a
child as well as who is best suited to take care of a child. Other factors including the parent’s or caregiver’s circumstances and capacity
to parent, including the child’s ultimate safety and wellbeing, are
also taken into consideration. This standard is applied in all states,
the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.28 Other
countries which are part of the United Nations, including France and
the United Kingdom, apply this standard as well.
The best-interest-of-the-child is codified in Title V, Book I of
the Civil Code. As article 131 explains, “[i]n a proceeding for
28. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Determining the Best Interests of the Child Report (2016), available at https://perma.cc/YC9N-Y5PV.
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divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child.”29 According to the 1993
Revision Comment (a), “the best interest of the child [is] the overriding test to be applied in all child custody determinations.”30 Further, Revision Comment (d) states that “[t]his Article should be followed in actions to change custody as well as in those to initially set
it.”31
Based on the code, the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly concluded that the best-interest-of-the-child standard was the correct
standard that needed to be applied by the Louisiana Court of Appeal
for the Fifth Circuit in the instant case. Since Francisco D. wanted
to modify the stipulated judgement which he, Tracie F., and Kathy
had agreed upon in the original consent decree, it was pertinent that
this standard was applied to these facts as required by article 131.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit decided to use a heightened standard under
article 133, which had imposed a greater burden on Francisco D.
than the burden of showing a material change of circumstances and
the best-interest-of-the-child standard articulated by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. This heightened standard required Francisco to
prove “rehabilit[ation]” to be currently fit to be designated as a domiciliary parent and to prove that the environment provided by Kathy
as the present domiciliary parent had “materially changed.”32 This
is a standard that was unfair to Francisco and created a roadblock
for Francisco to be able to prove that it was in D.’s best interest to
stay with Francisco D. As the biological parent of D., Francisco
needed to be given the utmost opportunity to prove to the court that
he deserved to have sole custody of his child, no matter whether he
29. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2019). The parties in this case expressed that they held onto their substantive rights, which were maintained under
the law in effect when the district court’s decision had been determined. Accordingly, the law was applied in effect before January 1, 2016. Louisiana Civil Code
article 6 establishes, in part, that “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only.”
30. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131, comment (a) (2019).
31. Id. at art. 131, comment (d).
32. Id. at art. 133.
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was going to prevail in the judgment or not. With the standard that
the Fifth Circuit had imposed, Francisco’s rights were being abated
because he had constitutionally protected rights as a biological parent in this matter regarding D. Specifically, the United States Constitution provides a protection to biological parents: embedded in the
fourteenth amendment, parents are given the due process right to
raise their children.33 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court
explained in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters that the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause provides that biological parents have the
protected right to control the upbringing and education of their
child.34 Thus, the application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard maintains this protected right, and the decision by the Louisiana
Supreme Court to apply it was consistent with article 131 in the
code.
An innocent child who comes into the world deserves to be
placed in the most adequate and stable environment because the environment that a child is placed in during the child’s upbringing can
have a major impact on the future development of the child. If the
child is placed in an unstable and risky environment, then the child’s
future development could be in jeopardy and the child could end up
in a very bad situation. On the other hand, if a child is raised in a
positive and enriching environment, the child could have a prosperous and successful life. Therefore, it is important to weigh all of the
factors mentioned in article 134, which the court applied in the instant case to determine the best interest of the child. Some of these
factors include: (1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child; (2) the capacity and disposition of
each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care,
and other material needs; (3) the length of time the child has lived
in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment; and (4) the reasonable
33.
34.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 549 (La. 1990).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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preferences of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.35 These factors along with the
other listed factors in article 134 truly allow an examination into the
relationship between the child and each party to determine who the
child is most compatible with and who can provide the child with
the most adequate and stable environment. This is why the code has
chosen this standard to govern situations like the present one to determine what is truly in the best interest of the child. Thus, although
the application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard by the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed Francisco to maintain his constitutionally-protected right, the court correctly concluded that Francisco
had not met his burden of proof that it was in the best interest of D.
to award sole custody to Francisco.
Tracie F. and D. had moved into Kathy’s and Michael’s house
when D. was only about six months old in 2006. During this time,
Tracie F. and Francisco D. had shared joint custody with Tracie F.
as the domiciliary parent. Thus, D. spent most of his time with
Tracie, Kathy, and Michael. Tracie and D. stayed with Kathy and
Michael for an extended period of time, which led Tracie to defer
her main responsibilities as a mother to Kathy and Michael. This
situation went on for a couple of years during the time when Tracie
was involved in an abusive relationship and had been abusing drugs.
Thus, it was not in the best interest of D. to stay with her any longer
with her designated as the domiciliary parent because this would
have exposed D. to a risky situation. Although joint custody was
eventually transferred from Tracie F. and Francisco D. to Francisco
D. and Kathy in 2013, with Kathy named as the domiciliary parent,
D. still spent most of his time with Kathy. Francisco was not required to give Kathy child support, with Kathy being a nonparent;
therefore, Kathy continued to handle the financial responsibilities
for D. By this time, D. was about eight years old and had spent his
childhood with Kathy as the primary caregiver. Francisco only
35.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (2019).
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recently started to be consistent and active in D’s life the year before
he filed for sole custody in 2014.
Although Francisco had started to become involved in D.’s life
and put effort in to create a stable and adequate environment for D.,
it was not enough to establish that he deserved sole custody of D.
Being actively involved in one year compared to seven years of life
which Francisco D. could have actively spent with D. if he chose to
proves even more why Kathy should remain the domiciliary parent.
There was not a material change in circumstances by Francisco D.’s
actions, as the Supreme Court concluded. Therefore, Judge Crichton
who concurred with the opinion, but assigned different reasons, was
correct when he explained that Francisco had not changed enough
to be considered integrally involved in D.’s life and that Francisco
had not even met the threshold of materiality.36 Further, Francisco
D. had not proved that it would be in the best interest of D. for D. to
stay with Francisco D. as the domiciliary parent. With that being
said, although Kathy is a nonparent, she proved that it was in the
best interest of D. to have her reinstated as the domiciliary parent
for joint custody between her and Francisco D. Kathy further proved
that it can be a custom in society that a nonparent be considered the
one to provide the most adequate and stable environment for a child
based on the totality of the circumstances, and that a primary judgment of joint custody between a parent and nonparent should be reflected in the code.
B. Evidentiary Standard for a Nonparent to Obtain Custody
In Title V, Book I of the Civil Code, for an award of custody to
parents, article 132 indicates that:
If the parents agree who is to have custody, the court shall
award custody in accordance with their agreement . . . in the
absence of an agreement, or if the agreement is not in the

36.

Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 251-252.
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best interest of the child, the court shall award custody to the
parents jointly.37
Article 132 further requires that “if custody in one parent is
shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of
the child, the court shall award custody to that parent.”38 Article 132
does not consider a nonparent. However, the code does address the
evidentiary standard for a nonparent who is attempting to obtain
joint or sole custody of a child. This standard is codified in Title V,
Book I of the Civil Code in article 133. As article 133 purports:
If an award of . . . sole custody to either parent would result
in substantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody
to another person with whom the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any person able to provide an adequate and stable environment.39
Thus, this means that a nonparent cannot be awarded joint or
sole custody of a child unless the nonparent can prove that the child
would be in substantial harm with the biological parent. Under these
circumstances, a nonparent does not even have a right of action under article 132 since the nonparent would not be a member of the
class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the
litigation. This can be an issue for situations where, although the
child may not be in substantial harm, the best interest of the child
would be to stay with a nonparent, such as a grandparent. Although
the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed joint custody between Francisco D., a biological parent, and Kathy, a nonparent, from a stipulated judgment, the court failed to address this issue otherwise. This
is an issue that needs to be addressed because it has become customary in society for grandparents to raise their grandkids.
The upward trend for grandparents raising their grandkids has
been called the “Grandparenting Generation.” Sixty percent of
households that were headed by grandparents in 2014 translated to
37.
38.
39.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (2019).
Id.
Id. at art. 133.
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2.7 million grandparents being the primary caregiver for their grandkids, which is a 7 percent rise from 2009.40 This type of situation
usually occurs when one or both of the biological parents abuse
drugs, abandon the kids, work long hours, or might be involved in
another situation that requires a grandparent to care for the kids so
that the kids will not be placed in an unstable and inadequate environment. Thus, the situation may not always be that the child was
removed from a harmful situation, but it might be in the child’s best
interest for the grandparent to have custody of the child; “Kids who
are being cared for by relatives also report that they are more likely
to feel like they’re loved, like they are cared about and that they have
that kind of security that is so essential for a child to develop.”41
When kids are placed in the care of their grandparents, the
grandparents carry majority, if not all, of the responsibilities for their
grandkids. In the instant case, Kathy had assumed the majority of
the responsibilities for D. because it was in D.’s best interest for
Kathy to be the domiciliary parent since D. had been exposed to a
risky situation based on Tracie’s situation. This is important because
although Kathy technically was not D.’s biological parent, Kathy
played the role of a biological parent in the sense that she had provided an upbringing for D. which included a stable and adequate
environment. This environment was filled with love, affection, and
mental, physical, emotional, spiritual and educational growth. Thus,
in this situation, Francisco should have been required to pay Kathy
child support from the original stipulated judgment since Kathy, although a nonparent, had taken the role of a biological parent and
raised Francisco’s child as if it were her own.
Moreover, it is vital that the code be amended by the Legislature
to reflect this custom and allow parents and nonparents to obtain
joint custody between one another in a primary judgment declared
40. Alejandra Cancino, More Grandparents Raising Their Grandchildren,
PBS (2016), https://perma.cc/EU5P-8RGS/.
41. Sarah Jones, The Grandparenting Generation, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(2018), https://perma.cc/HR96-3YC9.
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by the court without the evidentiary standard required to be proven
by the nonparent in article 133. Although the acquisition of joint
custody was not an obstacle for Kathy, based on the code language
under articles 132 and 133, it could be an obstacle for many other
nonparents who try to obtain custody of a child, including same-sex
couples.42 Unless the parent and nonparent agree to this lower standard, the lower standard is likely unconstitutional.
In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court held a
Washington statute unconstitutional which permitted any person to
petition for visitation rights at any time and authorized state superior
courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child’s
best interest.43 Under this statute, the judge accords no deference to
the parent when determining the best interest of the child, but rather
allows the judge to be the only one to decide the best interest of the
child in order to grant visitation rights. Visitation rights entail the
ability for a person to have a right to visit the child under certain
circumstances. On the other hand, custody entails who the child
should stay with under certain circumstances. Cases dealing with
visitation rights can be used to explain the rights of a parent in a
custody case such as this one because both cases consider the same
underlying principles, including the best-interest-of-the-child standard. In the Troxel case, the grandparents had filed a petition for visitation rights regarding two of their grandchildren. The mother of
the two girls wanted the grandparents to see the children one weekend a month (with no overnight stay) with certain holiday visits.
However, the grandparents wanted two weekends a month and two
full weeks during the summer. The superior court gave no weight to
the mother’s having consented to visitation even before the filing of
any visitation petition or subsequent court intervention. Instead, the
42. Based on the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges on June 26, 2015, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the freedom to marry, allowing all samesex couples to marry, which ended marriage discrimination across the country,
including in Louisiana; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607-2608
(2015).
43. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S 57, 72 (2000).
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court rejected the mother’s proposal and settled with a middle
ground, which ordered one week in the summer, one weekend per
month, and time on both of the petitioning grandparents’ birthdays.44 The U.S. Supreme Court held this unconstitutional. The
court ruled that the statute interfered with the fundamental right of
parents to rear their child’s upbringing. The court further ruled that
parents have the protected right to limit visitation of their children
with third persons and should be able to choose who their children
are exposed to. Here, the mother had the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. The court
held this unconstitutional and ruled that a state cannot interfere with
parents’ rights just because the court believes that it can make a better decision without showing deference to the parents.45
The ruling in Troxel v. Granville can be applied in the instant
case because, as stated before, it is a common custom that nonparents take kids under their wings when a parent has agreed to it
and/or it is in the best interest of the child to do so. A parent should
have the authorization to decide to share custody of their child with
a nonparent as a fundamental right. However, judges should show
deference to parents’ ideas first when determining the best interest
of a child in a custody case. Besides the judge, it is a parent’s right
to determine the best interest of a child when the parent is able to
make a sound decision based on this protected right that is provided
to them. There should never be an obstacle for a parent to make a
decision about custody of their child unless it is proven otherwise.
If the parent and nonparent have not agreed to an obstacle for a nonparent to obtain custody with a parent, a nonparent should be granted
the opportunity to have joint custody with the parent if that is what
the parent wants for the child’s upbringing. Article 133 represents
an obstacle because a nonparent would have to prove harm toward
the child in the custody of a parent to be able to obtain custody. Most
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
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parents would not agree to this obstacle based on the current custom.
Thus, the state of Louisiana should recognize this right given to the
parent which has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court and
make it easier for parents and nonparents to obtain custody together.
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in the instant case exemplifies how imperative it is that the Louisiana Legislature considers
amending the Civil Code so there is a clear recognition of a parent’s
right to consent to a judgment wherein the parent shares legal custody
of the child with a nonparent. It would have been efficient if the court
would have addressed this issue in the decision; however, the court
made no indication that such a stipulated judgment between a parent
and nonparent would be void. Further, the court in In Re J.E.T. also
granted judgment for a parent to share legal custody with a nonparent.
The court acknowledged that it is foreseeable that because of youth,
complications, or other life circumstances, a parent might agree to a
nonparent being designated as a domiciliary parent. The court further
recognized that there is an applicable burden of proof where the parent has been lucky enough to find such a person with whom to share
joint custody, but later petitions to modify the stipulated award of
joint custody between the parent and nonparent.46 Therefore, it is obvious that courts in Louisiana recognize that nonparents in this society
sometimes take care of children as a matter of custom. Also, it is clear
that these courts support legal custody between a parent and nonparent in various circumstances, based on the best interest of the child.
Moreover, if the Louisiana Legislature also supported this legal
relationship between a parent and nonparent under article 132, nonparents would no longer have to fight the article 133 obstacle in order
to provide a stable and adequate environment for children. Without
this obstacle, children can be placed in a comfortable environment
that enhances their educational, spiritual, mental, physical, and emotional growth.

46.

In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575, 584 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016).
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I. INTRODUCTION
How can someone file a claim for insurance money if not a party
to the insurance policy? In Louisiana, like in other civil law jurisdictions, contracts may produce effects for third parties only when
provided by law.1 The Louisiana Civil Code has an article allowing
contracting parties to stipulate a benefit for a third party (stipulation
pour autrui), but it does not provide much guidance for determining
when such a stipulation exists.2 This lack of a solid framework could
lead practitioners to confuse stipulation pour autrui with other similar legal relationships that confer benefits on third parties, like a
*
J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau
for his help during the research and editing process.
1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1985 (2019).
2. Id. at art. 1978.
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trust: “It is only in cases not covered by legislation that a lawyer or
judge may look for solutions elsewhere.”3 Ledet v. FabianMartins
Construction, LLC demonstrates that discovering a stipulation pour
autrui is sensitive legal analysis, which requires us to look past our
civilian roots and into jurisprudence to identify its factors.4 In this
case, the benefit of the insurance was simply incidental, depriving
the plaintiff of direct recourse against the insurer but, as will be seen,
may leave a different cause of action rooted in the Louisiana Trust
Code.
II. BACKGROUND
In Ledet v. FabianMartins Construction LLC, the court was
tasked with determining the existence of this relationship. The plaintiff, Mr. Ledet, is the owner of unit 9-B of the Carrol Condominiums. A broken water pipe above his floor caused serious water damage to much of the complex, along with his individual unit. The
Carol Condominium Association is a non-profit created by La. R.S.
9:1121.101 (Louisiana Condominium Act) for the management of
the complex. Comprised and funded exclusively by unit owners, the
Association has the affirmative duty of securing property insurance
to cover any possible damage to the common elements and units of
the condominium.
After the flooding, both the Association and Mr. Ledet filed a
claim with the insurer. The Association received payment, but Mr.
Ledet was denied payment due to him not being a named insured,
additional insured, or a third party beneficiary. Mr. Ledet filed this
suit against multiple parties for damage to his unit, but the only relevant issue in this case is his cause of action against the insurer.
The insurer, in its answer, claimed they were notified of Mr.
Ledet’s loss through the Association’s claim, and adjusted
3. Id. at art. 1, comment (c).
4. Ledet v. FabianMartins Construction, LLC, 258 So. 3d 1058 (La. App.
5th Cir. 2018).
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accordingly; further, they alleged, he had no right of action against
the insurance company because he was not a named insured.5 In
response, Mr. Ledet claimed he had a cause of action as a third party
beneficiary of the insurance policy, under the theory of stipulation
pour autrui. In ruling against Mr. Ledet’s theory the trial court
stated, “there is no clear expression of intent to benefit the Plaintiff
. . . [t]hus the Plaintiff is not a third party beneficiary and has no
standing to assert a claim.”6 Mr. Ledet appealed.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
Mr. Ledet’s only means of establishing a right of action against
the insurer rested in the finding of a stipulation pour autrui in his
favor. Louisiana Civil Code article 1978 does not detail the analysis
for establishing a stipulation pour autrui,7 but based on doctrinal
principles set forth by Professor J. Denson Smith,8 the Louisiana
Supreme Court has developed a working interpretation of this article. Smith’s examples for a third party beneficiary relationship
rested on establishing a promisor-promisee obligation that intended
to discharge some other obligation the promisee may have with the
third party.9 This analysis was altered by the Supreme Court in the
Joseph case, to a three-prong test.10 Even though the insurance policy, the Condominium Act, and the declaration specifically mentioned that individual unit owners may be entitled to insurance proceeds, the court found this was insufficient to establish a stipulation pour autrui.

5. Id. at 1063.
6. Id. at 1064.
7. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1978 (2019) (“A contracting party may stipulate
a benefit for a third person called a third party beneficiary. Once the third party
has manifested his intention to avail himself of the benefit, the parties may not
dissolve the contract by mutual consent without the beneficiary’s agreement.”).
8. J. Denson Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation
Pour Autrui, 11 TUL. L. REV. 18 (1936).
9. Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 358 (1969).
10. Joseph v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 2 of St. Mary, 939 So. 2d 1206 (La.
2006).
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IV. COMMENTARY
Aligning with the Louisiana Supreme Court, the appellate court
adopted the three-prong Joseph analysis to determine if the contract
stipulates a benefit in Mr. Ledet’s favor.11 Based on this, a stipulation is found only if: “1) the stipulation for a third party is manifestly
clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided [for] the third
party; 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract between
the promisor and the promisee.”12
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the
insured; therefore, its interpretation is grounded in contract law. The
interpretation of a contract requires a determination of the common
intent of the parties.13 Mr. Ledet has the high burden of proving the
insurer intended to grant him this benefit, since any party claiming
an enforceable obligation has the burden of proof.14 Analyzing the
contract, the Condominium Act, and the declaration, the appellate
court correctly failed to find a stipulation in Mr. Ledet’s favor.
A. Manifestly Clear Stipulation
The first prong of the Joseph analysis requires the stipulation to
be manifestly clear.15 Reviewing the evidence presented, it is difficult to find a clear stipulation in Mr. Ledet’s favor. Starting with the
plain wording of the contract, “no party other than you [the Association, the named insured], having custody of the Covered Property
will benefit from this insurance.”16 The words “you and your” only
refer to the Association, and their rights are nontransferable without
the insurer’s consent.17 This passage explicitly disproves any inten-

11. Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1066.
12. Id.
13. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045 (2019).
14. Id. at art. 1831 (2019): “A party who demands performance of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation.”
15. Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212.
16. Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1068.
17. Id.
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tion of the insurer to obligate itself to any party besides the Association. Any benefit that would be derived by Mr. Ledet would have
to channel through the claims filed by the Association. This channeling of claims is implied given that the insurer reserves the option
to pay owners directly as a credit of satisfaction for the Association’s
claims.18
Additionally, the insurance payment provision states that any
loss “shall be payable to any insurance trustee designated for that
purpose, or otherwise to the [A]ssociation.”19 The use of the word
“shall” mandates the affirmative action of paying the insurance proceeds only to the listed parties, either the designated trustee (the Association) or the Association. Nowhere in this clause are the individual unit owners mentioned or implied to have a right to insurance
proceeds directly from the insurer. Mr. Ledet did cite to a provision
giving the insurer the option to adjust losses directly with the individual owners, “we may adjust losses with the owners of lost or
damaged property if other than you,” but this still is insufficient to
fulfill this factor.20 Mr. Ledet’s counter argument more likely reserves rights only for the insurer when deciding how to adjust losses;
since direct adjustment is contingent on the insurer’s whim, this provision alone does not create a manifestly clear obligation.
The Louisiana Condominium Act and the Association’s declaration implicitly limit the type of insurance the Association is supposed to obtain. The purpose is to cover the parts of the complex
that unit owners do not own exclusively but share in common, such
as parking, staircases, elevators, and other shared structures and
spaces. The law requires the Association’s insurance policy, but
does not prevent unit owners from obtaining their own insurance.21
Indeed, the Association’s declaration states that “[e]ach Unit Owner
shall be responsible for obtaining his own insurance on the contents
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1067 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1073.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.112 (2019).
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of his own Unit.”22 The act created an obligation for the Association
to obtain insurance which would not interfere with individual owners, while the declaration mandated unit owners to insure their own
property. Reading the insurance policy, the law, and the declaration
together negates any claims for a clear stipulation in a unit owner’s
favor.
B. Certainty as to the Benefit
The law creating the Association’s duty to secure insurance
brought with it a strict contingency clause for reimbursing the unit
owners for their loss. “[U]nit owners and lien holders are not entitled
to receive payment of any portion of the proceeds unless there is a
surplus.”23 A unit owner’s right to the insurer’s payment is only triggered if the payment exceeds the cost of repair assumed by the Association. Since there is only potential entitlement to insurance proceeds, the unit owners have no certain benefit arising out of the policy. The only certainty deriving from this clause is the supremacy of
the Association’s claims to the insurance proceeds.
If there is any enforceable obligation, it is against the Association. This obligation is imposed by the Condominium Act; it is not
derived from the insurance policy. Any such payment a unit owner
could potentially be entitled to would depend on the actions of the
Association in spending their insurance proceeds. Mr. Ledet’s reliance on the payment provision allowing the insurer the option to
adjust losses either with the Association or with unit owners individually (as mentioned earlier) is doomed to failure, as it is at the
discretion of the insurer.
C. Benefit Not a Mere Incident
A stipulation pour autrui requires a party to intend to confer an
obligation directly in favor of a third party. Here, the intent of the
22.
23.

Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1063, 1074.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.112 D (2019).
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insurance contract is most likely to be for the discharge of the Association’s duty under the Condominium Act to maintain insurance over
the complex. This is evidenced by the Association’s premier claim to
the insurance proceeds, while leaving the individual owner’s rights
dependent on the Association’s actions. The only means whereby the
unit owners would have dealt with the insurer is through individual
adjustments that the insurer would use as credit toward the Association’s claims against it. Reading the act, the declaration and the policy
together, the unit owners were not to have a claim for the insurance
proceeds, but only the incidental benefits of the repaired common elements of the condominium and potentially any money left over if the
Association failed to spend it all.
The benefits that the individual unit owners would gain from the
insurance on the complex passed through the Association’s insurance
contract. Where coverage of the individual units was not the intent of
the Association’s contract, the unit owners do receive some incidental
benefit from the Association carrying insurance. This benefit is explicitly mentioned to cover the common areas and might allow unit
owners to collect insurance proceeds if they filed a claim with the
Association and there is a surplus. The clear intent was only to create
a relationship between the individual unit owners and the Association.
D. Trust Relationship
On appeal, Mr. Ledet claimed he had a right of action against the
insurer due to the insurance trust relationship set up in his favor. Evidence of this trust relationship can be found throughout the cited policy provisions and the declaration naming the Association as the
“trustee” for the insurance funds.24 The court correctly refused to recognize an enforceable trust relationship directly against the insurer,
but did not delve into much analysis. The court could have clarified
this issue by stating Mr. Ledet’s proper recourse was not directly

24.

Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1063, 1064-1073.
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against the insurer, but against the Association in its capacity as trustee.
For Mr. Ledet to sue the insurer, his action would have to fall
under La. R.S. 9:2222(1) of the Trust Code, but this only applies “if
the trustee improperly refuses, neglects, or is unable for any reason
to bring an action against the obligor.”25 Unfortunately, the issue
was not properly raised on appeal; therefore, the court was not called
to pronounce on the duties of the Association as a “trustee.” The
court could have simply reiterated the general rule with La. R.S.
9:2222: “A trustee is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of
the trust estate.”26 To even fall under the exception, Mr. Ledet would
have had to allege fault on the part of the Association, which would
have been difficult given that the insurer was “notified of the loss by
[the Association] and adjusted same in accordance with the terms of
the Policy.”27 Mr. Ledet incorrectly alleged fault on the part of the
insurer as a means of satisfying a stipulation pour autrui claim when
he should have been asserting fault claims against the trustee for refusal or negligent handling of his damage claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The sources of law in Louisiana are legislation and custom.28
While our French style Civil Code is broad enough to cover most
legal issues in its purview, recourse to jurisprudence and doctrine is
often necessary when it comes to applying general provisions to the
specific facts of a case. The Fifth Circuit correctly searched for the
existence of a stipulation pour autrui inspired by doctrine and jurisprudence constante when interpreting Louisianan Civil Code article
1978. Since a stipulation is never presumed, Mr. Ledet had a high
burden of establishing his right of action. The court rightly determined that he was not a third-party beneficiary; instead, he benefited
25.
26.
27.
28.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2222 (2019).
Id.
Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1063.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2019).
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incidentally from the insurance policy, giving him no right of action
against the insurer.
However, further analysis shows that he was in a trust relationship with the insured, namely the Association entrusted by law with
the duty to purchase insurance for the protection of the condominium. As beneficiary of a trust, he could have sued the Association in
its capacity as trustee of the insurance money. Because he did not,
the court cannot be blamed for refusing to address the trust relationship, though the discussion points in that direction. Stipulation pour
autrui and trusts are very different devices. Though both would benefit the same third party, the stipulation would have created a contractual obligation enforceable against the insurer where a trust
would not. In addition to having plead the wrong doctrine, the plaintiff also sued the wrong defendant. It is only where the Association,
in its capacity as trustee, “improperly refuses, neglects, or is unable
for any reason, to bring an action against the obligor” (here, the insurer),29 that Mr. Ledet would have the right to sue both of them.
There was no such allegation in the present case.

29.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2222.
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Two pilgrims travelling o’er the sands one day,
Saw a great oyster that was washed their way:
Their fingers pointed-wildly stared their eyes;
Their mouths both watered for the tempting prize:
One springing, stooped in haste to seize the prey,
The other bawled while driving him away:
‘Not quite so fast-let us decide our right;
’Tis his to whom it first appeared in sight,
And while he sucks, the other may look on.’
‘If that’s the argument you go upon,
My sight is good, thank God,’ his neighbour cried.
‘And mine’s not bad,’ his friend as quick replied;
‘I saw it first, or may I die!’
‘Be it,’ his neighbour made reply;
‘You’ll own. I first the oyster fait.’
While thus in vain dispute they dwelt,
John Doe came past-as judge they bid him sit.
* J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to thank Prof. Moréteau for his guidance in the
editing and publication of this case note.
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The clients’ eyes with pleasing hope were lit.
Grave John the oyster oped and swallowed it.
He wiped his mouth, and said in judge-like speech:
‘Whereas the court allows a shell to each,
Free of all costs-go home, and live like friends.’
Count what it costs before a lawsuit ends;
Count what it takes from starving families’ backs:
John gets the cash and home the client sends,
And barely for their papers leaves them sacks.
Jean de La Fontaine, The Oyster and the Litigants, Fables, IX, 9 (1671)

I. INTRODUCTION
May a party to a contract when subrogated to the other party’s
rights to compensation for actual damages benefit from a windfall
when compensation payable under a settlement is well in excess of
the actual loss? Vekic v. Popich, a case decided in the wake of the
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, illustrates
the idea that subrogation should be interpreted in light of the agreement as a whole while also considering equity in situations not previously contemplated by the parties.
II. BACKGROUND
In 2009, plaintiff, Nikola Vekic, attempted to purchase three
oyster leases owned by Dragutin Popich and his family.1 While Mr.
Popich was unwilling to execute a credit sale, he agreed to enter a
sublease with an option to purchase.2 With the help of an attorney,
the Popich family prepared a sublease with the option to purchase,
and a proposed act of sale. These documents were then sent to Mr.
Vekic along with a letter indicating that Mr. Popich was “unwilling
to do a credit sale.” Mr. Vekic consented to a sublease for four years
unless it was terminated earlier by either party according to the
1.
2.

Vekic v. Popich, 215 So. 3d 483-484 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 484.
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lease’s provisions. The amount of rent was not to exceed $90,000,
with $30,000 due upon execution of the agreement3 and $20,000 due
annually over the next three years.4 Under the terms of the sublease,
Mr. Vekic had the option to purchase the leases at any time on or
before April 30, 2012. On April 20, 2010 the Deepwater Horizon
well exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.5 At the time of the explosion,
Mr. Vekic had not exercised his option to purchase and as such the
Popich family remained the leaseholder of record. However, the following year on or about June 19, 2011, Mr. Vekic exercised his option. The act of sale originally prepared in 2009 was executed with
no alterations to the original terms proposed.
Shortly after the explosion, a plaintiff class sued BP for damages and losses as a result of the explosion. By 2012, BP and the
plaintiff’s Steering Company had reached a settlement agreement
establishing a compensation plan for qualified oyster leaseholders
in exchange for settling their claims with BP and other released parties. In order to receive a settlement payout, claimants were required
to (1) file a claim form with the Deepwater Horizon Economic
Claim Center (DHECC), (2) produce documents verifying that they
were the record owners of the leases with the Department of Wildlife Fisheries on the day of the explosion, (3) show that their oyster
leases had state ID numbers, and (4) provide documents showing the
geographic area in which the oyster leases were located.
In June of 2012, Mr. Vekic filed a claim for all of his lease holdings including the three oyster leases purchased from the Popich
family. In January 2013, Helen Popich, an attorney and daughter of
Mr. Popich filed claims for herself, her father, and her sister. The
submitted forms expressly informed the DHECC of the 2009 sublease to Mr. Vekic and the post-explosion sale of the leases. The
forms also indicated that there had been no transfer or assignment
3. Id.
4. Id. at 485.
5. The Deepwater Horizon Well is an offshore drilling rig that was leased
to British Petroleum (BP) at the time of the explosion on April 20, 2010.
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of rights to Mr. Vekic regarding the cause of action for the Deepwater Horizon incident.
Subsequently, Mr. Vekic received a proposed settlement offer
for his lease holdings but not for the leases he had purchased from
Mr. Popich. The Popich family in turn received and accepted a settlement offer for $901,999 in exchange for a release of any claims
arising out of or in any way related to the Deepwater Horizon incident.6 Mr. Vekic sued the Popich family alleging that he was entitled
to the settlement proceedings pursuant to their agreement.
The Popich family later received notice of eligibility for a second
round of payments. However, before the funds could be recovered, the
trial court had the money deposited into a trust account until further
direction from the court. The trial court ultimately interpreted the sublease agreement as a sale of subleased property to Mr. Vekic for
$90,000 and consequently awarded Mr. Vekic all of the proceeds less
10% for attorney fees for past BP settlements and costs according to
the contingency fee agreement between the Popich family and their attorney. The trial court further ruled that any future payments from BP
belonged exclusively to Mr. Vekic without any reduction for additional attorney’s fees. The Popich family timely filed an appeal.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
A. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the court focused on determining whether or not the
sublease was a sale in disguise.7 In reaching its verdict, the court
broke down its analysis into examining the intent of the parties and
entitlement to the BP settlement proceeds. In addressing the intent
issue, the court considered Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2046 and
20498 and concluded that the agreement between Mr. Vekic and Mr.
Popich was a sublease as evidenced by the instrument, which clearly
6.
7.
8.

Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 483-486.
Id. at 487.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2046, 2049 (2018).
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described the intent of the lessor to lease the oyster leases to Mr.
Vekic. What was less clear was the function of the option to purchase.9 Mr. Vekic argued that the format of a sublease with an option
to purchase was used because a conditional sale in which the owner
retained title until payment was made in full is prohibited in Louisiana. However, the court noted that while it is true that the conditional sale of a movable is prohibited, the conditional sale of an immovable is not. Given that the oyster leases were immovables, there
was no need to disguise a credit sale as a sublease with an option to
purchase. A credit sale can be distinguished from a lease in that the
sale contemplates ultimate ownership by the purchaser. The court
determined that this contemplation was absent given that both the
plain language of the lease and the fact that Mr. Vekic knew Mr.
Popich was “unwilling to do a credit sale” as expressed in the transmittal letter conveyed to Mr. Vekic along with the other pertinent
documents prior to the lease agreement. The court was not persuaded by Mr. Vekic’s argument that the lease was a sale in disguise
because it lacked a stipulation that an additional consideration be
paid in order to exercise the purchase option. Though there was not
any stipulation requiring the payment of additional consideration,10
the concept of consideration contained in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 was eliminated as inconsistent with the Louisiana legal system.11
Moving on to the issue of entitlement to the BP settlement proceeds, the court noted that the sublease had a section stipulating that
in the event of damage to the lease, Mr. Vekic was entitled to receive
his actual loss.12 The sublease further defined actual loss to be the
cost of bedding oysters in the damaged area. Under the sublease, Mr.
Vekic had the right to damage proceeds in the amount sufficient to
reimburse him for actual losses with any surplus of the reimbursed
9.
10.
11.
12.

Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 488.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2620 (2018), comment (h).
Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 489.
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amount to be received by the Popich family as advance rent. However,
Mr. Vekic stated at trial13 that he had suffered no “actual loss” as defined in the sublease and no evidence was admitted showing that the
oil spill damaged the oyster leases.14 The sublease provision did not
address whether Mr. Vekic would be eligible to damage proceeds beyond oyster bedding reimbursement. The court considered Louisiana
Civil Code article 2054, which provides that when no provision for a
particular situation is made, it must be assumed that the parties intended
to bind themselves to the express provisions of the contract.15 The sale
of the oyster leases which occurred after the BP spill contained no reference to an assignment of rights to seek damages from BP. This was
important because the Popich family were the record owners of the
oyster leases at the time of the spill and, in order to recover from BP, it
was necessary to produce documentation evidencing record ownership
at the time of the spill.16 Mr. Vekic could have requested that the act of
sale be modified to include an assignment of rights and he could have
exercised his option to purchase the leases prior to the spill but chose
not to. The court further noted that Mr. Vekic purchased the oyster
leases “as is” and that Louisiana courts have consistently held that a
purchaser is precluded from claiming damages to property that occurred prior to the purchaser’s acquisition of the property (the subsequent-purchaser doctrine). The court concluded by finding that the sublease with option to purchase was not a sale in disguise and that Mr.
Vekic was not entitled to the BP settlement proceeds pursuant to the
terms of the sublease with option to purchase.17
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court Decision
In contrast to the appellate court analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court focused on determining whether the damages clause of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 490.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2054 (2018).
Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 490.
Id.
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the sublease agreement would allow Mr. Vekic to recover the BP
settlement proceeds and whether Mr. Vekic was precluded from recovery under the subsequent purchaser doctrine.18 Beginning with
the first issue, the court noted that section 9 of the sublease specifically stated that “[c]laims for damage to or destruction of any portion of the subleased property shall be adjusted by the Lessee.” The
court determined that because the use of the word “shall,” represents
a mandatory requirement, the Popich family had expressly assigned
their right to adjust all damage claims to Mr. Vekic. Consequently,
Mrs. Harris’s act of filing a claim with the DHECC constituted a
breach of contract.19 Although the agreement did not expressly stipulate that excess damages would go to Mr. Vekic, it did not allow
anyone other than Mr. Vekic to adjust claims for damages.20 It also
did not provide that the Popich family would receive anything other
than the $90,000 for “rent” and any fees or costs associated with late
payment or default. The court felt that the terms of the agreement
clearly contemplated that all claims for damages would be covered
by its provisions and that the appellate court erred in conducting a
de novo review without giving any deference to the trial court’s decision. In the court’s opinion, the agreement contained support for
an argument that it was the intent of the parties for Mr. Popich to
receive $90,000 for the oyster leases and nothing more.21 In section
10.2 of the agreement, it was stipulated that if a complete taking
occurred, the lessor would retain the first $90,000 awarded or paid
less the total amount of rent previously paid by the lessee with any
remaining amounts being awarded to the lessee.22 Furthermore, the
court noted that although the agreement was labeled a sublease, the
agreement provided in section 10.82 that captions and heading shall
not be considered in the construction or interpretation of the lease.
Therefore, the court determined that even though the agreement
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Vekic v. Popich, 236 So. 3d 526, 529 (La. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 531.
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was labeled a sublease, this was not significant in establishing
which party could recover damages.23 Based on these factors, the
court decided that the settlement of a claim fell within the plain
meaning of the word “adjust” and that, although the Popich family
argued that Mr. Vekic has not proved actual damages, the court’s
legal analysis did not hinge on whether Mr. Vekic’s claim against
BP was meritorious, but rather was one of contractual interpretation.24 Additionally, the court found it was not necessary to prove
actual damages in order for there to be a determination that Mr.
Vekic was entitled to damages beyond $90,000.25
Moving on to the second issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found that the appellate court erroneously applied the subsequent-purchaser doctrine in this case.26 In Eagle Pipe and Supply Inc. v.
Amerada Hess Corp, the court found that:
[A]n owner of property has no right or actual interest in recovery from a third party for damage which was inflicted on
the property before his purchase, in the absence of an assignment or subrogation of the rights belonging to the owner of
the property when the damage was inflicted.27
In this case, however, the court contended that Eagle Pipe and
the subsequent-purchaser doctrine did not apply because the Popich
family assigned Mr. Vekic the express right to adjust claims for
damage or destruction before the damage at issue occurred.28 The
court agreed with the court of appeals that there had been no express
assignment of rights in the act of sale. However, the court found that
no such reservation was needed because section 17 of the sublease
established that no provision of the agreement would be deemed
waived or amended except by a written instrument unambiguously
setting forth the matter to be waived or amended. The act of sale did
23. Id.
24. Id. at 534.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 535.
27. Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc., v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246, 256257 (La. 2011).
28. Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 536.
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not unambiguously waive section 9 of the original sublease.29 Given
its analysis, the court reversed the court of appeal’s decision and
reinstated the trial court’s judgement.
IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary will first conduct a more thorough analysis of
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision that there was an assignment of rights in the sublease which entitled Mr. Vekic to adjust for
and receive damage claims. Next, a synthesis approach to the appellate court’s and supreme court’s decisions will be considered. Finally, the principle of equity and its application to this case will be
explored.
A. Subrogation of Rights
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court appears to be correct in
concluding that the agreement contained a subrogation of rights.
This conclusion is supported by the language in section 9 of the
agreement, which provides that claims for damage or destruction of
any portion of the subleased property shall be adjusted by the lessee.
However, section 9 of the agreement goes on to say that the lessee
shall have the right to proceeds derived from the claims which are
sufficient to reimburse the lessee for actual damages with any excesses to be paid to the lessor as advance rent. This provision suggests that, though there may have been a subrogation of rights, the
subrogation was limited to claims involving actual damages. If this
is true, Mr. Vekic’s recovery would be limited and possibly precluded
given the fact that he testified that there were no actual damages at trial.
The subrogation that occurred is conventional because it arose by
agreement rather than by operation of law.30 Louisiana Civil Code article 1827 provides that a conventional subrogation is subject to the

29.
30.

Id.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1829 (2018).
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rules governing the assignment of rights.31 Therefore, under the Code,
the rights of Popich would be assigned to the lessee (Mr. Vekic) unless
the rights were limited by the provisions of the agreement. In this case,
the idea that the subrogation of rights was limited is not far-fetched if
one considers both the nature of an oyster lease and the intent of the
parties. Generally, the success of an oyster lease depends on the favorable effort of the lessee in raising oysters. As such, it makes sense that
the parties would provide for instances where damages result in a difficulty or inability to raise oysters. While it is true that these damages
can extend beyond what is physical, the parties likely did not intend to
give this interpretation to section 9. Even though there is no specific
language saying that the subrogation of rights applies only to claims for
actual damages, there are facts that support an inference to this end. Not
only does section 9 limit the lessee’s recovery to actual damages, but
the sublease also provided that actual damages are defined as the cost
of bedding oysters in the damaged area.32 Louisiana Civil Code article
2051 says that, although a contract may be worded in general terms, it
must be interpreted to cover only those things that the parties apparently intended to include. Based on this article, it is an overly broad
stretch to say that the subrogation extended to rights beyond recovery
for actual damages. The counter to this argument would incorporate a
reference to the takings provision of the sublease. Section 10.2 of the
sublease establishes that, in the event of a complete taking, the lessor
will retain the first $90,000 with any remaining amounts to be paid to
the lessee.33 The Supreme Court determined that this provision was
proof that the agreement intended for the Popich family to recover
$90,000 and nothing more.34 However, a complete taking never occurred in this case. An application of article 2051 would not support a
conclusion that this provision applies to other situations not clearly contemplated by the parties. Generally, the finding of a complete taking
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at art. 1827 (2018).
Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 489.
Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 531.
Id. at 530.
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depends on whether there was a “complete loss.” As it applies to oyster
leases, a “complete loss” would involve actual damages stemming
from the inability to raise oysters. Consequently, it might be that Mr.
Vekic can recover beyond the value of his actual damages but only in
the event of a complete taking. This interpretation eliminates the perceived conflict between the sublease provisions on taking and damages
in terms of contractual interpretation. In other words, both provisions
suggest that the parties intended these provisions to apply in the context
of actual damages rather than other kinds of damages. In light of this
consideration, the takings clause in the sublease operates as a “worstcase scenario” with respect to recovering for actual damages.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2050 stipulates that each provision in
a contract is to be interpreted in light of the other so that each is given
the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.35 It is not enough
then to say that, because the agreement allows the lessee to adjust for
damages, there was a subrogation of all rights to claims for damages.
Section 9 must be read in pari materia with its entire contents and with
the agreement as a whole to accurately establish the intent of the parties.
B. A Synthesis Approach
Assuming for the purposes of analysis that Mr. Vekic had a right
to adjust for actual damages, the question of whether this right extends to the BP settlement remains unclear. This is both because, as
noted above, Mr. Vekic admitted to the absence of actual damages
and because, in order to obtain a settlement from BP, it was stipulated that documentation must be presented to show record ownership of the oyster leases at the time of the incident. The court
of appeals rightly noted that the oyster leases are incorporeal immovables and that the conditional sale of immovables is not prohibited under Louisiana law.36 If the parties wanted to contract a
35.
36.

LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2050 (2018).
Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 488.
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sale at the time of the purported lease, they could have. Nevertheless, the intent to this end was almost certainly lacking since Mr.
Popich included with the other original documents a transmittal
letter stating that he was “unwilling to do a credit sale.” The appeals court accurately pointed out that whether or not Mr. Vekic
intended to one day obtain title from the beginning is irrelevant
because he obligated himself to the terms of the sublease which
required him to exercise his option in order to take title of the
leases. 37 As a result, even if Mr. Vekic was entitled to adjust for
claims to actual damages, this entitlement appears to be limited
in the sense that only Mr. Popich could bring a claim for damages
against BP since he was the record owner at the time of the incident.
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that this case involved a
matter of contractual interpretation. To the extent that it pertains
to Mr. Vekic’s recovery, this conclusion is correct. The original
sublease between Mr. Vekic and Mr. Popich provided that Mr.
Vekic could recover his actual damages. Accordingly, as a matter
of contractual interpretation, Mr. Vekic should be entitled to recover. This recovery however might be contractually limited to
the extent of his actual damages. Furthermore, based on the
guidelines set forth by BP and the facts presented, Mr. Vekic may
be precluded from bringing the claim himself since he was not
the record owner at the time of the incident.
C. The Principle of Equity
Justice Weimer, in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion, stated that Mr. Vekic testified to spending approximately
$250,000 on rock and oyster shells after the spill to provide cultch
for the purpose of remediating the leases. The use of the word “remediate” suggests that the leases were likely in a state of damage or
disrepair prior to the expenditure. Though Mr. Vekic testified that
37.

Id. at 491.
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there were no actual losses, it is possible that after his testimony
the oyster beds were determined to be damaged by the spill. If by
the facts and evidence presented this is deemed to be the case, Mr.
Vekic may have a contractual basis for recovering his expenditure.
What is then left to be determined is whether the result would be
different if the expenditure enhanced the condition of the leases
rather than functioning to repair an “actual loss” as defined in the
sublease.
It is clear from the language of the agreement that the parties
had not previously contemplated the windfall of the BP settlement.
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2054, when the parties
make no provision for a particular situation it must be assumed that
they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions
of the contract but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in the contract of that kind necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.38 The spirit of the agreement between
Mr. Popich and Mr. Vekic works against an argument for full recovery of the settlement by one of the parties as does the concept
of equity.
The settlement amount of $901,999.5039 largely exceeded the
compensation previously contemplated, equaling more than ten
times the agreed-upon price. 40 As Justice Weimer aptly put it, the
parties in the original agreement intended there to be a mutual benefit, with one party receiving $90,000 and the other receiving a
sublease with the possibility of obtaining title to the oyster leases.
Bringing equity into the fold and allowing Mr. Vekic to recover
the costs of remediating the leases would be consistent with
achieving the purpose of the agreement—contracting for the mutual benefit of the parties.
38. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2054 (2018).
39. Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 528.
40. The $901,999.50 settlement represents part of $20.8 billion paid by BP
for its role in the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf. See Coral Davenport &
John Schwartz, BP Settlement Raised to $20.8 billion, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma
.cc/SJE7-D8GB.
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One of the requirements for recovery from BP was that an individual must be the record owner at the time of the spill. This requirement leaves only Mr. Popich with the ability to file for recovery
given that he was the record owner at the time of the spill. As a
result, any legal fees incurred during the settlement proceedings
might fall on his shoulders, which would make it unfair to deny him
reimbursement for court expenses in the event that he is awarded
nothing. An equitable solution to the question of which party should
be entitled to recover is that they both should. Mr. Vekic can recover
the remediation expenses even if they were not incurred as a consequence of the damage inflicted by the spill. Mr. Popich, in turn, can
receive the remainder of the settlement.
Judge Barbier, in his stated reasons for approving the original
plaintiff class settlement agreement with BP, said that oyster leaseholders are being compensated through the Oyster Compensation
Fund in part to pay out-of-pocket expenses for re-cultching or otherwise tending to oyster lease beds.41 Mr. Vekic’s remediation
costs are exactly the kind of damage contemplated by the spirit of
the BP’s agreement and the original sublease agreement between
Mr. Popich and Mr. Vekic. This fact goes to an argument for equity given that Mr. Popich had sold the leases after the spill and, as
a result, no longer needed to pay for remediation expenses. The
settlement consequently represents pure profit after any court costs
for Mr. Popich because he has already received the $90,000 provided for in the sublease with option to purchase. Mr. Vekic’s decision to spend $250,000 on remediating the oyster beds was likely
based on facts establishing a need and almost certainly was not
carelessly made. While it may be important for a contractually
based argument for recovery, it is unnecessary to establish that
damage was inflicted by the spilling of oil into the Gulf to recover
under the principle of equity. Furthermore, by the clear language of

41.

Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 535.
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article 2054, equity should be considered when the parties make no
provision for a particular situation, which is the case here.
In sum, keeping an eye on the bigger picture helps make a confusing situation a bit less mind-boggling. It is plausible to conclude
that neither party should be entitled to the full settlement both as a
matter of contractual interpretation and according to the principle
of equity, which aims at avoiding unjust enrichment. The doctrine
of enrichment without cause, enshrined in article 2298, is not irrelevant but need not be relied upon given the existence of a valid juridical act to which the litigants were parties. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2054 establishes that when the parties make no provision for
a particular situation it must be assumed that they intended to bind
themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract but
also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in the
contract of that kind necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose. Balancing the concepts of contractual interpretation and equity embraces article 2054 and the spirit of article 2298 by reconciling what appears at first glance to be conflicting legal principles
and bringing to light a solution that is appropriate for the circumstances. Equity may echo the fable by Jean de La Fontaine, but
in Vekic v. Popich there is more than just one oyster to be shared
among the litigants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“I will keep them from harm and injustice.” This classic iteration of the Hippocratic Oath is one of the duties that doctors hold
themselves to when treating a sick or ailing patient.1 Indeed, we all
go to the doctor’s office with an aspiration for adequate treatment
and a hope that our doctors and caretakers will perform our treatments smoothly. In the unfortunate circumstance of a doctor’s
wrongdoing, however, certain protocols must be followed to remedy the injured patient’s harm. A recent decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court calls into question the correct method to cure such
an injustice. When a patient has suffered injury or death as a result
of medical malpractice by his or her doctor or caretaker, the litigants to the suit must file a medical review panel claim to deter*
J.D. Candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. I would like to thank Professors Olivier Moréteau and Clare
Ryan, as well as Christabelle Lefebvre and Giovanna Cain for all their assistance and guidance.
1. William C. Shiel, Jr., Medical Definition of Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINENET, https://perma.cc/4ZG8-ULZW.
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mine whether the doctor breached his or her standard of care. The
Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent holding in Guffey v. Lexington
House2 limited the class of persons eligible to file this crucial step
in the litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
Under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (the “Act”), in
order to bring a claim for medical malpractice, a patient or their
representative must file a claim for a medical review panel before
filing the suit.3 Louisiana courts have established that “[a] request
for a medical review panel is a prerequisite to and not the equivalent of a suit for medical malpractice.”4 The panel is a body of experts who evaluate a medical claim and provide an expert opinion
as to whether the doctor or health care provider in question
breached his or her duty of care.5 The duty of care required is the
“degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances,
by members of the profession in good standing in the same community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence.”6 The
panel does not make findings on damages, and litigants may still
proceed with bringing suit even if the panel determines there was
not a breach.7 The Act defines a “claimant” for medical review
panel purposes as “a patient or representative or any person, including a decedent’s estate, seeking or who has sought recovery of
damages or future medical care and related benefits.”8 When a
medical review panel claim is filed by a proper claimant, the prescriptive period for a medical malpractice claim is suspended during the full time the claim is pending before a medical review pan2. Guffey v. Lexington House, LLC, 283 So. 3d 1001 (La. 2019).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) (2019).
4. Houghton v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 859 So. 2d 103, 105106 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2003).
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.8(N)(6) (2019).
6. Id. at § 40:1231.1(A)(22).
7. Guffey, 283 So. 3d at 1012 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting).
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.8(A)(4) (2019).
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el and ninety days following notification to the claimant or her attorney of the panel’s opinion.9
In Guffey v. Lexington House, Geneva Guffey was an elderly
patient at Lexington House Nursing Home in Alexandra, Louisiana, who died on May 16, 2016.10 Her granddaughter, Deana Frederick, alleged that some months before her death, Ms. Guffey had
been dropped during a transfer from her bath chair to her bed,
causing injuries that eventually led to her death. Ms. Frederick
filed a complaint of medical malpractice and requested the formation of a medical review panel on November 2, 2016. Two of
Mrs. Guffey’s surviving sons, George Guffey and James Guffey,
who were the plaintiffs in the case before the Louisiana Supreme
Court, were added as claimants to the medical review panel on
May 18, 2017, more than one year after Mrs. Guffey’s death.11
On May 22, 2017, Lexington House filed an exception of no
right of action, asserting that Ms. Frederick was not a proper
claimant because she was not included in the class of persons entitled to recover damages for a wrongful death and survival action
under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.2 and 2315.1, respectively.12 The trial court denied the exception, arguing that a “claimant”
for medical review panel purposes is not limited to those who will
ultimately be allowed to assert a survival or wrongful death claim
when the panel proceedings are concluded.13 The medical review
panel eventually held that Lexington breached its standard of care
since Mrs. Guffey should have been transported to her bath chair
by two people, but concluded that the laceration did not “exacerbate any of her chronic medical problems nor did it contribute to
her ultimate demise.”14
9. Id. at § 40:1231.8(A)(2)(a).
10. Guffey, 283 So. 3d at 1003.
11. Id.
12. Id. The first line of proper claimants under the articles are the decedent’s surviving spouse and children.
13. Id. at 1004.
14. Id.
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On January 28, 2018, within ninety days of the issuance of the
medical review panel opinion, James and George Guffey filed suit
on behalf of their mother, and Lexington filed an exception of prescription, alleging that the actions prescribed since neither brother
filed a malpractice claim within one year of the death of their
mother or discovery of the malpractice.15 The trial court denied the
exception of prescription, holding that Ms. Frederick was a proper
claimant because of her actual relationship with Ms. Guffey, and
that the timely filing of a claim for medical malpractice by one
claimant suspends prescription with regard to all other potential
claimants even if they were not named in the case.16 The appellate
court later affirmed, holding that Ms. Frederick was a proper
claimant as a succession representative and extending the holding
in Truxillo v. Thomas to allow suspension of the Guffey brothers’
suit due to Ms. Frederick’s medical review panel claim.17
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court, with Justice Guidry writing for
the majority, reversed the court of appeals’ ruling that Ms. Frederick was not a proper claimant for medical review panel purposes under the Act and held that prescription was thus not interrupted. The court reasoned that a proper medical review panel claimant under the Act must be someone “seeking or who has sought
recovery of damages or future medical care and related benefits
under this Part.”18 Thus, a claimant is only proper if he or she has
a right of action to claim wrongful death and survival damages
under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.1 and 2315.2. Because
the proper party must be the decedent’s surviving spouse or children, Ms. Frederick did not fall into this class of persons, and,
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1005 (citing Truxillo v. Thomas, 200 So. 3d 972, 976 (La. App. 4
Cir 2016)).
17. Id. at 1006.
18. Id. at 1008.
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thus, her filing of the medical review panel did not interrupt prescription.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Johnson noted that Ms. Frederick
was a proper claimant under the statute because she was Mrs.
Guffey’s succession representative, had a valid power of attorney,
and was named executrix and sole beneficiary under Ms. Guffey’s
will.19 Additionally, the dissent distinguished a medical review
panel from a wrongful death action, holding that the medical review panel does not have the power to adjudicate the rights of parties.20 The dissent ultimately concluded that the statutory language
of the Act was broad enough to include Ms. Frederick, since the
claim could be brought by a patient or his or her representative,
with a “representative” including a legal agent of the patient,
which Ms. Frederick was through her power of attorney.21
IV. COMMENTARY
The Supreme Court’s holding in Guffey presents a problematic
precedent regarding both statutory interpretation and procedural
guidelines. It has long been an interpretative dogma that when a
law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no
further legislative interpretation shall be made.22 Ironically, when
the majority in this case held that the plaintiffs ignored the full
wording of the statute, the majority indeed committed the same
blunder themselves. Section 40:1231.1(A)(4) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, through its wording, essentially lists three main sets
of people allowed to file a medical review claim: the patient or
their representative or any person seeking damages/future medical
care benefits. While the statutory language and punctuation placement is indeed quite intricate, a reasonable reading of the statute
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1013 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2019).
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should be broad enough to include Ms. Frederick because, due to
her legal duty toward Mrs. Guffey, she could be qualified as a valid representative. Although Ms. Frederick is not in the first class of
plaintiffs to bring suit for wrongful death and survival, she is indeed a valid legal representative of Ms. Guffey and could be
deemed a proper claimant under the statute. Additionally, as a legal
representative and voice for Ms. Guffey, Ms. Frederick could also
satisfy the requirement of having a “real and actual interest”23 in
the action at hand. Although Ms. Frederick is not a proper party to
claim wrongful death and survival damages under the Act, her significant personal and legal relationship with Mrs. Guffey should
warrant her a proper party to at least file a claim to discover
whether the nursing home breached their duty, which ultimately
led to her grandmother’s demise.
The most detrimental consequence of the holding of this case is
the Supreme Court’s treatment of the medical review panel claim
as an extension of, rather than a supplement to, the medical malpractice action. While convening a medical review panel is certainly a prerequisite that must be met, the purposes and proceedings of
both actions should not warrant a similar holding in terms of proper parties. Even though a person may not have a legal right to collect wrongful death and survival actions, he or she should at least
be granted a courtesy in being allowed to investigate the cause of
their loved one’s death. Essentially, if Mrs. Guffey entrusted Ms.
Frederick enough to act as her legal representative and carry out
her estate, Ms. Frederick should, at a bare minimum, have a right
to find out what indeed happened to her grandmother.
Since the medical review panel is only a means rather than an
end to collect wrongful death damages, a proper claimant should
not be severely limited in this preceding procedure. Indeed, a medical review panel’s composition is made up of three health care
providers and one attorney, who does not vote and is purely there
23.

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 681 (2019).
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to advise the panel.24 Since the panel is not composed of legal experts designed to either award damages or render judgment in favor of either party, it seems strained to liken these two distinct proceedings and hold that only an actual party to the lawsuit can determine whether the doctors breached. Since the legislature allowed “agents” or “representatives” to initiate a claim under the
Act, the legislature intended to enable “agents” and “representatives” to protect the estate for those who may ultimately have a
right to file suit.25
While the majority in this case is correct in holding the Guffey
brothers are proper claimants under the statute, the court’s holding
severely limits and undermines the wording of the Medical Malpractice Act and confuses the steps of the litigation process. The
majority cites Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1231.8(B)(2)’s
language that a health care provider against whom a claim has
been filed may raise the peremptory exception of no right of action
at any time without the need for completion of the medical review
panel.26 Regarding the majority’s opinion, the legislature may not
have anticipated the situation, such as the one here, where a proper
medical review panel claimant is different from a proper medical
malpractice lawsuit plaintiff. However, the majority’s argument
here could be considered a bit reaching. One of the fundamental
principles of statutory interpretation is that when the language of a
law is susceptible of different meanings, the law must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the
law.27 As illustrated above, because the purpose of the medical review panel is to determine whether a doctor breached, rather than
to collect damages, Ms. Frederick should have been deemed a
proper claimant because a broader definition of “claimant” should
be allowed to determine breach rather than to collect damages.
24. WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE—TORT
LAW § 15:5 (2d ed., West 2018).
25. Guffey, 283 So. 3d at 1009.
26. Id. at 1010.
27. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2019).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Guffey certainly
represented a landmark case as to the procedure for filing a medical review panel. While the majority does make strong arguments
of statutory interpretation with its holding, the dissent seemed to
have a better viewpoint in terms of policy considerations. The policy considerations emphasized by the dissent should outweigh the
strict, albeit problematic, textual interpretation of the majority. In
the holding, the court denies those with a legal duty to the patient
the right to file a review panel claim by limiting the definition of
“claimant” to essentially only a family member. While the majority
does present strong rationale as to its definitions, its holding could
indeed be a form of injustice to the Guffey’s that the Hippocratic
oath was meant to prevent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The statutory and jurisprudential rules governing building restrictions must strike “a balance between individual demands for
the recognition of modifications of property rights to suit individual needs and social demands for the preservation of a relatively
simple system of unencumbered property.”1 The Louisiana Civil
Code defines a “building restriction” as a charge “imposed by the
owner of an immovable in pursuance of a general plan governing
building standards, specified uses, and improvements.”2 The Code
further requires that if there is any “doubt as to the existence, validity or extent of the building restrictions” it must be “resolved in
*
J.D./D.C.L. candidate (May 2020), Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Prof. Olivier Moréteau for
his research suggestions and support throughout the writing of this case note.
1. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights: Limits of Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 LA. L. REV. 44 (1969).
2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 775 (2017).

358

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

favor of the unrestricted use of the immoveable.”3 Louisiana jurisprudence has established that building restrictions are to be strictly
construed,4 conflicting with the Revised Statutes, which state that
building restrictions should be liberally construed.5
II. BACKGROUND
In Fashion Plantation Estates Property Owners Association v.
Sims,6 the Sims owned a home in Fashion Plantation Estates Subdivision located in Hahnville, Louisiana. Their property, along with
the rest of the subdivision was subject to the restrictive covenants
included in the St. Charles Parish conveyance records. The Fashion
Plantation Estates Property Owners Association (the “Association”)
was responsible for enforcing the covenants. The original covenant
under paragraph 8 provided that “[p]arking or temporary storage of
boats, campers, etc. will not be permitted in front of any houses.”7
The covenant was amended eleven years later under paragraph 11,
which provides that “[p]arking or temporary storage of boats, campers, recreational vehicles, trailers, etc. will not be permitted in front
of any homes. Also, such items will not be permitted within 100 feet
from the edge of any street unless it is parked behind a six-foot privacy fence or in a garage.”8
In 2004, the Sims purchased a boat and parked it in their driveway, next to the garage door, and in front of a portion of their home.9
On April 7, 2015 the vice president of the Association sent the Sims
an informal notification that they were in violation of paragraph 11
because their boat was parked in front of their property. The Sims
3. Id. at art. 783.
4. Id. See comment (b). See also Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So. 2d 1013 (La.
1986) (holding that building restrictions should be strictly construed).
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.4 (2019).
6. Fashion Plantation Estates Property Owners Association v. Sims, 209 So.
3d 384 (2016).
7. St. Charles Con. Rec., Paragraph 8 (1999) (emphasis added).
8. St. Charles Con. Rec., Paragraph 11 (2010) (emphasis added).
9. This portion of their home was the farthest right wall which faced the
street. It included a decorative inlay and was not a main portion of the house.
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were also notified that they had three days to remove the boat from
their property or formal action would be taken. The Sims failed to
remove the boat, and the vice president sent them formal notifications of their alleged violation on April 13, April 15, and May 15,
2015. In these notifications, the Sims were informed that if they continued to remain in violation of paragraph 11, enforcement action
would be taken and a $15.00-a-day fine would be imposed until the
violation was corrected, in addition to costs and attorney’s fees. The
Sims continued to ignore the Association’s requests and on August
5, 2015, the Association filed a petition for a permanent injunction
pursuant to the Louisiana Civil Code10 in the 29th Judicial District
Court, seeking to enjoin the Sims from further violating paragraph
11 of the amended covenants. The Association also sought the payment of the $15.00 daily fine and all costs incurred as a result of the
Association’s enforcement of the covenants, including attorney’s
fees.
The Sims answered the petition on August 17, 2015 and denied
all the claims alleged in the petition. The Sims argued that they were
not subject to the amended covenants on paragraph 11, as they were
improperly amended, and that they were only subject to the original
covenants. The bench trial on the injunction was held on December
4, 2015. At trial, the vice president testified that the Sims’s boat was
parked in front of their home, was only 54 ½ feet from the street,
and was not behind a six-foot privacy fence. Thus, they were in violation of both paragraph 8 of the original covenants and paragraph
11 of the amended covenants. The vice president testified that the
purpose of paragraph 11 was to “maintain the value of the properties” and to look like a subdivision and not a “junkyard.”11 He also
testified that there had been several other instances where boats or

10. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 779 (2017), providing for injunctive relief.
(“Building restrictions may be enforced by mandatory and prohibitory injunctions
without regard to the limitations of Article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”)
11. Sims, 209 So. 3d at 386.
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trailers had been parked in a similar fashion, but the residents corrected the violation in a reasonable time after notice was given.
However, Mr. Sims described the boat to be parked along the side
of the house, and not in front of it as the vice president suggested.
Both parties submitted post-trial memoranda.
The Sims argued that a legal definition should be applied to the
case, not a literal interpretation of what constitutes the front of the
Sims’ property. The Association argued that the covenants were
properly recorded, the boat was parked in front of the home, and the
Sims violated the covenants.12 On February 4, 2016, the trial court
issued a judgment in favor of the Sims, finding that paragraph 8 of
the original covenants was vague and ambiguous.13 The trial court
held that the covenants did not define “in front of” and did not use
the term “front” in such a way that “in front of” in paragraph 8 could
be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the covenants. The
trial court went on to note that while the Association contended that
the portion of the structure that jutted out past the garage constituted
the “front” of the home, this was likely not the opinion of laymen
who may view the home.14 The trial court found that the placement
of the Sims’s boat on the side of the home and in front of the garage
door did not violate the original 1999 restrictive covenants.
As to Sims’s other issue, the trial court held in their favor that
the paragraph 11 covenants did not apply to them. The court noted
that the 1999 covenants, under paragraph 8, set a term of 25 years
and a specific method for their continuation and modification. The
trial court found that the original covenants were recorded on February 26, 1999 and had not been in effect for the required 25-year
12. Id. The Association argued that the violation was “to the detriment of the
overall scheme of uniformity of planning and development governing the subdivision and to the detriment of the other property owners.”
13. Id. at 388. Due to the vague and ambiguous nature of the covenant, the
trial court noted that the covenant must be interpreted against the developer and
in favor of the property owner.
14. Id. at 386. The trial court supported its finding by the testimony of the
Association vice president, who testified that the covenants were amended in 2010
because several of them were ambiguous and needed explanation.
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term and could not be amended in 2010. The Association appealed
the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Louisiana.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the
trial court in favor of the Association. The appellate court held that
the trial court erred in the interpretation of the restriction under the
Revised Statutes (La. R.S. 9:1141:4), finding that the vice president’s testimony proved that the purpose and intent of the restriction
was to maintain the value and appearance of the property.15 The
court held that the covenant was not vague or unambiguous, and that
the boat was parked in front of the house in violation of paragraph
8. The Association argued in the second assignment of error that the
trial court erred in finding that paragraph 11 was not effective
against the Sims. The appellate court did not decide whether paragraph 11 was or not effective against the Sims, as the point was moot
in light of their holding on paragraph 8.
The court reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment back
to the trial court for the issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting the Sims from parking their boat in violation of paragraph 8.
The trial court was instructed to determine the assessment of fees to
the Sims associated with the enforcement of the covenants by the
Association.
IV. CONFLICTING VIEWS ON BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The legal nature of building restrictions is not under dispute. They
are “incorporeal immovables and real rights,”16 not simply obligations. They are a restriction on ownership to the detriment of individual owners, to the collective benefit of all other residents of a subdivision. The Civil Code wants them to be regulated “by application of
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:1141.4 (2019), provides that “[t]he existence, validity, or extent of a building restriction affecting any association property shall
be liberally construed to give effect to its purpose and intent” (emphasis added).
16. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 777 (2017).
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the rules governing predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the nature of building restrictions.”17 Strictly
speaking, they do not qualify as predial servitudes: though one may
identify a servient estate, there is no dominant estate.18
There are two views on how to interpret building restrictions.
The Civil Code views them as a charge restricting the use of the
immoveable, and for that reason it prescribes a strict interpretation.
This strict interpretation is meant to be protective of the right of
ownership. The Revised Statutes prescribe a liberal interpretation,
favoring the development of well-regulated subdivisions, protecting
the interests of present and future owners at the cost of a limitation
of their ownership rights. The narrow view of the Code treats building restrictions as real rights, to prevent structures that are immoveable or to prevent any annoying actions by a neighbor. This view
protects the property owner. However, building restrictions go well
beyond imposing a standard of construction, they also regulate how
the individual owners can use the private and public space. This type
of regulation makes the type of interpretation used crucial for determining how property owners can use their own property.
The liberal view of the Revised Statutes was used by the Appellate Court in its construction of the phrase “in front of,” creating a
building restriction on the boat in favor of the Association. This interpretation is protective of the investment of the developers and of
communal living. This view on the building restrictions would allow
for the restrictions to further regulate the acts that homeowners can
do on their private property, to ensure that the standard of communal
living within the subdivision is upheld. Under this broad interpretation of the Revised Statutes, the Sims would be unable to park their
boat on their own private property, as the standards of communal
living should not be subrogated to that of the rights of the private
property owner.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at art. 646.

2019]

FASHION PLANTATION ESTATES V. SIMS

363

The trial court used the narrow interpretation under article 783,
construing the language in favor of the individual owner and against
the Association. The trial court did so because at the time of the enactment of the original restrictive covenants in 1999, the Louisiana
Condominium Act had not yet been adopted.19 The court saw therefore no reason to apply the new law to be found in the Revised Statutes, and therefore ignored the liberal interpretation that it is promoting. This narrow interpretation under the Code favors the rights
of the property owner more than the Revised Statutes. Under the
Code, building restrictions must always be interpreted in favor of
unrestricted use of the immoveable, but this cannot be taken to the
extreme.20 Individual restrictions must be interpreted to ensure the
furtherance of the general development plan, but must not be too
burdensome upon the individual property owner.21 The conflict between the narrow interpretation promoted by the Code and the liberal interpretation enshrined in the Revised Statutes must be resolved.
V. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE REVISED STATUTES AND THE CODE
The trial court narrowly interpreted the covenant in favor of the
Sims, using article 783 and comment (b) to find the language of the
paragraph 8 covenant language “in front of” to be ambiguous and
vague. The appellate court chose to broadly construe the language

19. Fashion Plantation Estates Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Sims, No. 80, 281 D,
La. Dist. LEXIS 10595, at 5 (La. Dist. Ct. 29th Dist. 2016). Subsequent to the
original covenants, the legislature enacted the Louisiana Homeowners Association Act, and changed the law to use liberal interpretations. However, the trial
court found that because the Association did not offer any evidence that the Revised Statutes would change the interpretation of the ambiguous covenants, the
court decided not to rule on the use of the Revised Statutes.
20. Allen Scott Crigler, Some Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 LA.
L. REV. 1201, 1212 (1981).
21. Id. at 1213. The reasonableness standard allows for a balance to be struck
between the need of the developers to have flexible restrictions to allow for a
certain standard of communal living, against the public policy concerns that individual’s property is not unduly encumbered, allowing them the freedoms of property ownership.
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consistent with the Revised Statutes, holding in favor of the Association. It held that the area where the boat was parked, next to the
garage but in front of the farthest right wall that faced the street, was
in fact in front of the home, therefore, in violation of the covenant.
The provisions of the Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Homeowners Association Act, were introduced in 1999.22 These Revised
Statutes govern building restrictions and homeowners’ associations
in Louisiana. The appellate court used these Revised Statutes to justify its broad interpretation of the building restriction in favor of the
Association. The view under the Revised Statutes to liberally construe building statutes is in direct conflict with article 783, and the
Louisiana jurisprudence has well established that building restrictions are to be strictly construed.23 The statute states specifically
that “[t]he existence, validity, or extent of a building restriction affecting any association property shall be liberally construed to give
effect to its purpose and intent.”24 The Code states that “[d]oubt as
to the existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immoveable.”25 Unrestricted use of the immoveable in this case would favor the trial
court’s narrow interpretation, construing the covenant in favor of the
property owner.
This conflict between the Revised Statutes and the Civil Code
can be resolved by the doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali
or specialia generalibus derogant, a maxim of interpretation that
states that the more specific law should be given full effect over the
more general law. The Revised Statutes, tailored specifically to
building restrictions, should prevail over the code articles, enacted
to cover building restrictions in a broader sense. Indeed, article 783
clearly states that the provisions of the Louisiana Homeowners Association Act “shall supersede any and all provisions of this Title in
22.
23.
24.
25.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.1 et seq. (2019).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 783 (2017). See comment (b).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.4 (2019) (emphasis added).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 783 (2019).
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the event of a conflict.”26 The appellate court was in that sense correct in using the Revised Statutes, following the prioritization established by the Civil Code itself. However, we are facing a true conflict of norms that may not be resolved by the mechanical application of the maxim. Both the lex generalis and the lex specialis give
a “general” rule of interpretation, and these two rules conflict. The
only reason we describe the second one as special law is due to the
Louisiana Homeowners Association Act that is housed in the Revised Statutes. Yet, in essence, both are rules of interpretation and
they are general.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resolving such a conflict may require legislative intervention,
to decide whether the interpretation under the Civil Code, protective
of individual ownership, or the Louisiana Landowners Association
Act, protective of investment and communal living, is to prevail.
Both texts are addressing the very same building restrictions, one in
general terms, and the other with more specific rules, and it does not
make sense to have one promoting restrictive interpretation, while
the other favors liberal interpretation. This conflict may be resolved
merely by removing one of the two provisions, as they are antagonistic.
While the appellate court cannot be blamed for applying a timehonored maxim of the civil law, keeping these conflicting provisions
is a strange way to strike the balance between the individual demands for the recognition of modifications of property rights and
the social demands for the preservation of a system of unencumbered property, which was Professor Yiannopoulos’s concern.

26.

Id. See also Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1986).
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I. INTRODUCTION
“When the lack of legislative guidance is combined with the
inconsistent statements of the lower courts and the dodging of
the issue by the Supreme Court, the nature of the bystander
claim is far from clear.” 1 Although this was written in 2005, it
is clear from cases such as Doty v. GoAuto that the nature of the
Lejeune claim, or “bystander claim” and its effect on loss of
consortium claims has led to further questions for both insureds
and insurers in Louisiana.

*
J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to thank Professor Church for his comments
throughout the writing of this note.
1. Jessica Coco, The Status of Bystander Damage Claims in Louisiana: A
Less-Than-Perfect Fit in the Tort Puzzle, 66 LA. L. REV. 261 (2005) (citing Moody
v. United Natl. Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236, 240 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995) (stating that
claims under 2315.6 are derived from the bodily injury of a tort victim)).
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II. DOTY’S HOLDING AND REASONING
On November 16, 2015 plaintiff (Mrs. Doty) filed suit against
the driver who struck her 80-year-old husband as he was crossing
a mall crosswalk. Plaintiff’s petition states that she heard her husband cry out as he was struck, after which she turned around and
saw him lying on the ground. Her husband’s immediate injuries
were severe, and included a fractured left foot, a concussion, and
contusions on his legs, elbows, and arms. He was later diagnosed
with cellulitis (infection) of the leg, arm, and foot, a bladder infection, anxiety, and dementia. He was also diagnosed with paraplegia, and as a result was confined to a hospital bed for 28 days
before being transferred to a nursing home.2
Plaintiff sued GoAuto, defendant’s liability insurer, as well as
State Farm, her own Uninsured Motorist insurer. Plaintiff alleged
that she suffered Lejeune damages, now codified under article
2315.6,3 after witnessing her husband’s accident. A Lejeune
claim, or bystander claim under article 2315.6, requires proof
that: (1) one is a member of the class to whom such a right is
granted; (2) one saw the injury-causing event; (3) the harm sustained by the injured person must be such that one can reasonably
expect a person in the claimant’s position to sustain serious mental anguish or emotional distress; and (4) the mental anguish or
emotional distress must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable.4
In March 2016, the defendant and her liability insurer, GoAuto,
were dismissed from the suit after they settled. In January 2017,
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it
had paid the full $50,000 per person limit on the policy for bodily
injury.5 The policy provided:
2. Doty v. GoAuto Ins., 251 So.3d 706, 710 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2018).
3. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.6 (2019) (providing for recovery for severe, debilitating, and foreseeable mental anguish for a certain class of persons
who view the tortious event or come upon the scene thereafter).
4. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 714 (citing Castille v. La. Med. Mut., 150 So.3d
614 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2014)).
5. Id.
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Limits
a. The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one insured injured in any one accident, including all damages sustained by other insureds as a result
of that bodily injury, is the lesser of:
(1) the amount of all damages resulting from that bodily injury reduced by the sum of all payments for damages resulting from that bodily injury made by or on behalf of any person or organization who is or may be held legally liable for
that bodily injury; or
(2) the limit shown under ‘Each Person.’
b. Subject to a. above, the most we will pay for all damages
resulting from bodily injury to two or more insureds injured
in the same accident is the limit shown under ‘Each Accident.’6
State Farm contended that plaintiff’s Lejeune claim was limited
under the single-per-person limit, because it was a result of her
husband’s bodily injury. Plaintiff relied upon the language in
Crabtree in her opposition, which allowed for recovery of a
Lejeune claim under a separate per-person limit. Defendant’s motion was denied. The trial court awarded plaintiff $50,000 in general damages (subject to the per-accident limit), a $25,000 penalty
for State Farm’s failure to pay UM claim within 30 days of receipt
of written proof, and attorney’s fees as well as court costs.7 On
appeal, State Farm alleged that (1) the trial erred in denying its
motion for summary judgment, (2) the plaintiff’s claim met the requirements established in Lejeune, (3) the plaintiff’s award was
excessive and (4) the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. The
Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court and awarded
plaintiff additional costs of the appeal. 8
The nature of the Lejeune claim and whether a Lejeune claim
constitutes a separate bodily injury for the purposes of coverage
under an insurance policy has caused much confusion in jurisprudence. In this case, on appeal, the court held that Ms. Doty met the
6.
7.
8.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 710-711.
Id.
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requirements for a Lejeune claim. The court stated that the requirements of article 2315.6, when read together, “suggest a need for temporal proximity between the tortious event” and the harm.9 The
court stated that the standard of the perceived injuries are superimposed onto the victim, in this case, her husband. Due to his age,
plaintiff’s shock, and the tire tracks and impression on her husband’s
leg, she met the requirements.10 Further, the award was not excessive.11 The court stated several reasons for this, including the fact
that the plaintiff lost ten pounds after the accident due to anxiety and
stress and the fact that she declined an ambulance for her husband
due to her shock. In sum, her physical symptoms helped to prove
her shock. Interestingly, the court notes that:
Mrs. Doty’s love and affection for husband was so great that
never left her husband’s side while he was at St. Patrick’s . . . . He stayed in St. Patrick’s twenty-eight
days . . . when he was transferred to Resthaven Nursing
Home. While her actions, themselves, are not factors in
Lejeune damages, they demonstrate the love and affection
she has for her husband. These facts bolster the finding of
the trial court that she suffered extreme distress seeing him
lying in the road face down with tire marks across his legs
just after hearing the accident happen.12
As Judge Gremillion’s concurrence points out, there are issues with this logic. In this case, the plaintiff’s damages needed
to be carefully separated because State Farm’s tender of nonLejeune damages had been extinguished by its tender of its limits
to the plaintiff.13 The “non-Lejeune damages” are loss-of-consortium claims. Loss-of-consortium claims, or loss of sex, society,
service, and support are separate and distinct from Lejeune
claims.14 As stated in Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance, lossof-consortium claims are typically subject to a single-person
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 718-719 (Gremillion, J., concurring).
Id. at 719.
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limit, 15 due to the fact that they have been held to be “derivative”
in nature. 16 Put another way, “a loss of consortium claim is a
derivative claim of the primary victim’s injuries . . . . The derivative claim does not come into existence until someone else is
injured.” 17
Judge Gremillion notes that the court relies on several factors, including plaintiff’s distress over her husband’s ongoing
medical issues before he was treated, and his lengthy stays in
the hospital as well as the rehab facility. 18 These are factors that
point to loss-of-consortium claims, not necessarily Lejeune
claims, which only encompass immediate shock of witnessing
the accident. 19 Thus, part of her claims should have been subject
to the single per-person limit on recovery. 20
As the concurrence notes, the Court of Appeal confuses the
Lejeune claim requirements and evidence of loss of consortium,
committing legal error. 21 As a result, she is awarded in excess,
because the loss-of-consortium claims are “derivative” and thus
subject to a per-person limit, while the Lejeune claim for witnessing the accident constitutes its own bodily injury under the
per-accident limit. Judge Gremillion bolsters this argument by
citing similar cases with lower damages, 22 and also notes that
Ms. Doty was not treated or diagnosed with any serious mental
illness or issues after the accident.23 He notes that the legislature clearly
15.
16.

Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance, 696 So.2d 569, 577 (La. 1997).
Coco, supra note 1, at 262 (citing FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C.
GALLIGAN, LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 15-2 at 101 (Mitchie 1996)). The importance
in this distinction lies in what limits will apply in the policy.
17. Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 632 So.2d 736, 740 (La 1994) (quoting
Shepard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 545 So.2d 624, 629 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 550 So.2d 627, 628 (La. 1989)).
18. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 719 (Gremillion, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 720.
20. Id. at 719.
21. Id. at 720.
22. See Granger v. United Home Health Care, 145 So.3d 1071 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2014) (nurse who witnessed her husband’s overdose and was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder was awarded $1,000).
23. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 719 (Gremillion, J., stating that while he doubts
Ms. Doty suffered severe enough mental anguish, jurisprudence has suggested
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intended for article 2315.6 to compensate for immediate harm that is
severe and apparent, but not to compensate for normal anguish and distress.24
Additionally, although the concurrence does not address this, one
element required for an article 2315.625 Lejeune claim is that the person
fit a certain class of persons. These classes of persons are logically allowed to collect because their damages will be large due to their love
and affection for the victim. Therefore, plaintiff’s subsequent suffering
as she stayed with her husband should not have been considered, because she already fit the class of persons under article 2315.6, who are
essentially presumed to have love and affection for the victim. The
court did not need to consider further duplicative proof of her love and
affection. Instead, the immediateness of the shock should have been the
other consideration in deciding what amount to award.
III. DID DOTY CLARIFY THE NATURE OF THE LEJEUNE CLAIM?
A more glaring issue in this case is the categorization of Lejeune
claims as physical bodily injury under the policy, as well as the implications on the categorization of loss-of-consortium claims. Article
2315.6(A) states that: “The following persons who view an event causing injury to another person, or who come upon the scene thereafter,
may recover for mental anguish or distress that they suffer as a result
of the other person’s injury.”26 In reading this in pari materia with the
language of the policy in Doty, it seems as though the Lejeune damages
that psychological diagnosis is not dispositive. Given the abuse of discretion
standard, he agrees with the court in this respect) (also citing Dickerson v. Lafferty, 750 So.2d 432, where a child who witnessed accident was not diagnosed
with any mental illness, phobia, or other disorder).
24. Id. at 717.
25. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.6 (2019) allows recovery for:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the
injured person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of
them.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
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would constitute damages that “result from” the damages sustained
by one person in an accident. Thus, it would be logical to conclude
from strict statutory construction that Lejeune claims are ones that
would be subject to a single-person limit, and the plaintiff in Doty
would have been limited in recovery to the single-person limit, because of the “resulting from” language. Further, article 2315.6 defines Lejeune claims as mental-anguish claims, which are technically not “physical bodily injuries” from a strict definition standpoint. The policy in this case defined bodily injury as “a physical
bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease, or death that results
from it.”
However, relying on previous case law, the Doty court ruled that
the Lejeune claim was its own separate bodily injury subject to the
per-accident limit.27 The confusion on this issue is emphasized in
Judge Gremillion’s concurrence, in which he dissents from the holding that the failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious: “State Farm
should not be punished for contesting coverage in this case, given
the ‘evolving’ case law in this area.”28
A. Are Lejeune Claims Distinct due to “Temporal Proximity” to
the Accident, Physical Nature, or Both?
Legal scholars have articulated that there is a distinction between Lejeune claims and loss-of-consortium claims because
there exists “an independent duty to protect a plaintiff from mental

27. Doty, 251 So.3d 706 (citing to Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736). The court relies
on the holding in Crabree, in which a Lejeune claim was subject to the per-accident limit in part due to the ambiguities in the policy. Interestingly, Justice Victory
dissents in Hill v. Shelter Ins. Co., 935 So.2d 691, 696 (La. 2006) for the same
reasons given above. He states that he would overrule Crabtree, because the policy
clearly defines “bodily injury” to one person to include all injury and damages to
others resulting from this bodily injury. Regardless of whether the mental anguish
as defined by Crabtree is its own separate injury, it is still included. He reasons
that the Crabtree court ignores the word “all.” Considering Doty’s definition of
bodily injury is physical bodily injury and all sickness, disease, or death that results in it, I would agree with this logic.
28. Id. at 724.
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anguish damages occasioned by the injury to a third person.”29 Louisiana
courts, however, have resolved the issue based on whether the language
of the policy is ambiguous, on the proximity to the accident, and on the
physical nature of a Lejeune claim.30 In Crabtree, the primary case upon
which Doty relies,31 the court held that plaintiff’s Lejeune claim was a
bodily injury that was subject to the per-accident limit in the policy because “bodily injury” was vaguely defined.32 The court utilized the
standard three-step approach for analyzing an insurance policy:
(1) if the words of the policy are clear and explicit and lead
to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation of the
policy is necessary; (2) an insurance policy should not be
interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner so as to
enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably
contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion; and (3) the policy should be construed as a whole
and one portion thereof should not be construed separately
at the expense of disregarding the other.33 If after applying
the other general rules of construction an ambiguity remains,
the ambiguous provision is to be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.34
Crabtree concluded that the mental anguish of a Lejeune claim was
a bodily injury under the policy, in part because the limiting word
“physical” was not included.35 However, the court contradicts itself in
dicta when it states that the essence of the Lejeune tort claim is shock,
which can manifest itself physically.36 Further, “there is no bright-line
distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ injuries, either in medicine or law.”37 Thus, the presence of the word “physical” should not
29. Coco, supra note 1, at 269 (citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556
So.2d 559 (La. 1990)).
30. See Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, supra note 17.
31. See Smith v. Thomas, 214 So.3d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2017). Doty also
relies upon Smith due to the nearly identical language, but Smith also relies on
Crabtree.
32. Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, supra note 17.
33. Id. at 741.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 744.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 475.
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be relevant. Yet, it is stressed repeatedly.38 The question remains: is
physical manifestation a method of proving shock, or is it part and parcel of the claim?
The court in Crabtree envisioned a scenario where absurd consequences could have resulted had they ruled the other way:
Under State Farm’s construction, all injuries including bodily injuries which ‘result from’ another’s bodily injury
would be subject to the single per person limit while all other
bodily injuries would be covered under the aggregate per accident limit. Thus, if an oncoming car hit Mr. Crabtree while
he was driving with Mrs. Crabtree, and the injury to him
caused him to drive off the road and hit a tree resulting in
external, physical injury to Mrs. Crabtree, the latter’s injury,
under State Farm’s interpretation, would ‘result from’ the
former’s injury and therefore fall under the single bodily injury limit.39
Finally, the strongest argument the court makes is that the plaintiff
in Crabtree was injured in the same accident as her husband, the tort
victim.40 Thus, Crabtree reached its conclusion for three reasons: (1)
the vagueness of the term “bodily injury,” (2) the “absurd” consequences resulting from this vagueness had they ruled for State Farm,
and (3) mental anguish could be its own bodily injury given the policy
language.41 As noted in Smith, the discussion in Crabtree suggests that
the Supreme Court is not prepared to rule that Lejeune claims are or are
not derivative.42
Doty is distinguishable from Crabtree because it did include the
limiting word “physical,” and yet this was not taken as dispositive. Further, Doty’s policy language appears to be far less vague than the language discussed in Crabtree.43 Doty emphasized the “temporal proximity” to the event and allowed for recovery under the per-accident

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 742.
Smith v. Thomas, 214 So.2d 945, 967, supra note 31.
See Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, 739.
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limit,44 citing Smith. The court further reasoned that Lejeune claims
can constitute shock rising to the level of physical injury, citing dicta
from Crabtree. Doty appears to seize on Smith and Crabtree dicta
and hold that Lejeune is a physical bodily injury that is not derivative
of the initial tort victim’s injury, despite Crabtree’s suggestion that
State Farm could have changed the outcome by including this same
word.
B. How Dicta on Lejeune Claims Cases Have Affected Loss of
Consortium
The Supreme Court in Hill held that the wrongful death claims
of several adult children of the deceased could be subject to separate
per-person limits for each child. The policy language was identical
to Crabtree, and the limiting word “physical” was not used.45 The
court stated that the “test” to determine if their injuries were each
their own separate bodily injuries turned on the severe and debilitating nature of the mental anguish.46 The Hill47 court did not discuss
the requirement that in order to be subject to the per-accident aggregate limits, the bodily injury had to occur “in the same accident.”48
Nor did they discuss whether the loss of consortium claim was derivative in nature. This standard is arguably not compatible with any
previously-discussed cases, particularly when analyzing dicta.
In Hebert, State Farm altered the language to “physical.” The
Supreme Court ruled that the wrongful death claims of the plaintiff,
who was not near the accident, were subject to the single per-person
limit on the injured relative, and not to the aggregate per-accident
limit. This was for two reasons: (1) the policy was very clear and
specific, and (2) the difference between Lejeune claims and wrongful death concerned temporal proximity to the accident and the fact
44. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 710.
45. Hill, 935 So.2d 691, 694.
46. Id. at 695.
47. Id. at 694.
48. Hebert v. Webre, 982 So.2d 770, 776 (La. 2008) (distinguishing from
Hill and Crabtree by stating the policy language was clearer).
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that Lejeune claims seem to be considered more physical in nature.
The court distinguished its holding from Crabtree as follows:
(1) ‘bodily injury’ now means ‘physical bodily injury;’ and
(2) ‘all emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury
sustained by other persons who do not sustain bodily injury’
is expressly included in ‘all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.’ As we explained in Hill, the
type of injuries suffered by a wrongful death plaintiff are
emotional distress type injuries.49
Thus, evolving jurisprudence seems to suggest that regardless of
whether a policy is ambiguous, Lejeune claims are distinguished
from loss of consortium because (1) they are more physical and (2)
they occur in the same accident. Therefore, they are not derivative.
Problems arise when the policy is ambiguous, particularly with respect to wrongful-death claims, because Hill suggested that vague
policy language might mean that even a wrongful death claim is not
derivative of one victim’s injury. This is problematic when considering the fact that this body of case law reasoning hinges on distinguishing the two.50
It is clear that the Supreme Court is concerned with the policy
implications in limiting a Lejeune plaintiff’s claim, as they are serious, debilitating emotional distress claims.51 Further, the rules of interpretation call for any ambiguities in the policy to be construed in
the claimant’s favor, and the court will often stretch to seek coverage. However, confusion has arisen because the court has not
squarely addressed whether the Lejeune claim is derivative, while
49. Id. at 776.
50. See, e.g., Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, see also Smith v. Thomas, 214 So.3d
945; Doty v. GoAuto 251 So.3d 706 (this body of case law spends considerable
time distinguishing between Lejeune claims and loss of consortium based upon
the physical nature and the temporal proximity. However, the Supreme Court suggests in Hill that where the policy is vague, loss of consortium might also rise to
level of physical injury that Lejeune does).
51. See Hebert v. Webre, 982 So.2d 770, 777 (explaining “grave policy concerns” about fairness and public policy implications of the policy language that
limited separate and independent causes of action to a single “per person” limit.
However, it ultimately distinguishes the policy at issue from Crabtree and Hill
because it is much more specific).
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the loss of consortium claim is not. They also imply that Lejeune
claims, which are a result of shock, are more physical than loss of
consortium, although both concern emotional distress. Finally, to allow an inherently subjective “test” to govern whether the loss of
consortium claim is severe enough to rise to the level of bodily injury does not fall in line with the former jurisprudential reasoning
regarding Lejeune claims, and may preclude some from recovering
if they outwardly manifest grief in a different manner. After Doty v.
GoAuto, these issues call for either legislative or jurisprudential clarification so that claimants are clear on what they are entitled to, and
insurance companies will not be scrambling to adjust policy language each time a new case is decided.

BOOK REVIEW
CONCEPTUALISING PROPERTY LAW: INTEGRATING COMMON LAW
AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS, by Yaëll Emerich, Elgar, 2018, ISBN
978-1-78811-183-6, 352 pp, £22/$31.
In her newly published book, Conceptualising Property Law:
Integrating Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Yaëll Emerich
explores the evolution and current status of property law in the civil
and common law.1 The predominant theme that emerges from this
impressively learned, eight chapter study is one of convergence.
Emerich repeatedly reveals that property—both as a general legal
concept and as a set of institutional arrangements governing how
people use, manage and exchange both tangible and intangible resources—actually functions in remarkably similar ways in the civil
law and common law traditions despite different historical origins
and doctrinal labels. Emerich’s interest in—and discovery of—this
striking commonality originates in her commitment to “transsystemia,” an approach to teaching and understanding law that grew
out of Quebec’s fertile bilingual, bijural mixed jurisdiction.
Many diverse readers will benefit from Emerich’s work. Lawyers, judges and traditional doctrinal property law scholars in the
largest civil law and common law systems will learn much from
Emerich’s careful study simply because of its clear, incisive description of so much law. Readers in other mixed jurisdictions, such as
Louisiana, Scotland and South Africa, will find the portions of
Emerich’s book that detail the choices Quebec has made in creating
its property law system particularly intriguing. Property theorists
will also find Emerich’s book rewarding as it points to a number of
deep, cross-jurisdictional patterns in the structure of property law.
1. YAËLL EMERICH, CONCEPTUALISING PROPERTY LAW: INTEGRATING
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 1 (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2018). As
Emerich notes, the 2018 publication is in part a translation of her 2017 book, Droit
commun des biens : perspective transsystémique (Éditions Yvon Blais 2017), but
also contains some substantive changes. Id. at vi.
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Emerich’s method of analysis might be described as an advanced form of functional comparative law. In the six chapters that
focus on specific doctrinal categories and questions, Emerich carefully analyzes each subject, combining recent theoretical insights
with objective, fair-minded descriptions of the relevant law in Quebec, the rest of Canada, England, and France. She relies on a mixture
of sources including scholarly monographs, treatises, textbooks, and
law review articles. She frequently dives into the Quebec and French
Civil Codes and common law statutes such as the Law of Property
Act of 1925 (England and Wales). On occasion, she also discusses
judicial decisions in some detail, with particular attention given to
decisions from Quebec, the Canadian common law provinces, and
the Supreme Court of Canada, along with occasional mention of
English, Australian, American, Scottish and French decisions.
The major reward produced by Emerich’s methodical analysis is
the picture of property’s structural unity in the diverse legal systems
she studies when viewed at a broad enough scale. Sometimes this
structural unity or convergence is explained by cross-system pollination. Other times it appears to result from deeper forces and needs
in modern, market-oriented societies governed by the rule of law
where legal elites (those who make property law) seek to afford individuals and legal entities a large measure of contractual freedom
to arrange their affairs regarding tangible and intangible resources.
Emerich’s book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1, the introduction, focuses almost entirely on the intellectual history and
aims of “transsystemia,” which she defines as “a legal approach centred on a dialogue between legal traditions, anchored in a pluralist
and non-hierarchical method that celebrates the irreducible differences and similarities between various traditions.”2 Emerich’s introductory chapter nicely explains how transsystemia began as a
pedagogical experiment at McGill Law School and transitioned into
a full-blown “knowledge project” with complex epistemological
2. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 1.
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aims.3 In Emerich’s telling, transsystemia is an approach to understanding law that seeks to move beyond borders, transcend legal
positivism, and reveal underlying conceptual and social commonalities and differences, while embracing dialogue and “dynamic pluralism.”4 A good portion of the introduction explores the subtle distinctions between traditional comparative law as both a method and
a science and transsystemic analysis, whose goals embrace “crosspollination” of legal discourse, decentering legal positivism and deconstructing law itself.5 Unlike traditional comparative law, transsystemia, as Emerich describes it, is less interested in harmonization
or unification of the law and more interested in dialogue and “impregnation of one tradition in another.”6 Emerich’s introductory
chapter closes with a fascinating discussion of a 1921 decision of
the Privy Council,7 in which common law courts applying Canadian
law began their long, and not always successful, attempt to incorporate aboriginal title into Canada’s property system. Emerich thus
opens another theme that weaves throughout her study, the story of
how non-western legal traditions confront western traditions, while
often remaining shadowed by precariousness.
The second chapter of Emerich’s book, “Historical approach to
property,” actually consists of three stories, all concerning the basic
idea of ownership or title. The first story concerns the development
of the Romanist conception of ownership as power over both corporeal and incorporeal things, the challenge posed to this conception
by continental feudalism and the recovery of a more unified, absolutist conception of ownership with the French Revolution, and the
eventual codification of French law under the Code Napoléon. As
she tells this well-known story, Emerich also weaves in the complex
3. Id. at 3.
4. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 5.
5. Id. at 5–8.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Matamajaw Salmond Club v. Duchaine, [1921] 2 A.C. 426. At the end of
Chapter 1, Emerich admits that “recognition of Aboriginal law remains precarious
in Canada.” EMERICH, supra note 1, at 14.
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story of the development of English common law’s more fragmented conception of multiple estates in land growing out of English feudalism. She explains how this fragmented, relational system
gradually evolved, with assistance from statutory reform and enlightenment philosophy, into a relatively unitary conception of ownership as a subjective right conferring exclusive authority over
things, including, when it comes to land, the exclusive authority expressed as the “fee simple” estate.
Many readers will find Emerich’s detailed account of the work
of the glossators in the 12th and 13th centuries and the post-glossators in the 14th century (namely Bartolus and the French jurist Jean
Faure) particularly enlightening as this period of civil law development is often shrouded in mystery.8 Equally enlightening will be
Emerich’s rich account of Quebec’s reception of a feudal property
system in the 17th century, with both French and English feudal elements.9 Readers will likely find Emerich’s bijural account of the
development of the idea of ownership as a subjective right compelling as she links jurists as diverse as Ockham, Grotius, Pothier and
Blackstone.10 Emerich closes this historical chapter by returning
once more to the problem of how Canadian courts have struggled to
accommodate the property claims of its indigenous peoples, the First
Nations. According to Emerich, while important conceptual progress has been made by Canadian courts and jurists, there “is still
little recognition of actual Aboriginal titles.”11
In her third chapter, “Origins of title: possession and its effects,”
Emerich turns to a classic subject of comparative legal analysis. In
this highly detailed account, which largely focuses on English and
Canadian common law and French and Quebec civil law notions of
possession and the respective systems’ treatment of the effects of
possession, Emerich finds many convergences and similarities.
8.
9.
10.
11.

EMERICH, supra note 1, at 25–29.
Id. at 29–31.
Id. at 39–41.
Id. at 45.
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Borrowing from the American property law scholar Carol Rose and
the French scholar Raymond Saleilles,12 however, Emerich also explores the theme of possession as a form of communication.
The first part of this chapter reviews the classic elements of the
concept of possession in the civil law (animus and corpus) and common law (animus domini and corpus or factum).13 This part also explains the subtle distinctions between animus domini (the intent to
possess as owner), animus possidendi (the intent to possess) and animus excludendi (the intent to exclude third parties) and the subtle
theoretical differences between Savigny’s subjective theory of possession, in which the intent to exercise the right of ownership is decisive, and Ihering’s objective theory of possession, in which the
possessor’s carrying out of acts that a typical owner would carry out
is crucial.14 Although Emerich recognizes the conventional wisdom
that Savigny’s views prevailed in the civil law jurisdictions of
France and Quebec and that Ihering’s views prevailed in common
law jurisdictions such as England and in some civil law jurisdictions
(Germany), she again finds evidence of convergence between the
two dominant western views of possession.15
The second major part of this chapter addresses the important
distinction between possession as a legal fact and ownership as a
more abstract right or relationship. It is here that Emerich draws
most explicitly on Rose and Saleilles (and to a lesser extent on
Holmes and Salmond) to demonstrate that in both the civil law and
common law traditions, possession ultimately functions as a form of
communication—a way of making claims to third parties about who
is master of a thing,16 or as Emerich puts it finally, “communication
to others of one’s intention to exercise control over property.”17
12. See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession As the Origin of Property, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985); RAYMOND SALEILLES, ÉTUDE SUR LES ÉLÉMENTS CONSTITUTIFS DE LA POSSESSION (Imprimerie de Darantière 1894).
13. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 50–53.
14. Id. at 51–53.
15. Id. at 54–56.
16. Id. at 57–61.
17. Id. at 64 (emphasis in original).
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The remainder of Chapter 3 explores many other nuances of possession and the many practical effects (or as Jean Carbonnier would
say “blessings”) of possession.18 These topics include: (1) how possession combined with the passage of time leads to the acquisition
of ownership through acquisitive prescription and adverse possession; (2) possession’s role in the doctrine of relativity of title at common law; (3) the distinction between possession, occupancy and
quasi-occupancy in civil law (especially in Quebec); (4) the modalities of the good faith purchaser doctrine in French and Quebec law;
(5) the importance of good faith in acquisitive prescriptive and adverse possession in different legal systems; (6) the role of possession
in establishing Aboriginal Title in Canadian law; (7) the theoretical
justifications for acquisitive prescription and adverse possession and
the challenge to those justifications posed by the development of
reliable land registration systems in the UK, Australia and Canada;
(8) the tenuous case for protecting possession separately from ownership through distinct and non-cumulative possessory and petitory
actions; and (9) the requirements for possessory protection and its
availability to mere detentors.19 Louisiana readers will be particularly interested in Emerich’s account of how Quebec has rejected
the rule preventing the cumulation of possessory and petitory actions and how France has now eliminated possessory actions entirely from its Civil Code.20
18. Id. at 47 & n.2 (quoting 2 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL : LES BIENS,
No. 784, at 1720 (Quadrige, Presses Universitaires de France
2004)).
19. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 64–78, 81–85.
20. Id. at 79–80 (discussing Article 722 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure and the law of 16 February 2015). Louisiana, however, still relies upon the
anti-cumulation principle, despite its occasionally harsh results. See LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3657; Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 216 So. 3d 965, 973 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 2016) (finding improper cumulation of the possessory and petitory
action and thus imposing burden on plaintiff of proving better title than defendant); On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass’n v. AKM Acquisitions, L.L.C., 188 So.
3d 1041 (La. 2016) (recounting long saga involving complex cumulation issues);
Goal Properties, Inc. v. Prestridge, 177 So. 3d 126 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2015) (holding that defendant who asserts title in a possessory action converts the action to a
petitory action).
LES OBLIGATIONS,
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Chapter 4 of Emerich’s study bears the enigmatic title: “In
search of private property: between the civil law and the common
law.” This provocative chapter compares how property law scholars
in both the civil law and common law have theorized the constitutive
elements, incidents or characteristics of property and, more particularly, the notion of ownership. Emerich emphasizes several subthemes in this chapter. First, she points out frequently that even
though the common law system of estates seems to create a more
relational, fragmented notion of private property with the residuary
interest held by the Crown, the modern “fee simple” estate functions
more or less like the modern civil law concept of full, unencumbered
ownership.21
Another sub-theme concerns the bundle of rights conception of
ownership in the common law, most famously articulated by Honoré
as eleven distinct “incidents” of ownership, and the traditional
“Latin triptych” of usus-fructus-abusus in the civil law.22 For
Emerich, the ability of theorists, lawyers and lawgivers to conceptualize ownership in terms of these “incidents” or “attributes” again
reveals the flexibility of the concepts of property and ownership.
Moreover, drawing on both English and American theorists dating
back to Hohfeld, and the French “personnalistes” (notably Planiol
and Ginossar), Emerich argues that the “fragmentability” of property reveals its fundamental relational quality. Her core insight
here—one shared, of course, by many property theorists—is that
property is a set of relationships between people regarding things,
rather than a set of relationships between people and things.23
21. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 90, 112–16. In the second meditation on this
theme in chapter 4, Emerich also explores the durational quality of ownership,
with special attention to the inter-relationship between “imprescriptibility” and
potential “perpetuity” of ownership and other real rights. Id. at 112–16. As a property law professor who often draws students’ attention to these questions, I found
this section particularly enlightening.
22. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 94–97. Here, Emerich relies on the classic essay: A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107–47 (A.
G. Guest ed., Clarendon Press 1961).
23. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 99–100
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In the last subtheme in this chapter, Emerich argues that the fundamental characteristic of property—its “essence” as she puts it—is
that it establishes “a relationship of exclusivity” between owners
and non-owners.24 Here, Emerich uses several leading decisions
from Canada and the United States and the work of English property
theorist James Penner, among others, to argue that although property
is certainly relational, “its uniqueness lies in the creation of an exclusive space relating to things subject to property rights, be they
tangible or intangible.”25 By referring to this “uniqueness,” and describing property “as a relation of exclusivity,” Emerich distinguishes property from other spheres of private law, such as contract
and tort, and seems to position her view of property closer to those
of some leading U.S. theorists who place exclusion at the core of
property.26
The final portion of Chapter 4 provides a more classic comparative law analysis of two problems: original acquisition of ownership of movable things or personal property (wild animals, lost and
abandoned things, even treasure) and derivative acquisition of ownership through voluntary transfer.27 Anyone who delights in property law will find Emerich’s recounting of the relevant Quebec Civil
Code provisions and several curious Quebec cases addressing original acquisition of ownership to be particularly exhilarating.
In her fifth chapter, entitled “Limitations to private property,”
Emerich pivots away from exclusion and focuses primarily on other
24. Id. at 98.
25. Id. at 104.
26. Here Emerich appears to align her claims about the comparative institutional nature of property and the importance of exclusion with American theorists
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith. See generally Henry E. Smith, Property as the
Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730
(1998). For an insightful evaluation of the theoretical claims of Merrill and Smith
and the reactions to their claims among other American theorists and an argument
that Merrill and Smith’s claims are more capacious and not as formalistic as some
of their critics contend, see Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 (2017).
27. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 116–29.
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strategies to regulate property, and in particular on the duties owed
by property owners to other property owners and the role of the state
and collective decision making in curtailing property owners’ sphere
of exclusive authority. Emerich’s primary subjects of analysis here
are the civil law doctrines of “abuse of right” and neighborhood disturbances (“troubles de voisinage”) and the common law doctrine of
nuisance. Once again, despite their distinct and mixed historical origins and often quite divergent procedural and institutional settings,
Emerich ultimately finds more functional similarities than differences. Whether confronted by a potential “neighborhood disturbance” arising under Article 976 of the Quebec Civil Code or a common law “nuisance” case, courts will always struggle to draw the
line between mere inconveniences that a neighbor must tolerate and
real damage that can be remedied by a monetary award or injunctive
relief. Further, Emerich finds that courts will always undertake a
deeply relational inquiry to decide these difficult cases. 28
The second and third parts of Chapter 5 address other limitations
on the exclusive rights of private property owners. Here Emerich
focuses first on how the right of the state and other state sanctioned
entities to acquire ownership of or real rights in private property
without the consent of the owner limits private property in both civil
28. Id. at 137–46. Although Emerich’s explication of the leading English and
Quebec cases in this area is exemplary, EMERICH, supra note 1, at 138, 140, her
inquiry neglects to include consideration of recent developments in Louisiana that
challenge her assertion that neighborhood disputes are always resolved using theories of unreasonable harm rather than fault or negligence. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 667 (amended 1996) (incorporating a three-part fault based analysis into
the determination of whether a proprietor is “answerable for damage” for a work
that “deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damages to him”). Compare
Rizzo v. Nichols, 867 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004) (applying revised Article
667 to find defendant liable for monetary damages based on fault due to flooding
caused by new construction on defendant’s property), with Taylor v. Haddox, 968
So. 2d 1200, 1203–04 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Rizzo and finding
that owner of mobile home park was not liable for damages under Article 667 for
damages arising from overflow of oxidation ponds because defendant has used
reasonable care to prevent runoff, pollution and silting); Fiebelkorn v. Alford, 105
So. 3d 110, 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012) (affirming trial court finding that plaintiff
failed to prove that defendant’s construction caused water damage on plaintiff’s
property).
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and common law systems. Although she reveals how the historical,
constitutional and legislative background and the techniques and nomenclature of “expropriation” in French and Quebec civil law and
“compulsory purchase” in English and Canadian common law differ,29
she still finds much more cross-system similarity, particularly as both
the power to expropriate and the scope of property subject to forced
transfer in both traditions has tended to expand over time. Emerich also
notes the occasional judicial resistance that surfaces when private property owners face overly aggressive coercive transfers or seek protection
from technically non-appropriating regulations that nevertheless have
the effect of eliminating all economic uses of private property.30
Emerich concludes Chapter 5 with a description of the limits imposed on property by the “collective interest,” by which she means
public or state claims to air rights, subsurface mineral rights and water.
Even though these resources are connected to land and could, in theory,
be the object of private property rights, Emerich details how in all of
the systems she studies these resources are either heavily regulated by
the state, treated as a common resource, or are owned by the state for
the benefit of the public.31 Emerich also describes a fascinating series
of cases from British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Quebec in which Canadian courts were called upon to examine whether environmental regulations restricting property owners’ ability to exploit minerals or the
surface of the land amounted to an expropriation for which compensation must be paid.32 Collectively these cases call to mind the
29. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 147–52.
30. Id. at 152–60. Although one understands Emerich’s likely reluctance to
delve deeply into the U.S. regulatory takings doctrine, one cannot help but wonder
how Emerich’s thesis of growing convergence between civil and common law
conceptions of expropriation would hold up if applied to recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. For a recent and authoritative summation of developments in
U.S. regulatory takings doctrine and a critique of the dominant approaches to understanding those developments, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 911 (2018).
31. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 152–66. Louisiana lawyers will be interested
to learn that in France and Quebec both solid minerals and fossil fuels below the
surface of land are reserved for the state. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 161–62 (discussing Mining Act, CQLR, c. m-131, art. 3 and Fr. Civ. C. art. 552).
32. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 167–68.
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United States Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine yet seem
to indicate that Canadian courts are generally quite reluctant to characterize environmental regulation as an expropriation except in the
most extreme cases.
Chapter 6 of Emerich’s book begins by reviewing the classificatory taxonomies of both civil law and common law property, particularly with respect to “the objects of property rights,” the title of the
chapter. Emerich first instructs that the immovable and movable distinction in civil law roughly, but not perfectly, mirrors the real property and personal property distinction in common law. Similarly, she
notes that the corporeal and incorporeal property distinction in civil
law tracks, in large part, the tangible and intangible property distinction in common law.33 She also points out that in the eyes of most
civil law jurists the broad category of property includes not only the
material objects of property (things), but also immaterial rights in
material objects. Indeed, according to Emerich, most civil law purists prefer to conceptualize property as the universe of patrimonial
rights, rather than things, since “the value of assets stem more so
from rights that one has over a thing than from the thing itself.”34
Despite recent evolution in civilian thought, Emerich still reviews
the conventional wisdom of comparative property law that the civil
law has tended to reduce the objects of property and ownership to
corporeal things (largely because of a mistaken and overly rigid
reading of Roman law), whereas the common law has had a much
easier time viewing incorporeal rights as objects of property because
of (1) the abstract and relational nature of feudalism and its by-product, the estates systems, and (2) the flexibility of concepts such as
choses in possession and choses in action.35 Emerich returns to her
core theme of “convergence,” however, when she celebrates that a
growing number of French and Quebec jurists now recognize that
property can be both corporeal and incorporeal and that Quebec now
33. Id. at 177–83.
34. Id. at 182.
35. Id. at 183–89
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warmly welcomes the “dematerialization of property law” and thus
has caught up to the “dephsyicalisation of property” found in the
common law.36
Emerich concludes chapter 6 by offering her own list of essential criteria for defining the scope of objects of property. For
Emerich, the things and rights (material or immaterial) that can legitimately be understood as objects of property must: (1) have some
value (presumably a pecuniary value); (2) be alienable or transferable to some degree; (3) be capable of appropriation; that is, public
policy must recognize that the thing or right can be appropriated, or,
as James Penner famously theorized,37 that the thing or right is “only
contingently connected to any particular person,” and, therefore,
could belong to someone else; and (4) be enforceable against third
persons (i.e., there must be a way to exclude others from interference
with the thing or right).38 As one would expect given her transsystemic orientation, the sources Emerich identifies in constructing
this list of criteria are attractively pluralistic, ranging from American
property theorists Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, to English theorist James Penner, Quebec property scholar David Lametti, traditional French doctrinal scholars Baudry-Lacantinerie and Chauveau,
and modern French scholars Frédéric Zenati-Castaing and Thiery
Revet.
The penultimate chapter of Emerich’s study addresses “Fragmentation and modifications to property,” by which she means
the variety of “dismemberments of ownership” in the civil law
and their “functional equivalents” in the common law. Here, as in
many of the other chapters, Emerich deploys her transsystemic
method to reveal that, despite their different historical and conceptual origins, a usufruct functions much like a life estate and
36. Id. at 189–94.
37. Here, Emerich relies on Penner’s famous “separability thesis.” See generally J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 111 (Oxford UP 1997); J.E.
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 803–
07 (1996).
38. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 194–98.
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that empheteuses in Quebec and emphyteutic and building leases in
France function much like leasehold estates in common law jurisdictions.39 Next, Emerich makes the hardly less surprising finding, given
their common Roman law roots, that civil law servitudes and common
law easements also perform the same law work.40 Emerich also argues
that profits à prendre and restrictive covenants have functional equivalents in the civil law jurisdictions she studies (Quebec and France) in the
concepts of personal servitudes and negative real servitudes or non-compete clauses.41 Turning to the question of whether, and to what extent,
the civil law and common law employ a numerus clausus principle—a
restricted menu of recognized property forms that can bind successive
owners even in the absence of privity of contract, Emerich concludes,
like others before her,42 that regardless of whether each system formally
and expressly limits the ability of property owners to create new kinds
of innominate real rights (often fishing and hunting rights over land but
also increasingly rights in intellectual property), courts will, from time to
time, recognize them if the original contracting parties’ intentions are
clear and third party information processing costs are not too excessive.43
39. Id. at 202–11.
40. Id. at 211–14.
41. Id. at 215–16. In future work, Emerich might benefit from considering
developments in the United States, where easements in gross are now widely recognized, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.5(2) (2000) (defining easement in gross); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY § 5.5.3, at 211–14 (4th
ed., Wolters Kluwer 2014) (discussing distinction between appurtenant easements
and easements in gross under American common law), and Louisiana, where servitudes in restraint of trade are now recognized, see RCC Properties, L.L.C. v.
Wenstar Properties, L.P., 930 So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006); Meadowcrest
Center v. Tenet Health System Hospitals, Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 515 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 2005) (discussed in John A. Lovett, Title Conditions in Restraint of Trade, in
MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND
30–66 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., Edinburgh UP
2009), and where all affirmative predial servitudes, whether formerly characterized as continuous or discontinuous, can now be acquired by acquisitive prescription. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 742.
42. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1
(2000).
43. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 216–23.
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Emerich concludes Chapter 7 with a walk through the realm of
undivided co-ownership (tenancy in common and its civil law twin
ownership in indivision plus common law joint tenancy and the civil
law equivalent, the “tontine” or “accretion clause”), divided coownership (also known as condominium or commonhold in Canada
and England respectively) and superficies (i.e., “vertical division”
that separates the ownership of buildings and other constructions
from ownership of the land on which they are situated).44 Despite
some technical differences here and there, one is struck by the overwhelming cross-jurisdictional similarity of the legal structures currently used to regulate the complex, interrelating needs of persons
who must cooperate in the management of overlapping property interests that run concurrently, who must share in the management and
upkeep of all or portions of common resources, or who want to divide up interests in complex horizontal or vertical arrangements.
Emerich’s depiction suggests that some invisible magnet of property
ordering in modern, market-oriented societies impels legal systems
toward similar structural arrangements regardless of their different
historical roots.
Emerich’s final chapter addressing “Trusts and fiducia” may be
the most impressive in the entire book as here Emerich takes on one
of the most complex conceptual challenges in the law of property.
In this chapter, Emerich notes how difficult it has been for scholars
to conceptualize the rights, powers and duties of the various actors
in a trust relationship and how challenging it has been for scholars
to trace the institution’s evolution in various legal systems, particularly those like Quebec and France, where the trust does not have
native roots.45 Nevertheless, throughout this chapter Emerich convincingly conveys the practical advantages of trusts (or trust-like arrangements) in modern society and works through both the classic
definitions, re-definitions and re-conceptualizations of the Roman
44. Id. at 223–34.
45. Id. at 238–56.
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trust, the common law trust, the fideicommisum in Quebec, the new
Quebec trust, and the fiducia that has emerged in the French Civil
Code.46 Her eventual “transsystemic” definition of the trust as a
“mechanism [or legal relationship] whereby a person holds or possesses property and administers it for the benefit of another person
or for some specific purpose,”47 nicely captures the core conceptual
insights she unearths in her comparative journey. Many readers will
find her discussion of the recent codification of the fiducia in France
especially enlightening. Property theorists from other jurisdictions,
particularly in North America, will find her final summation of trustee ownership in Scots law, with its useful and quite comprehensible
notion of “dual patrimonies,” compelling.48
Of course, in any book aiming to offer a compressive account
of a broad field from a comparative perspective, some perspectives and some detail must be left out. In this case, some property
scholars will no doubt note that there are important exceptions to
Emerich’s meta-narrative of structural convergence and to her
meta-definition of property as a body or rules that establish relationships of exclusion between owners and non-owners. Observers of property law in Scotland, for instance, would draw attention to the remarkable innovation of the Land Reform (Scotland)
Act of 2003 which give everyone in Scotland a right of responsible access, for purposes of non-motorized recreational access and
travel, to all land in Scotland and thus redefines landownership in
a way that makes tangible exclusion somewhat less of a core
value.49 Students of property law in South Africa would likewise
point out how that country’s new constitution requires property
to serve the ends of social transformation, equality and dignity
just as strongly as property owners’ interest in the exclusive right

46. Id. at 238–56.
47. Id. at 256.
48. Id. at 267–69.
49. See generally John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land
Reform (Scotland) Act of 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739 (2011).
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to determine the use of things.50 Lawyers in Louisiana might note
that public access to natural resources like water and water bottoms
is far from settled, given the fierce battle over the contested resource
of recently submerged land resulting from subsidence and coastal
erosion.51
At the more theoretical level, it would also be interesting to see
how Emerich responds to other major developments in contemporary property theory. Although she successfully integrates Carol
Rose’s insights on possession in chapter 3 and Merrill and Smith’s
insights about exclusion and the numerus clausus principle in chapters 3 and 6, Emerich does not engage with the powerful explanatory paradigm of property as both commodity and propriety offered
by Rose and by Greg Alexander.52 Nor does she fully grapple with
the challenge to Merrill and Smith’s theories offered by the followers of the Progressive Property School in the United States and
South Africa who contend that property ownership entails as many
responsibilities and social obligations to non-owners and the community at large as it does rights of exclusion and authority.53 Finally,
Emerich has not responded to insights of scholars like Katrina Wyman who argue that the differences between information processing,
exclusion oriented theorists like Merrill and Smith and their
50. See generally A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS (Hart
2009); A.J. van der Walt, The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1. J. L.
PROP. & SOC’Y 15 (2014).
51. See generally Jacques Mestayer, Saving Sportsman’s Paradise: Article
450 and Declaring Ownership of Submerged Lands in Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV.
889 (2016).
52. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Carol M. Rose, Property
as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in NOMOS XXXIII 223 (John W. Chapman ed.,
NYU Press 1991); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (U. of
Chicago Press 1997). In a recent article, Frankie McCarthy skillfully uses this
paradigm to explore the constitutional property case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. See Frankie McCarthy, Protection of Property and the European
Convention of Human Rights, 6 WM. & MARY PROP. RIGHTS CONF. J. 1 (2017).
53. For a detailed account, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING (Oxford UP 2018). For a short synopsis, see Lovett, supra note
49, at 743-753. See also the work of VAN DER WALT, supra note 50.
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progressive property critics might not be as wide as either camp
claims because the exclusion theorists are at heart functionalists who
embrace utilitarian cost-benefit analysis when it comes to establishing the boundaries between exclusion and governance strategies in
property law.54
Finally, it should be noted that Emerich’s audience and the real
subject matter of her analysis are legal elites—judges, legislators
perhaps, property lawyers, and, above all, property scholars. As her
title makes clear, she is interested in how judges and jurists have
viewed and conceptualized property. She does not claim to explore
how property law affects ordinary people as lived experience.55
Thus she does not examine how the particularities of place, time,
social custom and individual context affect how property is actually
experienced by those subject to property law. Her approach then is
essentially a top down, not a bottom up, one. Although this is certainly a defensible choice, some consequences follow. After all, if a
property observer moves to a high enough level of abstraction, the
structures and forms of property law may inevitably appear to converge from a functional perspective.56 A truly bottom up approach
might well reveal more divergence than the picture Emerich produces here. But taking a bottom up approach to property would require a completely different kind of book than the compelling and
scholarly one Emerich has written. It would, no doubt, also fail to
detect the many points of convergence and transsystemic cross-pollination that Emerich has discovered and revealed.
John A. Lovett
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law

54. See generally Wyman, supra note 26.
55. For a stunning example of this kind of property analysis, see DEBBIE
BECHER, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PUBLIC POWER: EMINENT DOMAIN IN PHILADELPHIA (Oxford UP 2014).
56. I am indebted to Jill Robbie, Lecturer at the University of Glasgow Law
School, for this insight.

FAILURES OF AMERICAN METHODS OF LAWMAKING IN HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, by James R. Maxeiner,
Cambridge, 2018, ISBN 978-1-10719-815-9, 358 pp, $110.

Introduction
There is no riskier comparative-law activity than engaging in an
overall critical analysis of one’s own legal system using outside perspectives. The editor-in-chief of this Journal has had this experience,
receiving praise from the comparatists but meeting the silence of the
autochthone jurists: no review of his book was ever published, at
least in the targeted country. 1 The Journal of Civil Law Studies salutes the publication of James Maxeiner’ Failures of American Models of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative Perspectives. It is
without a doubt a controversial work and we found no better way of
calling the attention of our readers to this highly stimulating book
than creating contrast. We had it reviewed by a United States-trained
scholar and by a bijural scholar trained in Germany and the United
States, hoping to bring a diversity of readers to the actual book and
generate rich and fertile discussions.
O.M.

1. OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, LE JURISTE FRANÇAIS ENTRE ETHNOCENTRISME ET
MONDIALISATION (Dalloz 2014).
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Review by Scott J. Burnham
I will never forget the introduction to statutes I got in law school.
My Contracts professor said at some point, “By the way, there’s this
thing called the Uniform Commercial Code in the Appendix to your
book. You might take a look at it some rainy day.” It seems like that
rainy day never came for a lot of lawyers and judges, for cases involving the sale of goods are still argued and opinions written without reference to U.C.C. Article 2. 1
Sometimes it seems like things have not changed all that much
in law schools since that day in my Contracts class some fifty years
ago. I recently heard of a Contracts professor who is so insistent on
teaching Contracts as common law that he deducts points from exam
answers if the student brings up the Article 2 rule, even where it is
applicable.
Some law schools regard Criminal Law as the antidote to the
heavy dose of common law, but my Criminal Law course was more
like a philosophy class. I remember at one point the professor expressed concern for our lack of statutory fundamentals, complaining exasperatedly, “You don’t know what the elements of homicide are?” My response, doubtless under my breath, was, “Hell, I
don’t even know what an element is.” Some law schools now require students to take a token short course in Legislation in the first
year, but whatever they are taught about statutes does not seem to
stick.
When conducting legal research, for example, even though
they know that courts have to follow applicable statutes, law students persist in first searching for a rule in the cases. If they do find
a statute, they are at a loss to say what the statute provides unless
there is a case telling them what the statute says. A statute is

1. See, e.g., Austin Instrument Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E. 2d 533 (N.Y.
1971); Rashid v. Jolly, 218 P.3d 499 (2009).
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apparently like a tree falling in the forest—it does not make a
sound unless a court is there to hear it. In Contracts, the first statute
students are likely to run into, U.C.C. section 2-207, is not a helpful
corrective, for it may well be a statute that does not mean anything
without a healthy dose of interpretation.
Indeed, Article 2 may be a poor introduction to statutes, for it
has been described as a “common law code.” Much of its application
depends on courts to flesh out the meaning of its weasel words. For
example, while section 2-302 allows a court to strike unconscionable terms or unconscionable contracts, there is little guidance in the
text or the Official Comments as to how to determine whether a term
is unconscionable. The statute only makes sense in light of its accreted common law application.
None of this would surprise James R. Maxeiner, whose Failures
of American Methods of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative
Perspectives excoriates law schools for perpetuating the myth that
the law is found in the common law. The first half of Maxeiner’s
book is a welcome revisionist history. The party line has long been
that the United States has historically been a common law country,
and only recently have we entered “the age of statutes.” Maxeiner
points out convincingly that we have always been a nation of statutes, only creating the fabricated common law heritage in the late
nineteenth century under the influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Christopher Columbus Langdell.
Maxeiner would prefer we laud notables such as David Dudley
Field, whose eponymous codes would have codified all of our law.
While Field was unsuccessful in getting his Civil Code adopted in
his native New York, it was adopted in California in 1872, followed
by adoption in several other states, not to mention Guam. Soon after
achieving statehood in 1889, Montana enacted its Civil Code, adopting practically wholesale the statutory scheme of California.
Although I had been taught this view of the primacy of the common law, I thought things might change when I began teaching at
the University of Montana. Surely, I thought, Montana, as a code
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state, would take a different approach to teaching contract law. I was
quickly disillusioned. Dean Jack Mudd told me that after he had
graduated from the law school and went to work as an associate in a
Montana law firm, one of his first assignments was to draft jury instructions in a contracts case. “Use the statutes for the instructions
on the law,” the partner told him. Only then did he discover that
Montana had a statutory scheme for contract law. His Contracts professor—the one I was hired to replace—had never mentioned the
code.
On some level this made sense, for most law schools aspire to
be national in their reputations. Thus, they would not be so provincial as to teach the law of the particular jurisdiction in which they
were located. But Mudd had the insight that the Montana School of
Law was not The Little Harvard of the West, and as the only law
school in the state, it could have the courage to be true to itself as
the Montana law school. In accord with Mudd’s view that we should
be doing a better job to prepare students for the practice of law, I
decided to incorporate these statutes into my teaching. Even if a
graduate did not practice in Montana, I thought students would find
the skills of working with statutes to be of value.
But how do you teach statutes? I have taught U.S. law in civil
law countries and found that the answer is often rote memorization.
U.S. law students apply the law to the facts and to hypothetical facts
from the first day of law school, and while this method may often
lead to the unhappy conclusion that law is indeterminable, it also
leads to the collection of skills that go by the shorthand of “thinking
like a lawyer.” If graduates use those skills to practice law, will they
really find it so hard to discover common law rules? They will have
to find precedents, which their legal research skills (which Maxeiner
disparages) should enable them to do efficiently. Because courts follow precedents, they can pretty well predict what the outcome will
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be—unless the facts are so different that the rule should not apply.
Which, to come full circle, is a strength of the common law system. 2
Even for those students who end up not practicing law, the critical reasoning skills are doubtless valuable. These skills are valuable
because the rules, whether found in the common law or a code,
rarely mean anything without a context. And the context in which
they are applied is a case. When I put together my own materials to
teach Contracts, I vowed that I would never use a case merely to
extract a rule. If that is all the case is for, then we might as well just
give students the rule, just as we would give them a statute. The
value of the case is in analyzing the application of that rule to a particular fact situation.
Here Maxeiner and the civilians might say, “Hold on a second—
in that last paragraph you spoke of a rule ‘found in the common law’
and you said you would instead ‘give students the rule.’ But you
can’t do that because unlike the civil law, the common law cannot
be found—no one knows what it is. You can’t give it to them because it is buried in the past cases and has to be extracted.” Maxeiner
likes to blast the myths of the common law, but isn’t this one of the
myths of the civil law—that, unlike the common law, code law is
readily available? I am especially fond of the optimistic comment of
Wilbur F. Sanders, a proponent of Montana’s codification of the
law:
[A] citizen of Montana, who has but little money to spend on
books, needs to have lying on his table but three: an English
Dictionary to teach [him] the knowledge of his own mother
tongue; this Book of the Law [the Civil Code], to show him
his rights as a member of civilized society; and the good old
Family Bible to teach him his duties to God and to man. 3
2. Another weakness of codes is their inflexibility, freezing the law at a particular stage of development. For example, prior to 1979, the Montana Code included Field Code § 13, which provided that “Persons of unsound mind, within
the meaning of this code, are idiots, lunatics, imbeciles, and habitual drunkards.”
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 64-104 (repealed 1979).
3. HENRY M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 92 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1898) (quoting Wilbur F. Sanders), quoted in Andrew P. Morriss, Scott
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As to the availability of the common law rules, I suspect that for
as long as there has been common law, there have been scholars and
entrepreneurs who provided us with the short cut of extracting the
pure metal rules from the ore of the past decisions. In England, this
function was served by Coke and Blackstone. In the United States
today, it is served by the Restatements. By giving the students a Restatement principle, I am giving them a shortcut (and a powerful
disclaimer needs to be added as to the limitations of this shortcut) to
the common law. Thus, the common law rules are readily available.
Maxeiner does not have a kind word to say about U.S. legal education, with which he has apparently been bound in an unhappy
marriage for many years. He mentions that in the German system,
the judges apply the facts to the law to come to a conclusion (where
there is no jury involved, I fail to see how this system differs from
the U.S. system). He then makes the amazing statement that German
law students learn how to do this after they graduate from law
school! So, what have they done in law school? One can only hazard
the guess that they have spent their time memorizing codes in order
to learn the law. But what is the point of that if the law is so readily
accessible and knowable?
In any event, I have my doubts that the rules are easy to find in
a code. Let’s say I am teaching contract formation. If I go to the
Montana Civil Code, section 28-2-102(4) tells me that for a contract
we need “a sufficient cause or consideration.” 4 What is that? Section
28-2-801 provides:
What constitutes good consideration. Any benefit conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor by any
other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled,
or any prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered by the person, other than prejudice that the person is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the

J. Burnham & James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late,
61 Mont. L. Rev. 371, 380 (2000).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-102(4) (2019).
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promisor is a good consideration for a promise. 5
This is a helpful definition of consideration, and we can unpack
it with profit. But to really get a grip on it, we need some context.
Cases like Hamer v. Sidway, 6 Kirksey v. Kirksey, 7 Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 8 and hypotheticals like “Williston’s Tramp”9
are staples of first-year law study for good reason—they give us the
context to make the rule meaningful. After wrestling with such
cases, I think U.S. law students get a pretty good sense of how to
concoct and identify this mysterious glue that binds contracts together. In fact, didn’t Mr. Field derive his rule by synthesizing
cases? So, it would seem that study of the cases gives us both the
rule and also a better understanding of the rule since we have seen
its application in context.
Let’s now go back to the rule we found in the Montana Code.
Having acquired a working knowledge of consideration from the
Code definition, we are only halfway to understanding that element
of contract formation, for section 28-1-102 mentioned “cause” as an
alternative to consideration. Where is its definition? Alas, it disappears from the Code after that initial mention. Curious about what it
is, I found a law review article on the topic. 10 Tracking the long history of cause, Professor Keyes seems to define it as the absence of
consideration. Curiously, in the more than 150 years since that statute was adopted in California, no attorney seems to have argued, “I
may not have consideration for this contract, but I don’t need it because according to the California Civil Code, I can have cause as an
alternative.” I’m not sure if the reason for this gap is because this
5. Id. at § 28-2-801 (derived from Field Civ. C. § 780).
6. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
7. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
8. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also
Scott J. Burnham, Understated Elegance: Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, in The Best and Worst of Contracts Decisions: An Anthology, 45 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 889, 907 (2018).
9. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:18 (2018).
10. William Noel Keyes, Cause and Consideration in California—A Re-Appraisal, 47 CAL. L. REV. 74 (1959).
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particular code has provided us with a red herring, or because
Maxeiner is right that we denigrate codes as a source of law.
On many occasions I have been frustrated by the Montana
Code as a source of law because I have seen how courts can manipulate it, often cherry-picking inapplicable statutes in order to
reach a desired result. An egregious example is Miller v. Fallon
County. 11 One of the issues in Miller was the enforceability of an
exculpatory clause. This seems to me a difficult issue for a code to
deal with, because enforceability depends on so many variables. A
statute could easily outlaw exculpatory clauses for personal injury,
as is the case in Louisiana, perhaps not coincidentally a civil law
jurisdiction. 12 But that solution seems to go too far, for the common law sensibly says that exculpatory clauses have a place in private ordering where there is a negotiated contract in an area that
lacks public interest.
In an excellent example of common law analysis, Tunkl v.
Board of Regents, 13 the California Supreme Court determined that
an exculpatory clause was not enforceable when entered into by a
patient seeking hospital services. The court then laid down factors—though these work better as elements—for courts to examine
in order to determine application of the rule in various contexts.14
Using these factors, California courts later determined, for example, that an exculpatory clause was not enforceable in a residential
lease but was enforceable in an agreement between a professional
driver and a race track. 15 This seems to me an example of the common law at its best. I am not sure how a code could deal with these
subtleties.
11. Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P. 2d 342 (Mont. 1986).
12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2018).
13. Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963).
14. See Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to
Bring a Negligence Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2014).
15. See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1978);
Nat’l & Int’l Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App.
3d 934 (1989).
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Now the scene switches to Montana. In Haynes v. County of
Missoula, 16 a case where the exculpatory clause was found in the
entry form that an exhibitor signed when entering an exhibit in the
Missoula County Fair, the Supreme Court of Montana first examined the Code provisions on illegality, and correctly found that a
provision is not illegal unless it is contrary to the public interest. In
order to determine the extent of public interest in this case, the Court
looked at the test laid out in Tunkl, and determined that, while the
case was close, there was sufficient public interest in a county fair
that the exculpatory clause was not enforceable. One may disagree
with the outcome, but it is hard to find fault with the analysis as an
example of common law reasoning.
A few years later, in Miller v. Fallon County, 17 the same court
was faced with the issue of the enforceability of an exculpatory
clause that had been signed by the wife of a long-distance truck
driver in order to secure permission from the trucking company to
accompany her husband on his travels. I don’t think there would be
much doubt that application of the Tunkl test would lead to enforceability, so the Court, determined to find for the plaintiff, had to take
a different route. It ignored the Tunkl test used as precedent in
Haynes, and instead looked to the statutes on illegality. It found this
one:
Contracts that violate policy of law—exemption from responsibility—exception. Except as provided in 27-1753, all contracts that have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for the person’s
own fraud, for willful injury to the person or property of another, or for violation of law, whether willful or negligent,
are against the policy of the law. 18
Well, the court reasoned, this statute says that it is illegal to put
in a contract a provision that is contrary to law, so let us ask, what
16. Haynes v. County of Missoula, 517 P.2d 370 (Mont. 1973).
17. Miller, 721 P. 2d 342, supra note 11.
18. MONT. CODE ANN., supra note 4, at § 28-2-702 (derived from Field Civ.
C. § 828).
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is law? It includes tort law, which says we aren’t supposed to commit
torts without facing consequences. So, it must be illegal to put in a
contract that one may commit a tort without consequence. Thus, the
exculpatory clause is illegal—as are all exculpatory clauses. The appreciation for context, for different results in different situations,
which characterized the common law analysis of the issue in Tunkl,
is gone, replaced by the inflexible rule derived from a code. A common law court could have come to the same conclusion, but along the
way to that conclusion it would have had to show us why it was
against the public interest to allow the exculpatory clause in this context.
As another example of the difficulty of codifying a complex rule,
the Montana court does not like the finality of worker’s compensation
settlements when the injuries turn out to have been greater than the
parties thought they were at the time of settlement. Historically, one
of the best tools to attack such a settlement is the doctrine of mutual
mistake. In Kienas v. Peterson, 19 for example, the Court found the
settlement voidable on grounds of mistake but conveniently omitted
discussion of the issue of whether the claimant had assumed the risk
of being mistaken.
In a later case, Wolfe v. Webb, 20 the Court had to face that issue,
since the settlement contained clear language indicating that it would
be binding even though the parties were mistaken about the extent of
the injuries. The Court took a close look at the Code rule on mistake.
Section 28-2-102 tells us that the parties have to consent to the contract, and section 28-2-301 tells us the consent has to be free. 21 Section 28-2-401 tells us that consent is not free when obtained through
mistake. 22
What is mistake? Section 28-2-409 tells us:
What constitutes mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a
19.
20.
21.
22.

Kienas v. Peterson, 624 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1980).
Wolfe v. Webb, 824 P.2d 240 (Mont. 1992).
MONT. CODE ANN., supra note 4, at §§ 28-2-102(2), 28-2-301(1).
Id. at § 28-2-401(e).
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mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part
of the person making the mistake and consisting in:
(1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact,
past or present, material to the contract; or
(2) belief in the present existence of a thing material to the
contract which does not exist or in the past existence of such
a thing which has not existed. 23
Where is the rule that a mistake has to be mutual or the rule that
one can accept the risk of being mistaken? There are no such rules
in Mr. Field’s code! Therefore, when there is mistake, there is no
consent, and when there is no consent, there is no contract. This
analysis seems correct on the face of the Code, which leaves out an
important element of mistake—assumption of the risk of being mistaken—that distinguishes it from the other defenses. And rather than
read that omission into the Code, the court was content to use the
omission when it served its purposes.
If the law is more accessible when found in the form of a code,
these examples certainly don’t demonstrate it. Maxeiner might argue that these problems are traceable to the way this Code is drafted,
though he does not have a negative word to say about the Field
Code. More likely, he would argue that the problem is traceable to
the way it has been employed by users unfamiliar with a code system. To illustrate the advantage of a code system, in the second half
of the book Maxeiner gives us a concrete comparison of two legal
systems, the German and the American.
The book comes alive for a moment at the beginning of this comparative section when, to illustrate his point, he uses the hypothetical
of a person who wishes to know the applicable law in order to drive
a horse trailer across the country. In Germany, there is only one body
of law to look to. In the United States, the laws are found in interstate
commerce law as well as in the laws of various states and counties,
much of it hard to find. Actually, the example may be even more
complex than Maxeiner indicates, for our traveler would no doubt

23. Id. at § 28-2-409 (derived from Field Civ. C. § 762).
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pass through Indian Country, and those jurisdictions have their own
laws that may well differ from the law of the state in which the reservation is located.
This example lets us down, however, because most of the relevant law is regulatory—it is found in statutes rather than in the common law. The example, therefore, does not demonstrate the superiority of statutes to the common law; it demonstrates a weakness of
American federalism. When each jurisdiction is permitted to have
its own law, it can indeed be difficult to plan a multistate transaction.
But isn’t this weakness of federalism also a strength? Why
should the horse law of Montana, where horses are used recreationally and in ranch work, be the same as the horse law of Pennsylvania, where horse-drawn buggies are a common mode of transportation in some communities, or the same as the horse law of Kentucky,
where horses are bred commercially?
Rather than furthering his argument that code law is superior to
common law, Maxeiner’s example instead launches a new argument—that much of U.S. statutory law is not code law at all, for the
statutes lack the integrity found in a true code. The case of the U.S.
Code being merely a dog’s breakfast of assembled and sometimes
contradictory statutes is the prime example. Again, I am convinced,
and anyone would agree that where we do have codes, we should
have workable codes.
Much of this section on codes is given over to a dry survey of
the German code scheme, again with few examples. It appears that
the vaunted German efficiency extends to their codes as well.
Maxeiner tells us “In Germany finding governing laws is easy and
unproblematic. Minutes, not days or hours, are required.” I decided
to test this proposition by seeing if I could find answers in the German code to the problems that puzzled me in my use of the Montana
Code: 1) What is consideration—or more broadly, what is required
for an enforceable contract? 2) Will a contract be avoided for mistake when a party has assumed the risk of being mistaken? 3) When
will an exculpatory clause be enforced?
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I had no trouble finding the German Civil Code (BGB). 24 Here
is what I found during my inquiry:
1. Consideration. In my search for how the German code deals
with consideration, I found that Title 3, Contract, Sections 145 et
seq., jumps right into offer and acceptance but omits discussion of
any other element of formation. I then did a word search for consideration and found that there are provisions that talk about consideration in a context very much like the U.S. conception of it. For example, Section 316 seems similar to U.S. law that provides for what
to do when no price is stated in the contract. 25 It provides:
“Specification of consideration. If the extent of the consideration
promised for an act of performance is not specified, then in case of
doubt the party that is owed the consideration is entitled to make the
specification.” 26
This provision assumes consideration, yet I see no earlier provision that goes to the heart of the question—which promises is our
society going to enforce, and if it is going to enforce those that are
supported by consideration, then what is consideration?
2. Mistake. It was easy to find the provision addressing mistake.
Section 119 provides:
Voidability for mistake. (1) A person who, when making a
declaration of intent, was mistaken about its content or had
no intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this
content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed that
he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of
the factual position and with a sensible understanding of the
case. 27
Without more, I am not sure this section answers my question.
Is a person “mistaken about its contents” when he enters a contract
to settle a claim for injuries for $10,000 when his injuries in fact

24. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], translation at https://
perma.cc/W4AJ-Y3MC (Ger.).
25. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305.
26. BGB § 316 (Ger.).
27. Id. at § 119.
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amount to $100,000, but he does not know that at the time? And can he
agree to accept the risk of being mistaken? If this section is merely a
starting point for analysis, then it would seem we are in the same position
we would be in if researching the question under a common law regime.
3. Exculpatory clause. It was also easy to find Section 309 on prohibited clauses:
Prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation.
Even to the extent that a deviation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the following are ineffective in standard
business terms:
7. (Exclusion of liability for injury to life, body or health and
in case of gross fault)
a) (Injury to life, body or health) [A]ny exclusion or limitation of liability for damage from injury to life, body or health
due to negligent breach of duty by the user or intentional or
negligent breach of duty by a legal representative or a person
used to perform an obligation of the user;
b) (Gross fault) any exclusion or limitation of liability for
other damage arising from a grossly negligent breach of duty
by the user or from an intentional or grossly negligent breach
of duty by a legal representative of the user or a person used
to perform an obligation of the user . . . . 28
This provision seems to answer our questions about the enforceability of an exculpatory clause. Section 305 defines “standard business terms” similarly to how U.S. law defines a contract of adhesion,
so this provision, like the common law cases discussed earlier, distinguishes between an exculpatory clause in a contract of adhesion
and in a negotiated contract. It prohibits the clause only in the former, leaving the implication that it would be enforceable in the latter. Similar to the U.S. cases, it appears to prohibit clauses that exculpate from gross negligence or intentional torts. In the area of simple negligence, it seems to prohibit all exculpatory clauses, without
consideration of whether the activity is in the public interest. One
can argue that that is an overly inclusive prohibition, but one cannot
argue that it is not clear.
28. Id. at § 309.
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It is quite possible that my search for answers in the German code
scheme reflects my own inadequacies rather than those of the code. However, my limited goal was to test Maxeiner’s proposition that I could find
the answers in minutes. My search results indicate that the German code
may not be as simple to access as Maxeiner would have us believe.29
In conclusion, Maxeiner has convinced me that in the United States,
we have long lived in an age of statutes. He has also convinced me that
these statutes are not as well written or organized as some of the codes
he admires, especially those of Germany. But he has not convincingly
made the argument that I expected him to make—that codes are preferable to common law.
Coincidentally, I recently read another book that draws comparisons
between U.S. law and German law—James Q. Whitman’s Hitler’s
American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law
(2017) I was particularly struck by a short passage in Whitman’s conclusion. I knew that Franklin D. Roosevelt felt stymied because he believed
the national emergency of the depression demanded rapid change in the
law that the Supreme Court would not permit. What I did not know was
that Nazi jurists felt the same way about the national emergency in Germany. If only we were not restricted by our codes, they thought. If only
we had a common law system like that in the U.S. where the judges could
make the law needed to meet the emergency.30 That insight caused me
more apprehension about the common law than anything in Maxeiner’s
entire book.

Scott J. Burnham
Gonzaga University School of Law
29. I am grateful for the assistance of Dlovan Schlato, a student at Gonzaga
University School of Law and a graduate of Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn. Ms. Schlato advises me that one would never rely solely on the
Code but would also consult the Commentary (Kommentar)—advice that
Maxeiner did not provide.
30. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 153–58 (Princeton U. Press 2017).
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Review by Markus G. Puder
James Maxeiner’s book makes a welcome contribution to the
conversation about comparative law in the United States. It truly is
a great read—not only because of its provocative contents but also
because of its personal tone.
The thread of the book is clear from the outset. Functional societies are predicated on a government of laws. America’s legal system is broken. Germany has a working legal system. Maxeiner organizes his storyline into a historical part, which establishes the
American baseline, and a comparative part, which juxtaposes the
American and the German experiences, including a creative case
study. From the vast array of topics raised by Maxeiner, instructors
could easily tier a complement of stand-alone modules for purposes
of creating a full course in comparative law. Those interested might
find the architecture of the book coupled with the wealth of references immensely helpful for such an endeavor.
Maxeiner’s book, rich in themes deserving of dialogue, does not
shrink from vigorous debate. You do not have to agree with the author in every instance. Ultimately, it is all about leaving the echo
chamber that appears to increasingly parochialize our comparative
law. For example, I was recently privy to a conversation between
two practitioners about a legal transplant. When it came to the question of what the model actually said in the language of the donor
system, one of the interlocutors asserted that “there are translations.”
But what if the translation is inaccurate? What might the client of
that attorney say or do in such a case? As I have experienced in the
context of my own bilingual (English-German) edition of the Louisiana Civil Code, 1 the comparative legal academy has become much
narrower than it used to be when it comes to law and language. In a

1. MARKUS G. PUDER, DAS ZIVILGESETZBUCH VON LOUISIANA:
ZWEISPRACHIGE ERSTAUSGABE MIT EINER EINLEITUNG (Nomos 2017).
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similar vein, too many comparative law journals in the United States
consider the dyad of legal translation and comparative law, or comparative law and legal translation, a topic too specific for their readership. In an increasingly smaller world, this posture seems peculiar
at best. 2 During the plurilingual and plurijural days of Louisiana, our
most illustrious jurists were masters of the art of bridging law and
language.
Similarly, whether the common law system or the civil law system is “superior” is not the point—reasonable people may reasonably differ in their views. But the conversation about both systems
must be had and it must continue. Comparative law is a living and
breathing creature. In mixed jurisdictions we know this all too well.
Take, for example, the Louisiana trust. 3 To this day, the literature
and the jurisprudence offer different models of explication when it
comes to reconciling the common law notions of formal and beneficial title with Louisiana’s unitary conception of ownership. Moreover, Louisiana needed to mollify its rule of immediate vesting and
remove the trust from the prohibition of substitutions. Arguably,
Louisiana has managed to split the atom by offering a body of trust
law that is fully functional within the American Union.
Another important theme raised by Maxeiner involves codified
law and codifications. Again, there is much room for fruitful dialogue. Significantly, a code is not a code in the United States. From
a Louisiana perspective, our code is “harder” than the codes more
fully discussed by Maxeiner. The Louisiana Civil Code embodies
the solemn expression of the legislature. While jurisprudence continues to fill and push the limits of the principles féconds en
conséquences, courts are bound by the legislated law of the code.
Especially in the wake of our civilian Renaissance, which took hold
in the 1960s, Louisiana state courts and federal Erie courts have
2. Markus G. Puder, Law and Language in Action—Transformative Experiences Associated with Translating the Louisiana Civil Code into German, 84
RABELSZ (forthcoming 2020).
3. Markus G. Puder & Anton D. Rudokvas, How Trust-Like Is Russia’s Fiduciary Management? Answers from Louisiana, 79 LA. L. REV. 1071 (2019).
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stayed the course. Understandably though, courts are rightfully irked
when the legislature in turn resorts to “fixing” specific judicial decisions deemed not true to a particular redactor’s preferred reading
of the law. In Louisiana, this occurred, for example, in the context
of a controversy over Louisiana’s law of fixtures (“attachments”). 4
In contrast to the Louisiana Civil Code, California’s Civil Code,
meanwhile quite aged, offers a snapshot of the ambient common law
of the time. Significantly, the code embraces the common law process and method of moving the law forward. Both features have encouraged the judiciary to be more assertive when it comes to abrogating and replacing codal law. For example, California’s Supreme
Court took it upon itself to replace by judicial fiat contributory with
comparative negligence even in the face of the properly construed
codal text.
Codes also differ in their style, transparency and readability.
Germany’s Civil Code is basically written for professional lawyers.
It is replete with legalisms. Laypersons therefore face the basic challenge of understanding its legal terminology and drafting technique.
In contrast, with its down-to-earth tone and accessible vocabulary,
the Swiss Civil Code is probably the most user-friendly codification
in the German law and language sphere. In Louisiana, the difference
among the redactors taking ownership of portions of the document,
as it continues to be revised in waves, has resulted in numerous stylistic and substantive fissures. Redactors have frequently brought
their indigenous and disparate cultures of origin to bear. This makes
the Louisiana Civil Code not only a challenging but also a voluminous document, even if core areas of private law, such as the Trust
Code and the Children’s Code, are housed elsewhere.
Finally, Maxeiner makes no bones about his preference for Germany’s approach to a government of laws. Might this reflect his experience of learning from one of the revered teachers and scholars

4. MARKUS G. PUDER, JOHN A. LOVETT & EVELYN L. WILSON, LOUISIANA
PROPERTY LAW (forthcoming 2020).
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at the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich—the late Professor Wolfgang Fikentscher? In the context of the functionality of
Germany’s system, one more observation comes to mind. The arrival of the European Union, with its regulatory rage (Regelungswut)
and governance paradigm of commandeering progressively expanding areas of competence, has dramatically altered trajectories towards a government of laws in Europe, including Germany. The debates about curvature of the cucumber (Krümmung der Gurke) has
become the emblematic image for this proposition. Time for a sequel, Prof. Maxeiner? Sis felix!
Markus G. Puder
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law

A SHORT HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE LAST TWO AND A HALF
MILLENNIA, by Tamar Herzog, Harvard, 2018, ISBN 978-0-67423786-5, 296 pp, $19/£16.
The book A Short History of European Law: The Last Two and
a Half Millennia (A Short History) by Tamar Herzog is an important
work on the foundations of Western legal culture, being of interest
for readers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean and beyond. It offers
a comprehensive—while also brief—approach to the legal history
of Europe from Roman times to the emergence and establishment of
the European Union. That challenging approach is masterfully
achieved by the author, since she highlights seminal events or landmarks that signpost the path followed: from Roman law, to ius commune, to the codification and later harmonization of the law. Needed
references to the common law are also included in a timely manner
by the author. The approach to the topics as followed by Herzog
also includes valuable references to events in the U.S. and other
American jurisdictions, hence showing how the shaping of law in
Europe also benefited from events across the Atlantic, and vice
versa. A Short History indeed offers a journey of discovery across
time and space.
Comparative legal history is currently in vogue in Europe.1
The discipline gained momentum when reconsidering teaching
guidelines, and finds a precedent in, amongst others, the celebrated work of Paul Koschaker. 2 Furthermore, comparative legal
history gained a place within the curriculum of European law
schools, longing for the study of legal history with a compara-

1. See generally AGUSTÍN PARISE, OWNERSHIP PARADIGMS IN AMERICAN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SHIFTS IN THE LEGISLATION
OF LOUISIANA, CHILE, AND ARGENTINA (16TH-20TH CENTURIES) 25–55 (Brill
2017).
2. PAUL KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS RÖMISCHE RECHT (Biederstein
1947). An appraisal of that early work was included in Thomas Duve, European
Legal History—Concepts, Methods, Challenges, in ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL
HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL HISTORY 29, 38–39 (Thomas Duve ed., 2014).
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tive approach. Accordingly, a comparative approach to legal history in Europe is reflected in the classrooms, 3 in the literature, 4
and in academic circles. 5 There is a call for a similar approach
in the Americas, and Herzog offers an exemplary reaction to that
call in A Short History. In her work, it should be noted, Herzog
invites a readership beyond Europe to explore the path towards
the discovery of common roots. 6
The methodology of A Short History should be commended.
Each chapter introduces clearly the purpose pursued by the author,
and all chapters fall under an overarching theme. Chapters succeed
in referring in an adequate and balanced manner to names of actors,
titles of products, and the most important shifts in paradigms. Chapters include a few explanatory notes when needed, while the use of
internal cross-references is likewise commendable. Finally, chapters
are enriched by a selection of recommended readings to further expand the universe of knowledge.
The introduction, entitled The Making of Law in Europe, presents an overview of the entire journey that lies ahead. From the
start, the author alerts readers to the fact that “everything [has] to do
3. Van Rhee and van der Meer explain the teaching of legal history within
the European Law School bachelor program at Maastricht University, where the
study of legal history evolves beyond the borders of the Netherlands. See C.H.
van Rhee & J.A.J.M. van der Meer, Teaching European Legal History at Maastricht University in the Netherlands, in HOW TO TEACH EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE
LEGAL HISTORY 143 (Kjell Å. Modéer & Per Nilsén eds., Lund 2011) [hereinafter
HOW TO TEACH EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY].
4. The literature has indeed developed during the past decades. See, e.g.,
O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: SOURCES AND INSTITUTIONS
(3d ed., Butterworths 2000); RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: A
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Jan Arriens trans., Cambridge U. Press
2009); JØRN ØYREHAGEN SUNDE & KNUT EINAR SKODVIN, RENDEZVOUS OF EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES (Fagbokforlaget 2010); UWE WESEL, GESCHICHTE DES
RECHTS: VON DEN FRUH
̈ FORMEN BIS ZUR GEGENWART (4th ed., Beck 2014); BART
WAUTERS & MARCO DE BENITO, THE HISTORY OF LAW IN EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION (Edward Elgar 2017).
5. Kjell Å. Modéer & Per Nilsén, Introduction, in HOW TO TEACH EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 3, at 9.
6. The invitation was extended by means of a translation to the Spanishspeaking world. See TAMAR HERZOG, UNA BREVE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO EUROPEO: LOS ÚLTIMOS 2500 AÑOS (Miguel Ángel Coll Rodríguez trans., Alianza
Editorial 2019).
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with context (or, rather, contexts) which radically altered over time.”7
The pursuit for unveiling the context(s) requires the description of
seminal developments only, featuring different jurisdictions at different times, whenever protagonists need to take the stage in order to
help illustrate a line of argumentation. A Short History therefore joins
the efforts that are being undertaken by several scholars and research
institutes to reconstruct events that help attain legal and cultural repositories for future studies by developing valuable contexts.8 Readers can clearly perceive in the introduction that the work of Herzog
invites them to explore the different contexts in which law evolved
across time and space.
The first part, entitled Ancient Times, introduces the two main
building blocks of the ius commune, in two chapters. On the one hand,
Roman law, where the author includes necessary references to the
role of main actors (i.a., praetors, jurists) and developments (i.a.,
adoption of different procedures, enactment of the Corpus iuris civilis) that resulted in the erection of that fundamental and influential
legal system. On the other hand, Christianity, where Herzog provides
valuable insights into its origins and early expansion. Further, attention is devoted to the interplay of Christianity with the other building
block of the ius commune, namely Roman law. That gradual interplay
would ultimately result in a “new Christianized understanding of Roman law, which initially was limited to the territories of the [Roman]
empire, [and later] won primacy throughout much of European territory.”9 These two chapters adopt a pedagogical approach—which due
to necessary simplifications—will be welcomed by readers.
The second part, entitled The Early Middle Ages, continues the
journey after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. Again, in two
chapters, Herzog describes the context in which law developed. The
7. TAMAR HERZOG, A SHORT HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE LAST TWO
AND A HALF MILLENNIA 5 (Harvard U. Press 2018).

8. See, e.g., Agustín Parise, Comparative European Experiences in Legal
History and Constitutional Law (19th–20th Centuries), 18 HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 411 (2017).
9. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 42.
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account first points out that the apparent vacuum left by Roman law
offered grounds for the early development of canon law, since the
latter very often recurred to the former. Yet, as the author clearly
depicts, Germanic elements soon percolated into the European fabric. The account then points to developments around the year 1000,
when different types of feudal relations took the stage, within a context shaped by a power struggle between secular and ecclesiastical
leaders. The resulting path, as stressed by Herzog, paved the way for
the consolidation of canon law.
The third part, entitled The Later Middle Ages, is marked by
the study of rediscovered Roman texts, first, in Northern Italy.
Canon law and feudal law would also experience developments
in that period, as is noted by the author. Ultimately, as explained
in A Short History, “the combination of new sources, methodology, and environment created a novel system of law.”10 That new
approach to law would soon spread across Europe. The third part
also looks at the emergence of the common law in England.
Again, the author provides valuable contextual information, to
help explain the origins of a system that would eventually (and
several centuries later) expand across the globe. Necessary references to writs and remedies, and to other procedural aspects, accompany the account that Herzog offers in her quest to depict effectively the context in which the common law was shaped. A
final reflection invites readers to explore the extent to which the
English experience can be considered exceptional. The answer
arrives soon, when Herzog states that “ius commune and common
law were perhaps not twins, but they were certainly siblings.”11
The fourth part, entitled The Early Modern Period, deals with
paradigmatic changes, in three chapters. A first paradigmatic change
relates to events that erode the ius commune. Herzog points to
the emergence of a mos gallicus, to the Protestant Reformation,
10. Id. at 81.
11. Id. at 115.
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and to the new role of local customs. It is possible to note that
the context indeed changes for the law in Continental Europe.
A second paradigmatic change affects the common law during
the Modern Period. A “particularly virulent period of religious,
political, social, and economic strife”12 is experienced in England, and eventually has an impact on the legal system. A number of reactions and counteractions were triggered, including
efforts to: isolate the common law from the monarch; make the
common law the law of the land, hence giving it a higher status
or influence vis-à-vis, amongst others, canon law, feudal law,
and equity; and confirm a solemn pact of loyalty to the monarch. Again, a final reflection invites readers to explore the extent to which the English experience can be considered exceptional. The answer this time is different, since the “myth of
English exceptionalism held strong”13 during this period. A
third paradigmatic change takes place within the context offered by the re-emergence of natural law. New territories were
explored, following the early efforts ignited in the Iberian Peninsula, and the need to deal with otherness triggered new ideas
and scholarly approaches. Herzog addresses the Spanish Scholasticism, also called Neo-Scholasticism, 14 being important in
defending the right to conquest and just war.15 Spanish Scholasticism was a unique production of minds, something not seen
before in legal history. Careful attention is devoted to the ideas
of Francisco de Vitoria in this part of A Short History, while Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius also attain a place of preeminence,
when referring to developments in England and the Netherlands.

12. Id. at 131.
13. Id. at 151.
14. On the Spanish Scholasticism, see the brief account in Agustín Parise,
The Valladolid Controversy Revisited: Looking Back at the Sixteenth-Century Debate on Native Americans While Facing the Current Status of Human Embryos, 1
J. CIV. L. STUD. 107, 120-124 (2008).
15. ANTONIO DOUGNAC RODRÍGUEZ, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
INDIANO 34-53 (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico 1994).
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The focus is no longer exclusively on Europe, and transatlantic
bridges start to be built.
The fifth part, entitled Modernity, offers an overview of two
seminal revolutionary periods that shaped Western legal culture.
On the one hand, the revolutionary endeavors of the Thirteen Colonies show how vernacular efforts were gestated in a context nurtured by European antecedents and Enlightened movements. Those
vernacular efforts that resulted in the 1776 Declaration also had an
impact in other parts of the globe, since a few decades later many
new jurisdictions would emulate the North American revolutionary
message and attain their own independence or adopt new constitutional texts. On the other hand, the events marked by the storming
of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, show how revolutionary ideas had
an impact on law and society. According to Herzog, this second
revolutionary period “featured a radical transformation, perhaps
the most radical transformation that European law has ever experienced.”16 These events indeed resulted in a new understanding of
the law and required likewise changes in the existing social and
political structures. Above all, the seminal revolutions addressed
in this part were marked by innovation and by a rupture with preterit understandings.
The sixth part, entitled The Nineteenth Century, offers a place
of preeminence to the codification endeavors that spread, starting
at that time, across Europe and beyond. The account first focuses
on the two seminal models provided by the French and German
experiences. Valuable contexts are provided, such as the one offered by the interaction of Romanists and Germanists in the path
towards the adoption of the BGB. The account then turns to the
fate of codification in the common law world. The English experience is followed by that of the United States, with a special focus
on Louisiana and New York. In the Southern state, there was oscillation between the adoption of continental European and common
16. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 183.
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law ideas, 17 and the author correctly points out that “developments suggest that there was more to the Louisiana story than
what met the eye.” 18
The epilogue, entitled A Market, a Community, and a Union,
guides readers through events that followed WWII and that help
explain the current status of the European Union. References are
made to treaties and rulings, along with elaborations on the political context that accompanied those developments. Here,
more references to the Cold War and the Eastern Bloc would
have enriched the necessary context and would have helped to
further understand the challenges currently faced by the harmonization of law in Europe. The book ends by placing the European story within a globalized world, a context in which a new
paradigm “would [need to] recognize the power of groups and
group solidarity as well as the persistence of inequalities and
differences by unmaking the metaphors proposed by the French
Revolution.” 19
A Short History will be of value for the teaching of legal
history both in Europe and beyond. Herzog is not writing exclusively for a U.S. audience, even when the first pages of the book
may seem to indicate differently. Further, the work of Herzog
may also be approached from other social sciences (mainly history) and from cultural studies at large. Subsequent editions of
the book may consider the inclusion of maps and images, since
for readers beyond Europe some locations and actors may be too
remote or distant. Above all, A Short History offers a pleasant
read, with sufficient level of depth and detail, while also
smoothly guiding the readers across time and space, always ensuring that steps are short, firm, and easy to follow. Readers will
benefit from the publication of this study by Herzog, one that
17. See generally Agustín Parise, Codification of the Law in Louisiana: Early
Nineteenth-Century Oscillation Between Continental European and Common
Law Systems, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 133 (2012).
18. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 225.
19. Id. at 243.
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offers an important contribution to the recent literature 20 on
comparative legal history.
Agustín Parise
Faculty of Law, Maastricht University

20. See, e.g., the very recent COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY (Olivier Moréteau, Aniceto Masferrer & Kjell Å. Modéer eds., Edward Elgar 2019) (including
contributions from authors from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean).

